Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union \u2013 foreign relations and the domestic situation by Sadowski, Rafal & Paczynski, Wojciech
C E S  R E P O R T
RAPORT OSW
Adam Balcer 
Rafa∏ Sadowski, Wojciech Paczyƒski
Turkey after the start of negotiations 
with the European Union – foreign relations 
and the domestic situation
Part I
W a r s a w J u n e 2 0 0 7
Raport OSW / CES Report
C e n t r e  f o r  E a s t e r n  S t u d i e s
OÂRODEK STUDIÓW WSCHODNICH IM. MARKA KARPIA
© Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies
Editor
Anna ¸abuszewska
Katarzyna Kazimierska
Graphic design
Dorota Nowacka
Project co-ordinator
Adam Balcer
Translation
Ilona Duchnowicz
Co-operation
Jim Todd
Publisher
OÊrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia /
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland
tel. / phone +48 /22/ 525 80 00
fax + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
The Centre’s analytical materials can be found 
on the Internet at www.osw.waw.pl
More information about the Centre for Eastern
Studies is available at the same web address
Spis treÊci / Contents
TURKEY AFTER THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION – FOREIGN RELATIONS 
AND THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. PART I
Introduction / 5
Theses / 6
The hurdle race. The greatest political and social 
barriers in Turkey’s path to the European Union / 7
Adam Balcer
The cold alliance. Turkish-US political relations 
after 2003 / 52
Rafa∏ Sadowski
Chasing Europe: the Turkish economy at the onset 
of negotiations with the European Union / 71
Wojciech Paczyƒski
Turkey after the start 
of negotiations with 
the European Union – 
foreign relations and 
the domestic situation.
Part I
Introduction
The start of accession negotiations between An-
kara and the EU is vital for the future of both
Turkey and the Union, including Poland as its
member state, as well as for the geopolitical si-
tuation in Eurasia (the Black Sea region, Cauca-
sus, Central Asia and the Middle East). Appre-
ciating the significance of these issues, the
Centre for Eastern Studies in early 2005 decided
to launch a project entitled ‘Turkey after the
start of negotiations with the European Union
– foreign relations and the domestic situation’.
The goal of this project is to present, within the
context of accession negotiations, Turkey’s
greatest internal challenges as well as Ankara’s
relations with its neighbour regions, the EU and
the USA. This Report is the first of three which
will be published as part of the project. The Re-
port includes texts on Turkish-US relations since
2003, major political and social challenges on
Turkey’s path towards the EU and the current
condition of the Turkish economy. The Report
was developed between July 2005 and Novem-
ber 2006, over which time CES workers and asso-
ciates searched for publicly available materials
in Poland, Turkey and EU countries, and went on
three research trips to Turkey, where they met
local researchers, analysts, politicians and offi-
cials. The authors of the Report would like to
express their gratitude to everyone who have
shared their opinions with them, and to the Po-
lish Embassy in Ankara, especially to Ambassa-
dor Grzegorz Michalski and Minister Andrzej
Ananicz for their expert support and assistance
in the authors’ work on this Report. This Report
does not present the official stance of the Polish
government on the issues discussed therein;
instead it reflects the personal views of its au-
thors, who have made their best efforts to en-
sure that their work is reliable.
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Theses
1. Turkey is an important element of the foreign
policies of the EU and the USA because of its de-
mographic, military and economic potential, as
well as its strategic location in the basins of the
Mediterranean and the Black Seas, on the fron-
tiers with the Middle East, the Caucasus and the
Balkans, and because of its NATO membership
and the opening of EU accession negotiations.
After Russia, Turkey is the EU’s second most sig-
nificant neighbour.
2. Relations with the EU and the USA are essen-
tial elements of Turkey’s foreign policy, consi-
dering their intense and asymmetric economic,
political and military ties, and the fact that tigh-
tening bonds with the West is deemed to be the
most important strategic goal of Turkish foreign
policy. Relations with the EU and the USA have
also greatly affected the internal situation in
Turkey, considering the requirement of democ-
ratisation which is connected with the criteria
of EU membership, together with the US’ very
active engagement in the Middle East (especial-
ly regarding the Kurdish issue).
3. The prospect of EU membership has been the
key booster of democratic reform in Turkey. Ne-
vertheless, in the case of Turkey – in contrast to
other EU candidates – this prospect cannot serve
as a lasting stabiliser for the domestic situation
because Turkey has more serious internal pro-
blems and greater tension in relations with the
EU and the Union’s individual member states
than the previous candidates had. In effect, it is
highly probable that negotiations between An-
kara and Brussels will be significantly extended,
and possibly even periodically withheld. A sce-
nario in which negotiations are deadlocked for
good cannot be excluded either.
4. Since 2001, Turkey has managed to carry out
changes which significantly strengthen its eco-
nomy. The prospect of integration with the Euro-
pean Union has given extremely strong encou-
ragement to improving the economic policy and
reforms in other sectors. Doubts about the path
of accession negotiations, which are already ap-
pearing now, may yet damage these strong me-
chanisms which have so far mobilised the pub-
lic and the political class to reform their country.
5. Turkish-US relations have cooled since 2003,
principally due to the US intervention in Iraq,
which resulted in an alliance between the USA
and the Iraqi Kurdish population. This has in
turn has made it more difficult for Turkey to
combat Kurdish separatism, and has posed a risk
of Iraq disintegrating as one effect of a possible
large-scale civil war and the subsequent emer-
gence of an independent Kurdistan. Although re-
lations between Ankara and Washington have
to a certain extent gradually improved, a defi-
nite thaw can hardly be expected for some con-
siderable time. The shape of US-Turkish relations
depends on the situation developing in the Mid-
dle East, while stabilisation of the region is high-
ly unlikely in the nearest future.
6. A scenario of Turkey’s relations of with the
EU and the USA cooling at the same time seems
possible for the first time in Turkey’s modern
history. If this does in fact come about, Ankara
will be brought closer to Russia and other Mus-
lim states, and cause a regression of the demo-
cratisation process. However, considering the
scale of relationships between Turkey and the
West, Ankara seems unlikely to adopt a radical-
ly anti-Western line in its foreign policy.
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The hurdle race. 
The greatest political
and social barriers 
in Turkey’s path to the
European Union
Adam Balcer
Theses
1. Although accession negotiations started in Oc-
tober 2005, it is still uncertain whether Turkey
will be accepted as a member of the European
Union. In its relations with EU member states,
Turkey has more serious internal and external
problems than previous candidates to EU mem-
bership had.
2. The greatest challenges on Turkey’s path to the
EU include:
– the unenthusiastic attitude of most EU residents
towards Turkey’s potential membership;
– the ambivalent attitude of Turkish society to-
wards the EU and the West;
– cultural differences;
– the Kurdish issue;
– problems with respecting human rights;
– the role of the army in the Turkish political sys-
tem;
– tensions between the secular establishment and
the governing party, which has an Islamic base;
– the need to regulate Ankara’s relations with Cy-
prus and, to a lesser extent, with Greece;
– references made by some EU member states to
the deportations and massacres of the Armenians
committed during World War I by the Young
Turks’ regime as genocide, and the related issue
of improving relations with Armenia; and
– rising nationalism in Turkey, provoked by the Cy-
priot, Kurdish and Armenian issues, which trans-
lates into Euroscepticism.
3. Those problems are very likely to cause signifi-
cant extension of the negotiation period between
Turkey and the EU, and even a temporary suspen-
sion. The possibility of breaking off talks comple-
tely cannot be ruled out either.
Box 1. The historical background 
of relations between Turkey and
Europe
Turkey is a unique candidate for EU member-
ship. The vast majority of its population is Mu-
slim (nearly 97%), while the societies of all EU
member states and other candidate states are
predominantly or mostly Christian, or identify
themselves with Christianity in terms of cul-
7
T
h
e
 h
u
rd
le
 r
a
c
e
. 
T
h
e
 g
re
a
te
s
t 
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
b
a
rr
ie
rs
 i
n
 T
u
rk
e
y
’s
 p
a
th
 t
o
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
C E S  R e p o r t
ture. Since the seventh century, the Mediter-
ranean Sea area has been the scene of confron-
tation and coexistence at the same time, which
contributed to cultural diffusion between Chris-
tians and Muslims. Experiences linked to con-
flicts and feelings of mutual incompatibility
played a greater part than those of coexistence
in developing the image of Muslims among
Christians, and vice versa. In effect, Turkey’s re-
ligious distinctness, combined with the nume-
rous wars fought in the past between Ottoman
Turks and Christians, gave rise to feelings of
mutual strangeness, anxieties and negative ste-
reotypes between Turkish and European socie-
ties. As a consequence, the cultural diffusion
from the best-developed Western European
countries into Turkey happened later than had
been in the case of other European regions in-
habited by Christians. At the beginning of the
modern era, Muslim communities in the Medi-
terranean region and in Europe proper (with
the exception of Russia) were predominantly
poorer, more conservative, patriarchal and au-
thoritarian than Christian ones, mainly for non-
religious reasons. For this reason, in the mod-
ern period some elements of Western culture
(such as the emancipation of women, the sepa-
ration of religion from the state and liberal is-
sues) were extremely difficult to adapt to Mu-
slim countries, including Turkey. On the other
hand, geography and history deemed that the
West would influence Turkey much more strong-
ly than other Muslim countries in the Mediter-
ranean area. Ottoman rule in the Balkans and
Anatolia, which had lasted for several centu-
ries, contributed to the development of nume-
rous common cultural elements shared by both
Christian and Muslim residents of the regions.
The Republic of Turkey emerged in 1923 out of
the Ottoman Empire, which as a result of its
conquests of a significant part of Europe (the
Balkans and Central Europe) and areas of Asia
which had had special historical ties with Eu-
rope (Anatolia) had become a part of the Euro-
pean system of international and economic re-
lations, fighting numerous wars, making allian-
ces and signing trade treaties1. (The Ottoman
expansion had a religious aspect (jihad) and the
state had been founded on the Islamic tradi-
tions. However, the Ottoman state had also in-
herited the tradtions of the Byzantine state.)
From the end of the seventeenth century, as a re-
sult of military defeats, the Ottoman Empire lost
vast territories to the Western powers & Rus-
sia, as well as to Ottoman Christian nationali-
ties, supported by the former. Its sovereignty
was significantly limited. Numerous massacres
and ethnic cleansings committed by Christians
against Muslims and vice versa during the con-
flicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Anato-
lia gave rise to mutual prejudices, which are
still alive in various forms today.
Under the treaty of S¯vres (1920), the Empire
became a protectorate of the Western powers,
cut down to the size of a part of Anatolia. The
struggle against the treaty’s provisions and the
memory of the loss of vast territories and com-
plete sovereignty as a consequence of the sepa-
ratism and expansion of European powers in
pre-republican times became the founding
grounds for the Republic of Turkey and the
main reference points for the modern Turkish
national identity. This phenomenon is referred
to as the S¯vres syndrome.
The loss of vast territories and complete sove-
reignty contributed to the Empire’s decision
to reform, using the legacy of Western civilisa-
tion. Turkey’s desire to join the EU is perceived
in Turkey as a continuation of the nearly 300-
year-old tradition of pro-Western transforma-
tion. The establishment of a secular national
state, the Republic of Turkey, by Kemal Atatürk
in 1923 was a breakthrough. Atatürk’s inten-
tion was to build a homogenously national, de-
cidedly secular and modern society based on
equal rights for men and women and close ties
with Europe. The implementation of that radi-
cal and very ambitious programme had to be
carried out against the will of most of the coun-
try’s population. In effect, the Republic of Tur-
key carried on some pf the authoritarian ele-
ments of the political model which had existed
in Ottoman times. The greatest consequence
of the changes initiated by Atatürk is that Tur-
key is different from the other Muslim states
in the Mediterranean region. This has been ma-
nifested by Turkey’s membership in all the
Western world’s organisations (with the excep-
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tion of the EU), its status as a candidate for EU
membership, its functioning as a democracy
(although not free from imperfections) since
the 1940s, the positive perception of the sepa-
ration of religion and state by Turkish society,
the smaller percentage than usual of religious-
ly active people, the greater role of national
identity as the basis of social identity, the bet-
ter social and legal position of women and the
smaller technological gap between it and West-
ern Europe. On the other hand, Turkey is still
much poorer and less democratic than West-
ern states are. Turkish society is also more pa-
triarchal and conservative (especially the fun-
damentalist minority) and much more poorly
educated and less urbanised than societies in
Western Europe.
Box 2. A brief outline of relations
between Turkey and the European
Union
Turkey started making efforts to sign an asso-
ciation agreement with the European Econo-
mic Community (EEC) in 1959, two years after
the organisation had come into existence. The
association treaty was signed on 12 September
19632. On 14 April 1987, Turkey officially sub-
mitted its candidacy for EEC membership and
adopted laws that expanded the scope of de-
mocracy in the country. The European Com-
mission rejected Turkey’s application in Decem-
ber 1989. However, the Commission deemed
Turkey as a potential candidate, i.e. a European
country3. The Commission’s major reservations
included the issue of the Turkish army’s occu-
pation of Northern Cyprus, territorial disputes
between Turkey and Greece (the latter being an
EEC member), large-scale violations of human
rights (tortures, assassinations and violations
of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities),
the insufficiently democratic nature of the Tur-
kish political system (especially the unusually
prominent position of the army) and the prob-
lems of the Turkish economy. A Turkish-EU cus-
toms union came into force on 1 January 19964.
At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997,
EU member states granted the status of a can-
didate to all those countries which had declar-
ed a will to join the European Union, with the
exception of Turkey. The main reason was the
same as in 1989. After that summit, Turkish-EU
relations plunged into the worst crisis in their
history; diplomatic relations were even sus-
pended for some time. A breakthrough in rela-
tions between Ankara and the EU happened in
December 1999, when Turkey received candi-
date status at the Helsinki summit. However,
this did not happen because the human rights
situation in Turkey had significantly improved.
What really decided the matter was the diffe-
rent distribution of political forces inside the
EU than that which had existed in 1997. Ger-
many, the most powerful EU member state,
since 1998 had been governed by the Social De-
mocrats, who were favourably disposed to-
wards granting the status of candidate to Tur-
key. Additionally, relations between Turkey and
Greece improved in 1999. Had the Union reject-
ed Turkey’s candidacy, the integration process
would have been inhibited for a long time. New,
more realistic hopes for EU membership had
contributed to initiating unprecedentedly deep
democratic reforms in Turkey, which started in
late 2001. The EU determined at the Copenha-
gen summit on 12–13 December 2002 that Tur-
key was not ready to start negotiations. How-
ever, it decided to reconsider the issue by the
end of 2004. Between 2002 and 2004, Turkey
implemented eight legislation packages, which
significantly broadened the scope of democracy
and brought the Turkish legislative system clos-
er to EU standards5.
On 17 December 2004, the European Council
positively evaluated the reforms, and set a start
date for negotiations of 3 October 2005. Nego-
tiations could start on condition that Turkey
signed a protocol to extend the customs union
to the 10 new EU member states – including
Cyprus – which had not been recognised by An-
kara, and that it adopted a new criminal code
complying with EU standards. In its conclu-
sions, the Council presented its framework for
negotiations with Turkey. Unlike previous Nego-
tiating Frameworks, this one included a provi-
sion which enabled permanent exclusions (de-
rogations) by member states6. The exclusions,
according to the Council, should be revised for
9
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impact on the operation of the EU internal
market. The Framework stated that the shared
objective of the negotiations was Turkey’s ac-
cession. However, it was explicitly laid down
for the first time in EU history that the nego-
tiations were open-ended by nature, and that
the outcome was not a foregone conclusion7.
Pursuant to the Framework, in case of a serious
breach of human rights by Turkey, the negotia-
tions would be suspended if a motion to that
effect forwarded by either the Commission or
one-third of the member states is supported by
a majority of EU member states8. In practice,
a veto by one country may cause a negotiating
deadlock, since closing and opening each ne-
gotiating chapter requires approval by all the
EU member states. On 29 June 2005, the Turk-
ish parliament adopted a new criminal code.
On 29 July 2005, the Turkish government sign-
ed a protocol to extend the customs union to
the 10 new member states. The negotiations
between Turkey and the EU were put on track
on 3 October 2005, following the dramatic half-
day-long talks between the United Kingdom
(which then held the presidency) and Austria9.
The EU amended the Negotiating Framework
to state that the possibility of absorbing new
members was one of the criteria necessary for
Turkey’s accession10. In January 2006, the Euro-
pean Council adopted the document entitled
‘Accession Partnership’, which had been pre-
pared several weeks earlier by the European
Commission. The document was also accepted
by Ankara11. The EU will evaluate Ankara’s ful-
filment of the Accession Partnership’s under-
takings at the end of 2007, and decide on the
nature of its further relations with Turkey on
the basis of the evaluation. In June 2006, re-
gardless of Cyprus’s attempts to thwart the
beginning of negotiations, Turkey opened and
closed the first chapter, concerning science and
research. Between October 2005 and October
2006, the Turkish legislation was screened for
compliance with the community’s law legacy
(the acquis). In December 2006, the EU decided
to suspend eight negotiation chapters, due to
Turkey’s failure to extend the customs union
to Cyprus. In March 2007 the EU opened the
second chapter of Turkish accession negotia-
tions (enterprise and industrial policy).
1. Turkey’s accession as seen 
by EU societies
European societies’ support for Turkey’s mem-
bership in the EU is vital for the success of the
process of this country’s integration for the fol-
lowing reasons:
– Turkey’s accession agreement has to be ratified
by the parliaments of all EU member states and
in a referendum by the French public. When vot-
ing on the accession agreement, Europe’s politi-
cal elites will take into consideration their socie-
ties’ opinions on Turkey’s accession to the EU;
– the negative attitude towards Turkey’s mem-
bership shown by European societies, and the rea-
listic prospect that the EU member states or their
societies will reject Turkey’s accession, regard-
less of the possible outcome of the negotiations,
has reinforced Eurosceptic sentiments in Turkey;
– due to the uncertainty of EU membership, its
prospect in the case of Turkey does not play the
role of an ‘anchor’ stabilising transformation to
the same extent that it did in the case of those
candidates accepted to the EU in 2004, and lat-
terly Romania and Bulgaria.
None of the previous candidates or the potential
candidates (in the Western Balkans) has raised
such serious reservations in the EU as Turkey
does. According to surveys conducted in 2006,
a majority – either absolute or relative – of EU resi-
dents are against Turkey’s membership12.
Opposition to Turkey’s EU membership prevails
in most countries where numerous emigrant Mu-
slim communities live (France, Germany, Austria,
Belgium and Denmark). The societies of a definite
majority of those countries which negatively per-
ceive future EU enlargement also show a negative
attitude towards Turkey’s accession (in addition to
the aforementioned countries, Finland and Luxem-
bourg). Turkey’s accession is also seen in negative
terms by the societies of most countries which
joined the EU in 2004 (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus). Fear of com-
petition in the allocation of EU funds may be one
reasons for this. The unwelcoming attitude of the
Greek and Cypriot societies to Turkey’s accession
is strongly linked to their serious problems in bi-
lateral relations with Ankara. Most societies who
have a positive stance on further EU enlarge-
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ment are also positive about Turkey’s accession.
European political elites, most of whom support
accession, are less sceptical about Turkey’s EU
membership. The circles which do not want Tur-
key in the EU include the radical right, a signifi-
cant part of the right wing and a small part of the
left wing (such as the socialists in Austria).
The key reason usually presented against Turkey’s
membership is the cultural difference of Turkish
society as Muslims, with Islam often being de-
scribed in radical terms13. According to opponents
of Ankara’s European aspirations, if Turkey join-
ed the EU, this would upset the European Union’s
internal integrity, which should be based on
a common cultural and religious background. This
feeling of difference has intensified since the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks. This is also linked to
problems with the integration of Muslims in West-
ern Europe, resulting from the unwillingness of
significant groups of Muslims to adapt to the Eu-
ropean system of values, European societies’ pre-
judices against them, and integration policies
which have been either bad or completely absent.
Emigrants from Turkey constitute the most nume-
rous group among the Muslim diaspora in the
EU14. Other weighty arguments used by oppo-
nents of Turkey’s accession include the fact that
97% of Turkey’s territory is located in Asia, its bor-
ders with the Middle East and the Caucasus, its
problems with respecting human rights and the
functioning of democracy, a fear of mass Turkish
emigration and of the costs of accepting a poor
country with a large agricultural sector. Many
opponents of Turkey’s membership believe that
opening negotiations with Ankara was pointless
because Turkey’s internal problems and cultural
& religious differences will not allow it to meet the
Union’s requirements. Moreover, the negotiating
process itself may destabilise the internal situa-
tion in Turkey because democratisation will bring
radicals to power. For a large group of opponents
to Turkey’s EU membership, the country’s inter-
nal problems are more important than the reli-
gious difference. According to surveys, many of
them declare they could change their opinion on
Turkey’s accession if the country achieved sustain-
able economic stabilisation and democratisation.
Supporters of Turkey’s membership believe that
Islam is not an impediment to Turkey meeting EU
criteria. They emphasise the historical and cul-
tural ties existing between Turkey and Europe.
Their arguments for Turkey’s integration are
mainly geopolitical, and are as follows:
– as a result of the integration process Turkey will
become stable and democratic, which will have
a positive impact on the neighbouring regions
(the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia),
improve the efficiency of the EU’s policy towards
them, and reduce the pressure of Turkish migra-
tion to the EU;
– Turkey will serve as a model for the Muslim
world and a bridge between it and the West;
– the negative consequences of rejecting Turkey
(intensifying anti-Western sentiments in Turkey,
worsening relations with EU countries, holding
back the democratisation process and raising ten-
sion between the state and the Kurds and reli-
gious communities);
11
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Attitude to Turkey’s membership
Absolutely negative
(all polls)
Negative
(a definite majority of polls)
Indefinite (mixed poll results)
Moderately positive 
(all or a definite majority 
of polls)
Countries
Austria
France, Germany, Greece, 
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, 
Latvia, Estonia and Cyprus
Italy, Holland, Lithuania, Malta
Spain, Ireland, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Hungary;
Bulgaria and Romania 
(EU members since 2007)
Forecast
No chance of changing 
the society’s attitude.
Small or moderate chance 
of changing the society’s 
attitude.
An open-ended issue
Probable loss 
of societies’ support
Table 1. Review of European societies’ attitudes to Turkey’s accession to the EU
Source: Eurobarometer, institutions for analysing public opinion in member states
– Turkey will serve as a transit country for trans-
port of oil and gas to Europe and a guarantee of
the Union’s energy security (diversification of ener-
gy sources);
– its accession will guarantee illegal migration
and drug smuggling from Asia to Europe through
the territory of Turkey will be combated more
efficiently;
– Turkey’s contribution, owing to its military po-
tential, to the development of European security
policy.
The role of public opinion in relations between
Turkey and the EU has significantly grown since
the French parliament amended the French con-
stitution in March 2005, imposing the obligation
to hold a referendum on each enlargement of the
EU after Bulgaria and Romania’s accessions. It
cannot be ruled out that other EU member states
will also impose such an obligation.
2. Turkish society’s attitude 
to the EU; differences in culture
and values
The attitude of Turkish society to the EU and the
European system of values is an important issue
for Turkey’s integration with the Union for the
following reasons:
– the S¯vres syndrome, widely shared by Turks
(namely a fear of partition of the country by ex-
ternal forces supporting separatism), may in a cri-
sis undermine support for EU membership;
– public support for membership is essential, con-
sidering the need to implement the controversial
reforms required by the EU;
– the Turkish society is much more conservative
than other EU societies, and as a result of their
conservatism Turks may have problems accept-
ing some EU standards in the social sphere;
– the strong devotion to sovereignty may make it
difficult to accept the limitation thereof which is
connected with the integration process.
In autumn 2006, approximately 55% of the Turk-
ish public supported Turkey’s membership of the
EU, and around 35% opposed it15. People support
accession because they believe it will contribute
to improving their financial situation and the de-
mocratisation of the country16.
Turkish society’s support for the EU is greater
than their identification with the West and Eu-
rope. Public opinion polls have indicated that
a majority of Turkish society perceives Turkey as
a part of the West and Europe, and Turks as Eu-
ropeans. Nevertheless, a significant part of the
society do not identify themselves with the West
or Europe, and some of those who identify them-
selves with Europeans have a rather moderate
sense of this identity. A clear sign of Turks’ aliena-
tion in Europe is the belief shared by a large part
of Turkish citizens that the European Union is
a Christian club, which has no place to offer for
Muslim Turkey17 More than 50% of Turks consid-
er being a Muslim as a condition of being a Turk.
Additionally, most Turks share a negative opinion
of Christians, although they perceive individual
European nations in different ways18. Public opi-
nion polls indicate that most Turks perceive de-
mocracy as the best possible system and gener-
ally support basic human rights and, as a conse-
quence, the main pro-EU reforms in the political
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sphere. On the other hand, Turkish society is only
moderately ready to take over the Western system
of values in the cultural and social spheres. Turk-
ish society is much more conservative than EU so-
cieties are19. The conservatism of Turkish society
is based on the major social role of the family,
which is perceived as the foundation of an indi-
vidual’s identity, more important than the state,
nation or religion20. EU accession raises serious
fears among Turks of negative cultural changes
(moral decay, crisis of the family and weakening
religiousness) and a loss of cultural identity.
Turks, unlike European societies, are exceptionally
strongly attached to the sovereignty of their ho-
mogenous national state; they have the feeling
that they are deprived of allies in the internatio-
nal arena21 and a strong anxiety of loss of territo-
rial integrity. Such tendencies are the effects of
the traditional state control, the S¯vres syndrome
and such modern factors as long-lasting bad re-
lations with almost all their neighbours as well
as the lengthy and bloody struggle against Kur-
dish separatism. The struggle, combined with the
devotion to the national homogeneity of the state,
leads to a majority of the Turkish society opposing
the granting of cultural rights to Kurds, and to de-
claring its readiness to accept some restrictions
to democracy in an emergency situation in order
to guarantee the state’s security. Moreover, a sig-
nificant minority support the authoritarian rule
of the army. A clear majority of Turks believe that
the EU member states are sponsors of Kurdish se-
paratism and intend to partition Turkey.
Turks commonly share the belief that the Euro-
pean Union employs double standards with re-
gard to their country. Although this belief is not
groundless, signs of inconsistencies in the Union’s
policy are often exaggeratedly perceived in Tur-
key22.
In sociological terms, Turkey’s accession is most
strongly supported by the Kurds, both the re-
ligiously conservative and the liberal middle class,
the intelligentsia and big business. These social
groups are interested in expanding the scope of
political and economic freedom (the conservative
middle class and the Kurds), and they identify
themselves most in cultural terms and have ties
with the West (the liberal middle class and big bu-
siness). Support for accession is the weakest
among the nationalist section of those secular so-
cial groups who are tied to state structures (the
military, the bureaucracy, the judiciary and some
academic staff), religious fundamentalists and the
nationalist-conservative Turkish population of
central Turkey (which strongly adhere to Islam
as the basis of national identity). The urban popu-
lation shows greater support for accession than
do residents of agricultural areas.
Of the key political parties, Turkey’s EU member-
ship is supported most strongly by the ruling Isla-
mic-democratic Justice and Development Party
(AKP), the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP)
and to a similar extent by the centrist Motherland
Party of Turkey (ANAP). The opposition centre-
right True Path Party (DYP) is a cautious supporter
of Turkey’s accession, although it continues to em-
phasise the need to treat sovereignty and inte-
rests of the country as top priority issues. The left-
wing nationalist Republican People’s Party (CHP),
the largest opposition party, represents a Euro-
sceptic point of view23. The radically right-wing
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the funda-
mentalist Saadet (Felicity) Party are staunch op-
ponents of Turkey’s EU membership.
Social sentiments clearly changed in Turkey be-
tween 2005 and 2006. Support for EU membership
fell from nearly 75% to nearly 55%. Opponents
increased from 15%–20% to around 35%. Confi-
dence in the EU and the perception of accession
as a necessity and a good thing have clearly wea-
kened. The lessening support for EU membership
means weaker identification with the West and
Europe. Dislike of Christians and fears of the con-
sequences of accession have become stronger.
Such negative trends have arisen for the follow-
ing reasons, among others:
– the escalation of the Kurdish rebellion in au-
tumn 2004;
– the disillusionment of the Turkish public with
the EU’s stance on Turkey as presented at the sum-
mit in December 2004 (e.g. the contents of the Ne-
gotiating Framework, the failure to keep the pro-
mises made by the European Commission to the
Turkish Cypriots, accompanied by the demand
that Turkey should extend the customs union to
Cyprus);
– resolutions on the Armenian genocide passed by
the parliaments of some EU member states and
the European Parliament (see Appendix 2);
– imposition of the obligation to hold referendums
on each subsequent enlargement by the French
parliament, and declarations by politicians from
13
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other countries that similar laws should also be
adopted in their countries; and
– tensions in relations between Muslims and
Christians (such as the publication of the carica-
tures of Mohammed or the fragment of the lec-
ture on Islam delivered by Pope Benedict XVI in
Regensburg).
There is a correlation between the government’s
ability to carry out controversial reforms or make
concessions regarding the Kurdish, Cypriot and
Armenian issues required by Brussels and the like-
lihood of the membership prospect. The less rea-
listic the prospect of EU accession seems, the
weaker Turkish society’s support for accession,
and hence the smaller the probability that they
will accept the most controversial decisions as
a lesser ‘necessary’ evil.
3. The Kurdish issue
The Kurdish issue is the most vital for the pros-
pects of Turkey’s integration with the EU, for the
following reasons:
– Turkey’s most serious internal problem is its
military conflict with the Kurdish guerrilla forces,
which has lasted for more than two decades, has
claimed the lives of over 37,000 people and has
cost US$150 billion in direct expenses;
– the Kurdish issue is strongly linked to numerous
economic, political and social problems (poverty,
conservatism, fundamentalism, patriarchy, human
rights, the position of the army and developing
of the so-called ‘deep state’, a shadowy network
of security structures), which are at the same time
serious reasons for some EU communities’ reluc-
tance towards Turkey’s accession;
– conditions of accession include guarantee of the
cultural rights of ethnic minorities as well as de-
centralisation of the administration, while meet-
ing such conditions will arouse concern about the
integrity of the state among a great majority of
Turks, and will entail the need to revise the defini-
tion of the state (national homogeneity), which
is one of the fundaments of the Republic of Turkey;
– the prospect of EU integration has played a key
role in Ankara modifying its policy on Kurds;
– a definite majority of Turks accuse EU member
states of supporting Kurdish separatism and the
division of their country; the EU requirements re-
garding cultural rights and the activity of Kurdish
separatist circles in EU member states are perceiv-
ed by Turks in this context;
– the support for accession is much stronger
among Kurds than among ethnic Turks. A clear
weakening of likelihood of accession will under-
mine Kurdish nationalists’ support for the conti-
nued territorial integrity of Turkey;
– the serious losses inflicted by the Turkish army
on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the
truce declared by Kurdish separatists created fa-
vourable conditions for implementing pro-EU re-
forms between 2001 and 2004. The re-eruption of
fights against the Kurdish guerrilla forces in 2004
was the main reason for the growing national-
ism in Turkey, weakening support for accession,
and consequently, a slowdown in the implemen-
tation of reforms. The conflict puts the continua-
tion of reforms in jeopardy.
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Box 3. Basic information on Kurds
Most Kurds live in regions where they are a mi-
nority. This tendency has been reinforced by the
large-scale migration of Kurds to metropolises
(Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Damascus, Tabriz, Teh-
ran and Baghdad). This has been happening on
the largest scale in Turkey. Turkey also differs
from the other countries in terms of its linguis-
tic assimilation of its Kurdish population.
It is difficult to precisely determine the number
of the Kurdish population due to the lack of ac-
curate statistical data and the complicated na-
ture of national and religious identity in the
Middle East. The importance of religious identi-
ty in the Middle East (Kurds often present a high-
er level of religious activity than their non-Kur-
dish neighbours), strong family structures, the
religious and linguistic diversity among Kurds,
their minority status in the countries which
apply the policy of assimilation and use the ’di-
vide and rule’ principle with regard to Kurds,
violent conflicts inside the Kurdish community,
the complex ethnic structure of the territories
inhabited by Kurds, their coexistence with other
ethnic groups (numerous mixed marriages)
and the underdeveloped nature of the Kurdish
modern national identity cause the following:
– many Kurds hold religious and tribal identity
in higher esteem than a national identity;
– some of them identify themselves with other
national groups than the Kurdish one;
– identification with the state is very impor-
tant for them (especially in Turkey).
Consequently, treating Kurds as a uniform na-
tional community is a simplification, while it is
more reasonable to use the term ‘people of Kur-
dish origin’ to define the whole Kurdish popu-
lation.
According to estimates by the Turkish polling
centre KONDA, which conducted the largest
survey on identity of Turkish citizens in the hi-
story of the country (around 45,000 respon-
dents), nearly 15% of residents of Turkey indi-
cated Kurdish and Zaza (1%) as their mother
tongues, and over 10% declared themselves to
be Kurds and Zaza (0.5%). Nearly 10% of re-
spondents who declared themselves as Kurds
and Zaza indicated Turkish as their native lan-
guage. In turn, 20% of residents of Turkey who
indicated Kurdish and Zaza as their respective
mother tongues admitted that they used Tur-
kish more often than they did their mother ton-
gues. Mixed Kurdish-Turkish families account
for almost 4% of all marriages entered into in
Turkey. It can be estimated that a certain per-
centage of Turkish residents who identify them-
selves as Turks and indicate Turkish as their
native tongue are of Kurdish origin.
The Kurdish problem in Turkey includes the fol-
lowing five interrelated aspects; (1) the politi-
cal dispute between the Kurdish elites and the
Turkish state about the definition of the state
and the status of Kurds, (2) the military conflict
with Kurdish separatists, (3) the clear socioeco-
nomic backwardness of the region predomi-
nantly inhabited by Kurds, (3) the trans-border
nature of the Kurdish community, which resides
in four countries, and (5) the link between the
situation of the Kurds in Turkey and Ankara’s
relations with the EU.
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Country
Turkey
Iran
Iraq
Syria
Population
number
12–15
million
6–7 
million
5 million
1,6–2 
million
Percentage
share
15–20%
10%
20%
8–10%
Main 
religions
Sunni Islam,
Alevism (nearly 
25–30%)
Sunni Islam, 
Shia Islam
(25–30%)
Sunni Islam 
and Shia Islam 
(small minorities)
Sunni Islam
Languages
Kurmanji, 
Turkish (a large part), 
Zaza (a minority)
Sorani (the largest group),
Kurmanji, Gurani, South-
-Eastern dialects, Persian
Kurmanji, Sorani
Kurmanji
Alphabet
Latin
Arabic
Arabic
Latin
The most numerous
ethnic-religious group
Sunni Turks 
(nearly 65–70%)
Shia Persians 
(nearly 50%)
Shia Arabs 
(nearly 60%)
Sunni Arabs 
(nearly 60%)
Table 2. Population of Kurdish origin in the Middle East
a) The Turkish state’s policy on Kurds
and their response thereto
The Republic of Turkey, which was founded in
1923 by Kemal Atatürk, defined the Turkish na-
tion as a community based on culture, the Turkish
language and citizenship. This definition excluded
the possibility of other ethnic communities func-
tioning in the public sphere24. Every resident of
Turkey was automatically identified by the state
as a Turk25. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds have
undergone ethnic assimilation. For many of them,
even though they have preserved their ethnic
identity as Kurds, the Turkish language has be-
come their mother tongue26. However, the pro-
cess of assimilation never had a chance of being
fully successful. Kurds constitute a populous mi-
nority concentrated in one region which has
a clear Kurdish character. The population growth
rate among Kurds is much higher than it is in the
case of Turks27. On the other hand, most Turkish
Kurds do not identify themselves with Kurdish
nationalism28. Kurds usually vote for Turkish par-
ties, especially for those close to Islamic tradition.
According to independent public opinion polls,
the vast majority do not support secession, and
most of them do not sympathise with the idea of
transforming Turkey into a bi-national Turkish-
-Kurdish state. The confrontation of the Turkish
army against the separatist guerrillas and terro-
rists has not erupted into an open ethnic conflict.
Many more Kurds serve in the village militias and
in the Turkish army than in the PKK. Desertions
happen rarely.
The military and autonomy-related traditions of
highlander Kurdish communities, the unpreven-
table development of nationalist ideology among
Kurds (the concept of their own state), favourable
geographic conditions (mountains) and external
support from countries hostile to Turkey (such as
the USSR and Syria) were among the reasons why
the Turkish state’s assimilation policy has met
with armed resistance from Kurdish guerrilla for-
ces. The Turkish army quashed many local Kur-
dish uprisings in the 1920s and the 1930s29. In the
1960s and 1970s, urbanisation, secular education
and the influence of Kurdish autonomy in North-
ern Iraq led to a developing Kurdish national iden-
tity in Turkey. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK),
with Abdullah Öcalan as its dictatorial leader, was
established in 1978. The PKK started terrorist ac-
tivity, which erupted into full guerrilla warfare
in 1984. Its main goal was to unite all Kurds into
one state, which distinguished it from other Kur-
dish groups in the Middle East. The Turkish army
& police forces and the PKK violated human rights
on a massive scale (tortures, killing civilians and
prisoners of war, more then a million people dis-
placed)30. The state radically restricted the Kurds’
rights and imposed antiterrorist laws, which
strongly restricted human rights, freedom of
speech and democracy. A ban on speaking Kurdish
in public places was in force between 1984 and
1991. A state of emergency (OHAL) was declared
in south-eastern Turkey in 1987.
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Distribution of the population of Kurdish origin in the Middle East
The struggle between the army and the PKK led
to informal relations being created between the
security structures and the criminal underworld,
leaders of Kurdish clans loyal to the state, and Turk-
ish radical nationalists31. Secret structures acting
outside the law (whose methods included assassi-
nations, attacks and kidnappings) were created in-
side the armed forces. These structures are referred
to as the ‘deep state’ (derin devlet). On the other
hand, the conflict produced connections between
Kurdish organised crime and the guerrillas32.
The first Kurdish political party linked to the PKK
was established in 1990. It has been delegalised
and has changed its name three times. Since Octo-
ber 2005, it has been operating under the name of
the Democratic Society Party (DTP). Kurdish parties
usually have a more moderate programme than
the PKK (autonomy rather than independence).
However, they cannot enter the national parlia-
ment due to the high election threshold of 10%33.
Several offensives launched by the Turkish army
in the second half of the 1990s seriously weaken-
ed the PKK, which declared a truce at the end of
1998. Clashes became significantly less intense.
A breakthrough came with the arrest of Öcalan in
1999, who was sentenced to death, although this
was thereafter commuted to life imprisonment.
Although the PKK leader is in a high-security pri-
son, he still has a great influence on the military
& political Kurdish movement. In April 2005, at his
initiative, the PKK adopted a new programme for
a ‘democratic Kurdish confederation’, which pro-
vides for setting up Kurdish republics in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria that will be united in a confe-
deration while at the same time formally remain-
ing integral parts of the aforementioned countries.
The end of the fight against the PKK and the re-
quirement to change the status of Kurds, which
was set as a condition for opening negotiations by
the EU, led to an extension of Kurds’ cultural
rights. However, the PKK decided these rights we-
re insufficient. On 1 June 2004, the PKK withdrew
from the truce, which caused an escalation of
armed clashes. The conflict between the PKK and
the army in south-eastern Turkey was accompa-
nied by violent demonstrations by Kurdish natio-
nalists between 2005 and 2006, during which de-
monstrators engaged in clashes with the police
and the army. The bloodiest riots, the biggest
since the mid-1990s, broke out in late March/early
April 2006; 14 people were killed during the riots.
An equally dangerous tendency was demonstrat-
ed by street fights between Turkish and Kurdish
nationalists and attempted lynches. Such tensions
between ordinary citizens had been rare in the
1990s34. Following the re-eruption of fights, the
PKK became more radical. The Kurdistan Freedom
Falcons (TAK), which plotted many terrorist attacks
between 2005 and 2006, including on tourist re-
sorts, left the party. The PKK announced a cease-
fire on 1 October 2006, and clashes between the
army and PKK have become rarer since that time.
b) The regional aspect (Iraq)
The development of Kurdish guerrilla forces in
Turkey was strongly linked to the existence of
their bases in neighbouring countries, especially
Iraq, as well as to the support offered to them by
Syria, and to a lesser extent Iran. In 1998, the
threat of a military intervention by Turkey made
Damascus change its policy on this issue. Iran
gradually changed its policy after the election of
the moderate president Khatami. Turkey’s rela-
tions with these two of its neighbours clearly im-
proved after the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
It significantly strengthened the Iraqi Kurds, which
was seen as a serious threat by Syria and Iran.
South-eastern Turkey has especially strong geo-
graphical, historical and economic ties with north-
ern Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan has been the most inde-
pendent and politically & culturally autonomous
Kurdish region for over 50 years. In fact, it is rea-
sonable to state that an independent Kurdish
state has existed in northern Iraq since 1991. The
region has been used as a logistical base by Kur-
dish separatist organisations from Turkey and
Iran. In the 1990s, Turkey, using the internal con-
flicts existing among Iraqi Kurds, managed to con-
vince some of them to engage in a common strug-
gle against the PKK. Serious losses were inflicted
on the PKK owing to the Turkish army’s ability to
carry out raids deep into Iraq and its co-operation
with Iraqi Kurds. The situation radically changed
in spring 2003, when the Turkish parliament vot-
ed against the agreement with the USA which pro-
vided for launching US attacks on Iraq from Turk-
ish territories and for the durable deployment of
Turkish troops tens of kilometres deep into north-
ern Iraq35. As a consequence, Iraqi Kurds have be-
come the key US ally in the region, and the Turk-
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ish army cannot carry out large-scale operations
in northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds have significantly ex-
panded the area territory under their control
thanks to the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime and to their alliance with the USA. They have
never been as strong as they are today. They do
not want to fight their compatriots from the PKK,
who pose no threat to their interests, and they op-
pose Turkish intervention in northern Iraq36.
c) The socioeconomic aspect 
of the Kurdish issue
Kurdish nationalism has also developed due to the
dissatisfaction of a significant part of the residents
of south-eastern Turkey with the socioeconomic
situation in the region, which is characterised by
exceptional socio-cultural backwardness (the low
social position of women, religious and social con-
servatism, low levels of education and the high il-
literacy rate)37 and by a low level of economic de-
velopment. In this context, the Kurdish issue has
a direct link to EU accession, since these pheno-
mena cause many Europeans to oppose Turkey’s
membership in the EU.
The slow process of socio-cultural modernisation
is in the first order an effect of the feudal and fa-
mily-based structure and the conservative reli-
giousness prevalent in the region38, which have
preserved their significance for the following rea-
sons:
– the limited openness of the region to external
influence39;
– concessions by the state, which does not have
sufficiently effective institutions and economy40;
– social needs resulting from military conflicts and
accelerated urbanisation; and
– poverty41.
Regardless of such negative phenomena, the Kur-
dish community in Turkey is not a static and ar-
chaic monad. Some social changes took place in
the second half of the twentieth century. Current-
ly, most Kurds in Turkey can read and write, live in
cities and do not treat family identity as the main
point of reference. Their religiousness has become
less orthodox, and their women have been eman-
cipated to a limited extent. The most important
sign of the modernisation process is secular Kur-
dish nationalism.
d) The EU’s influence on Ankara’s
policy on Kurds
In the early 1990s, Ankara’s efforts to gain candi-
date status for the EEC/EU contributed to the libe-
ralisation of its policy on the Kurdish issue. The
ban on speaking Kurdish in public places was lift-
ed in 1991. Since that time, Kurdish newspapers
and books have been regularly published (albeit
with great problems until recently) and records in
the Kurdish language have been issued. A Kurdish
cultural centre was established in Istanbul in
1991. The serious weakening of the PKK, the arrest
of Öcalan and conferring EU candidate status on
Turkey in 1999 provided grounds for the greatest
changes to the Kurdish policy in the history of
the Republic of Turkey. Brussels made setting the
negotiation beginning date conditional on these
changes. In August 2002, the Turkish parliament
passed amendments to legalise the usage of non-
Turkish languages on TV and radio, and on educa-
tion in languages other than Turkish. The amend-
ments were brought to practice two years later.
In June 2004, public radio and television started
broadcasting short programmes in Kurdish. Before
2006, the Kurdish language appeared only spora-
dically in local private media. The first program-
mes appeared in March 2006, and they cover
a much wider scope than those broadcast by pu-
blic television42. The first Kurdish daily newspa-
per in Turkish history has been published since
August 2006.
The first private Kurdish language course, follow-
ing lengthy efforts, was made available in March
200443. Gradually, more courses were launched.
However, all the courses were closed by mid-2005
due to the lack of people willing to attend them44.
A new Kurdish course was opened in November
2006. The AKP party, which has ruled Turkey since
late 2002, has been making attempts to improve
the socioeconomic situation in south-eastern Tur-
key by measures including promoting girls’ edu-
cation and improving the infrastructure (build-
ing roads)45. The process of paying compensations
to Kurds who had been forced to migrate to bor-
der regions by the army during military actions
has also begun, yet its implementation has been
rather slow46. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo-
gan has also initiated a discussion on the national
definition of Turkey, supporting the concept of po-
T
h
e
 h
u
rd
le
 r
a
c
e
. 
T
h
e
 g
re
a
te
s
t 
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
b
a
rr
ie
rs
 i
n
 T
u
rk
e
y
’s
 p
a
th
 t
o
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
18
C E S  R e p o r t
litical identification as the principal one (Türkiyeli)
after the American fashion, and recognising the
Turkish identity as one of the sub-identities47.
Political freedom has also been enhanced. The
state of emergency in south-eastern Turkey was
lifted in late 2002/early 2003. Kurdish political
leaders who had been sentenced to imprisonment
in 1994, including Leyla Zan, were released in June
2004. Between 2005 and 2006, the government
granted consent to the gathering of signatures for
petitions to transform Turkey into a Turkish-Kur-
dish federation and expressing support for Öcalan.
However, the usage of non-Turkish languages in
political activities (meetings, congresses and pos-
ters) is still banned. The local government reform,
which was blocked by the president’s veto in
2004, has not been carried out.
Minority cultural rights were introduced only
slowly due to the resistance shown by nationalist
circles in bureaucracy and justice authorities, and
by limited public support for the reforms48. Gra-
dually, many Turks, considering their support for
EU accession, ‘forgave’ the AKP for giving Kurds
cultural rights, and have accepted this as a ‘nec-
essary evil’ on their road to opening the negotia-
tions49. However, this public forbearance has sig-
nificantly lessened as a consequence of the inten-
sifying clashes between the Turkish army and the
Kurdish guerrilla forces.
e) The EU aspect
Nearly one million Kurds, the great majority of
who come from Turkey, live in EU member states.
They are both economic and political emigrants.
The largest Kurdish communities are in Germany,
France, Holland, Sweden and Denmark, where
they live close to Turkish emigrants. The diaspora
has played a very important role in developing
Kurdish nationalism since the end of the nine-
teenth century. It is a melting pot which unifies
Kurds from various regions. Ideas of modern Kur-
dish national identity have had the liberty to de-
velop in exile thanks to the wider scope of free-
dom and the opportunities to use Western ideas.
Currently, Europe is the main place where books
and magazines in Kurdish are published. Nume-
rous Kurdish radio and television stations, asso-
ciations and parties operate in EU countries. Some
of them have connections with the PKK, which
gathers funds in Europe, including by means of
criminal activities (drug trafficking). The fact that
circles linked to the Kurdish guerrilla organisa-
tion exist in European countries has led to deep
dissatisfaction on the part of the Turkish govern-
ment and society and reinforces the S¯vres syn-
drome. The conflict between Turkey and the PKK
also directly affects EU member states. This is ma-
nifested in tensions between Kurdish and Turkish
nationalists, Kurdish attacks on Turkish embas-
sies, anti-Turkish demonstrations held by the Kur-
dish diaspora and the involvement of some PKK
supporters in criminal activities50. Additionally,
European tourists have become a target of terrorist
attacks staged by the TAK organisation since 2005.
f) The prospects for resolving 
the Kurdish issue
A durable settlement of the armed conflict with
the Kurdish guerrilla forces cannot be achieved by
military means alone. The sources of the conflict
are deeply rooted in social, economic and politi-
cal problems, and can only be resolved by clearly
improving the position of the Kurds in Turkey. The
major impediments on the path to ending the con-
flict include:
– a lack of any clear prospect of Turkey’s member-
ship in the EU, without which the implementation
of pro-Kurdish reforms and the resultant margi-
nalisation of extremists is rather unlikely;
– serious differences of opinions between the
state and the Kurdish elites51;
– the existence of circles opposing a peaceful re-
solution of the conflict on both sides52;
– growing support for Kurdish nationalists53;
– the lack of any strong Kurdish political forces un-
connected with the insurgents54; and
– the strengthening position of the Iraqi Kurds fol-
lowing the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime
in 200355.
On the other hand, Kurdish guerrilla forces will
not regain the position they used to enjoy in the
1990s because the Turkish army has inflicted too
heavy losses on them. The membership of the PKK
has significantly decreased. The organisation has
become internally divided following Öcalan’s
arrest, and the PKK can no longer count on Syria’s
and Iran’s assistance. Currently, the support for
armed struggle is much smaller among Turkish
Kurds than it was ten years ago. Any further re-
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duction of PKK’s combat capacity in the present
geopolitical situation depends on Ankara’s co-ope-
ration with the Iraqi Kurds, who could success-
fully cut off the organisation’s supply routes. How-
ever, the Iraqi Kurds will co-operate with Ankara
against the PKK only if further pro-Kurdish re-
forms are implemented in Turkey56. Internal pres-
sure on the Turkish government will intensify
because the population growth rate is higher
among Turkish Kurds than among Turks.
4. Human rights (torture 
and ill-treatment, freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion
and the position of women)
The question of improving human rights in Tur-
key is linked to the country’s pre-accession efforts
for the following reasons:
– political criteria are of key significance and are
given priority over economic ones when the EU
decides on a candidate country’s status;
– Turkey has greater problems in this area than
all previous candidate members have had;
– any clear worsening of the human rights situa-
tion in Turkey will cause negotiations with the
EU to be broken off.
a) The impact of pro-EU reforms 
on the human rights situation and 
the development of civil society
Dozens of constitution amendments, new laws
and codes to significantly expand the scope of
freedoms of speech, peaceful assembly & associa-
tions, to combat the usage of tortures and to limit
the possibilities for delegalising political parties
were passed in Turkey between 2001 and 2006.
The process of implementing the new regulations
to be used in practice has lasted since 2004. This
is being done in a difficult situation, considering
the military conflict with Kurdish separatists,
which has been ongoing uninterruptedly for over
20 years now.
The government launched the policy of ‘zero tole-
rance of torture’ in 2004. In effect, some police-
men have been accused of and sentenced for
using tortures and ill-treating inmates, which has
happened on such a scale for the first time in Tur-
key’s history. Although the number of lawsuits
against policemen on charges of abusing powers
has increased, the great majority of the trials still
end in collapse or with suspended sentences be-
ing imposed. According to the leading Turkish
Human Rights Association (IHD), the most brutal
forms of tortures have been almost totally elimi-
nated. Pursuant to the European Commission’s
reports for 2004 and 2005 and the Council of Eu-
rope’s report for 2006, the usage of torture is not
systematic and is in decline57. Turkish human
rights organisations believe that torture and the
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ill-treatment of prisoners do have a systematic na-
ture, since most perpetrators go unpunished.
In 2006, the positive tendencies slowed down,
and the human rights situation worsened. The
main reasons for this were the escalation of the
conflict between the army and the PKK and the
large-scale riots in spring 200662. Between 2005
and 2006, most of those sentenced for expressing
their views were Kurds, who were charged mainly
with praising or supporting the PKK and spread-
ing separatist propaganda63. Regarding the other
sentences, charges of slandering the army and
(in fewer cases) other state institutions, influenc-
ing court proceedings and propagating radical re-
ligious views prevailed.
The problems with respecting human rights in
Turkey arise from the fact that the Turkish legisla-
tion, regardless of reforms, fails to meet EU stan-
dards. The new criminal code which came into
force in July 2005 was described by the European
Commission as adopting ‘modern European stan-
dards in line with criminal law in many European
countries’64. However, some of the code’s articles
met with reservations from the EU as posing
a threat to the freedom of speech. The most con-
troversial is article 301, which concerns insulting
‘Turkishness’, the republic and state institutions65.
The removal or amendment of article 301 was
one of the most serious EU demands made with
regard to Turkey in 2006. As a consequence of the
escalating conflict with the PKK and the serious
riots in spring 2006, a new antiterrorist law was
passed. The law, which extends the definition of
terrorism and the powers of security forces to use
arms during antiterrorist operations, and intro-
duces regulations which provide for the possi-
bility of limiting the rights of detainees and for
punishing publications accused of supporting,
spreading and praising terrorism, may be condu-
cive to human rights violations66. President Ahmet
Sezer appealed against the articles regarding the
freedom of the press to the Constitutional Court.
Trials which violate human rights do not only hap-
pen because of the excessive rigorousness of the
lawanother reason is the strict interpretation of
the law by the judiciary system, which represents
authoritarian and nationalist views67.
Developing civil society has been the main prac-
tical effect of passing reforms to expand the fun-
damental freedoms. Between 2004 and 2005, the
participation of Turks in non-governmental orga-
nisations grew by 45%, to 7 million (10% of socie-
ty)68. Regardless of these positive trends, however,
civil society in Turkey is much weaker in compa-
rison with Western Europe69.
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Type of human rights violation
Murder committed by unidentified perpetrators
Demonstrators killed by law enforcement 
agencies during riots
Individuals killed during interrogation
Cases of law enforcement agencies 
using tortures and ill-treatment
Publications banned and confiscated (posters, 
tapes, books, newspapers, magazines)
Radio & TV stations and programmes punished 
by the Radio and Television Board 
with a temporary broadcasting ban
Delegalised social organisations, political 
parties, cultural centres and publishing houses
People sentenced for expressing their views
People sentenced under the demonstrations 
and assemblies act61
2003
160 (2001)
2 (2002)
5 (2002)
over 120059
285
22 stations
nearly 150 (2001)
over 450
over 170
2005
1
7
5
over 63060
29
1 station
46 programmes
none
50
9
2006
20
12
4
over 640
22
2 stations
4
over 226
over 170
Table 3. Data from the Human Rights Association (Insan Haklar Dernegi)58
Source: Insan Haklar Dernegi, http://www.ihd.org.tr
b) Freedom of religion and conscience
Turkey is a secular state where the activity of reli-
gious structures is regulated by the Presidency of
Religious Affairs (Diyanet)70. No reservations a-
gainst this system have been made in the Euro-
pean Commission’s reports; the most criticised
issues include the situation of religious minorities,
religious culture and ethics as an obligatory school
subject (which in fact teaches religion71), and the
space for entering religion in identity cards.
Turkey has over 10 million Alevis (nearly 15% of
the country’s population), who are followers of
a strand of Islam which is more liberal than Sun-
nism and has numerous common theological ele-
ments with Shi’ism72. For centuries Alevis had
been treated as second-class subjects in the Otto-
man Empire, which was based on the primacy of
Sunni orthodoxy. In effect, they became staunch
supporters of left-wing politics, including radical
left, and Kemalism in the twentieth century. Their
social liberalism and their tradition of concealing
their religious identity arouse prejudice among
many Sunnis. Many Alevis were killed in the mas-
sacres in 1978 and 1993 in central Turkey. In 1995,
bloody clashes between Alevis and the police broke
out in Istanbul. Alevis have are different ways of
defining their own identity; some of them perceive
it only in cultural terms, and others believe that
they constitute a religious minority and as such
should be entitled to certain rights. The religious
Alevis are dissatisfied with the fact that the state
does not treat them as a separate community.
Alevis have a very sparse representation at the Pre-
sidency of Religious Affairs. Their places of worship
(cemevi) are not treated as temples, and receive
much smaller money from the Ministry of Culture
instead of state subsidies from the Diyanet73. As of
2006, the principles of Alevism have been present-
ed in the classes of religious culture and ethics.
However, Alevis do not like the way their religion is
presented in textbooks for this subject74.
The AKP represents only the Sunni electorate (and
to a great extent their more conservative part),
and so this government cannot be reasonably ex-
pected to significantly improve the status of the
Alevi community. Admittedly, the Education Mi-
nistry in July 2006 promised that it would intro-
duce classes on Alevism in the religious culture
and ethics syllabus, and government representa-
tives took part in ceremonies held by Alevi orga-
nisations in summer 2006. Nevertheless, the cen-
tral government and the AKP-controlled local
governments do not want to recognise cemevi
as places of religious worship.
Nearly 200,000 followers of religions other than
Islam (mainly members of the Armenian Church,
Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Jews) live in
Turkey. There are also groups of Protestants. Ge-
nerally, the situation of non-Muslims in Turkey is
much better than that in many Muslim states,
yet it is still worse than that of religious minori-
ties in western Europe. Armenians, Jews and Or-
thodox Greeks enjoy the best legal situation. The
state recognises their right to religious and cul-
tural education75. Foundations of religious com-
munities, which represent the vast majority of
religions, report to the state General Directorate
of Foundations, which includes a Foundation
Board. The nature of the foundations is not reli-
gious; they play an administrative role (manag-
ing the real estate of religious communities). Turk-
ish law does not permit the founding of associa-
tions which have openly stated religious goals76.
The lack of any legal identity and of possibilities
to educate priests in Turkey are the greatest prob-
lems which non-Muslim religious communities
have77. Ankara does not recognise the ecumenical
nature of the Orthodox Patriarchy of Constanti-
nople. Local authorities often cause problems in
building and repairing non-Muslim places of wor-
ship. Prosecution authorities also (though rarely)
launch proceedings against those who celebrate
religious ceremonies outside their places of wor-
ship. In 2005, missionaries were verbally attacked
by public institutions78. Several incidents target-
ed against non-Muslims happen every year. These
are mainly acts of vandalism and threats, some-
times beatings. The attacks on Istanbul synago-
gues in 2003, in which mainly Muslims were
killed, the murder of a Catholic priest in Trabzon
in February 2006, and the deaths of three Ger-
man Protestant missionaries in Malatya in April
2007 have so far been the most serious assaults
against non-Muslims.
The problems encountered by non-Muslims result
from the strong prejudices of the Turkish authori-
ties and society against followers of other reli-
gions than Islam, and their dislike of Christian
proselytisation79. These prejudices originate from
numerous wars against Christians, the Israeli-Pa-
lestinian conflict and the bad relations modern
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Turkey has with countries linked to some of its
non-Muslim minorities (e.g. Armenia). The prob-
lems of non-Muslims in Turkey are also connect-
ed with the rigorous interpretations of the prin-
ciple of separating religion from the state and of
sovereignty employed by the authorities.
However, pro-EU reforms have contributed to the
improvement in the situation for non-Muslims
in Turkey. In October 2002, the parliament voted
for amendments to the act on religious founda-
tions, enabling them to buy real estate80. They
were deprived of this right in 1974 during the in-
tervention in Cyprus. In November 2006, the
Turkish parliament accepted amendments to the
foundations act, which gave the following guar-
antees to religious communities: (1) the right to
regain previously nationalised real estate, (2) pro-
tection against arbitrary interference by the state
administration with the foundation’s internal af-
fairs and against nationalisation, (3) autonomy in
managing their real estates, (4) representation on
the Foundation Board, and (5) facilitations in set-
ting up foundations81. The law has not yet come
into effect, since some of its articles have been
vetoed by the president.
A law introducing new identity cards in which the
entry indicating the holder’s religion can be re-
moved at the holder’s request came into force in
April 2006 as part of legislation adjustments to
satisfy EU requirements regarding the freedom of
religion. An Alevi who did not want his child to
attend the obligatory religion and ethics classes
won a lawsuit to that effect in November 2006. If
the award is deemed final and binding by a court
of higher instance, it will set a judicial precedent.
c) Women’s rights
Improving the situation of women in comparison
to other EU human rights requirements poses
a special challenge to Turkey. In this case, adjust-
ment to EU standards requires serious changes
in the mentality of Turkish society. A woman’s
role in the family is perceived by the great majo-
rity of Turkish society in a traditional way82. Most
residents of Turkey identify family honour with
the good reputation of the wife, sister or daugh-
ter (the cult of premarital virginity and marital
fidelity)83. The attitude to the role of women is one
of the foundations of conservatism in Turkey
which makes it different from EU countries.
The level of women’s education, albeit consistent-
ly improving, is much lower than in the EU84. Just
over 25% of women in Turkey are legally employ-
ed. They are clearly overrepresented among peo-
ple working in the underground economy, which
is significantly larger in Turkey than in the EU85.
On the other hand, women in Turkey have a rela-
tively good representation in prestigious profes-
sions in comparison with some EU member sta-
tes86. Women make up less than 5% of members
of the Turkish parliament, and their representa-
tion is even worse at the local government level87.
However, the situation is much better in the state
administration and the judiciary system88.
The usage of violence against women, which oc-
curs on a much larger scale than in EU countries,
is the most radical manifestation of the poor so-
cial position of women in Turkey. Another serious
problem is the fact that a large minority of the
population, including women, accepts home vio-
lence89. Murders of and suicide by women happen
much more frequently in Turkey than in the EU.
Many of them are considered as honour killings;
these are committed against women accused of
‘promiscuous’ behaviour (which may include sim-
ple flirting) and blemishing the honour of the fa-
mily90. Murders and violence against ‘immoral’
women are linked to the fact that the society em-
ploys double standards to the erotic lives of males
(acceptance of premarital sex) and females91.
Numerous adjustments to Turkish law aimed at
improving the legal status of women have been
adopted since 2001 as part of pro-EU reforms. The
amendments to the civil code introduced in late
2001 and the new criminal code adopted in mid-
2005 were especially important92. In autumn 2006,
the government prepared legislation to improve
the legal protection of female victims of domestic
violence and imposing stricter penalties on per-
petrators of home violence. According to Turkish
women’s organisations, these reforms are insuf-
ficient and their implementation has encounter-
ed numerous problems93. Women’s organisations
have been demanding further legal changes, such
as introducing quotas (guaranteeing places) for
women in public life and in the labour market,
and adopting a wider definition of honour kil-
lings94. The AKP, which is a conservative party,
treats such demands with a reserve, and is rather
unlikely to embark on a very active policy to
emancipate women95.
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5. The position of the army 
and relations between secular 
& conservative religious circles
The role of the army in Turkish political life and
the relations between the secular establishment,
which is mainly based on military officers, and
conservative religious circles are significant for
the prospects of Ankara’s integration with the
EU for the following reasons:
– civilian control over the army is one of the key
conditions for Turkey’s accession, and the army
in Turkey has always had the exceptional position
of being the guarantor of the political system’s
stability, a situation which the generals do not
want changed;
– the secular establishment is in dispute with con-
servative circles over the form of separation of re-
ligion and the state; these tensions distract the
main political forces’ attention from the process
of integration with the EU, antagonise them and
put any consensus on accession at risk;
– the support of the governing AKP party for EU
membership is to a great extent connected with
their hope of lessening the influence of the army
on public life, and liberalising the rigorous rules
of separating religion and the state.
a) The status of the army 
in the political system
The significance of the army in Turkey’s modern
socio-political life originates from the important
role the institution played in the process of moder-
nising the Ottoman Empire and building the mo-
dern Republic of Turkey. The republic founding
fathers, including Kemal Atatürk himself, were
either retired or active generals. Until 1989, all the
presidents of Turkey, with the exception of Celal
Bayar, had been former military officers. The army
perceives itself as the main receptacle of Atatürk’s
legacy and the guarantor of the exclusively Turk-
ish and secular nature of the state. Since the es-
tablishment of political pluralism in Turkey in
1946, the army has staged four coups (in 1960,
1971, 1980 and 1997). Each time, following inter-
vention, democratically legitimate civilian autho-
rity has been restored. The army is an institution
which enjoys the highest public confidence, and
its exceptional position in the political system is
supported by a significant part of the society. This
special position of the army, which is of course
a non-democratic institution, has become one of
the main reasons for the inherent weakness of
the Turkish democracy, a key sign of which is the
lack of complete civilian control over the army.
The army was granted powers to monitor the po-
litical situation under the 1961 constitution as
a consequence of establishing the National Secu-
rity Council (MGK), most of whose directors and
members were military officers. The government
was obligated to pay due respect to its opinions
under the 1983 constitution96. Since 2001, the po-
litical role of the army has been reduced as part
of the process of Turkey’s adjusting to European
standards, and the powers of MGK have been sig-
nificantly reduced. Officially, civilians have gain-
ed the leading position in the Council97. Civilian
control of army expenses was introduced in Sep-
tember 200698. The number of press articles and
publications of reports criticising the views and
activities of military officers and appealing for fur-
ther reforms has increased in the last period99.
The generals perceive Turkey’s membership in the
EU as the crowning achievement of the country’s
Westernisation. However, at the same time they
fear any limitation of sovereignty, and are con-
vinced that the integration process is contribut-
ing to the increasing popularity of Kurdish sepa-
ratism and Islamic fundamentalism. In effect, they
are much less ready for the concessions required
by the EU. According to Hans-Jörg Kretschmer, the
EU’s ambassador to Turkey from 2002 to 2006, not
one of the lowest-ranking Turkish generals and
admirals had ever responded to his numerous in-
vitations for meetings. The fact that a moderate
and pro-European General, Hilimi Özkok, was no-
minated chief of staff in August 2002 contribut-
ed to the process of reducing the role of the army.
Özkok maintained correct relations with the go-
vernment and, despite some reservations, sup-
ported the process of Turkey’s integration with
the EU. His support was very important for the
government’s conciliatory policy on the issue of
Cyprus.
Regardless of the changes, the position of the ar-
my in Turkey’s political system still significantly
differs from solutions used to that end in the EU.
The general chief of staff reports directly to the
prime minister The specific position of the Turkish
Military Forces is connected with the Supreme
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Military Council’s (YAS) legal status. The members
of the council are the prime minister, the minister
of national defence, the chief of general staff, force
commanders, the commander of the armed forces,
the general commander of the gendarmerie, the
commander of the navy, the generals and admi-
rals of the armed forces. In additions to its legal
duties, the YAS decides on promotion, retirement
and disciplinary measures regarding armed forces
personnel. Decisions in the YAS are made by sim-
ple majority vote. In consequence, the YAS –
which is constitutionally under the government’s
authority – can take disciplinary measures against
prime minister’s vote. However, its decisions
should obtain the confirmation of the president.
The army has also strong influence on the prepa-
ration of the National Security Policy Document.
This document, which formulates national secu-
rity strategy is determined by the Council of Mi-
nisters within the views put forth by the MGK.
Practical issues are also important. Turkish gene-
rals often comment on the political situation, in
compliance with the broad definition of national
security. Officially, the budget of the armed for-
ces is prepared by the parliament, which has the
right to make amendments. According to the EU,
however, the Turkish parliament is not engaged
in any serious debate on the army’s budget.
b) Relations between the secular
establishment and conservative 
religious circles
Reforms limiting the powers of the army have
been carried out by the government led by the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), which (con-
sidering its Islamic roots) is most interested in les-
sening the influence of the military on politics,
and is the most independent of all the parties
from the generals’ influence. On the other hand,
the roots of the AKP make the generals especially
suspicious of its efforts to introduce civilian con-
trol over the army. The army is the key element of
the secular establishment, which includes a ma-
jor part of the judiciary, bureaucracy, academics,
media and the intelligentsia. The establishment
supports maintaining the status quo of separating
religion from the state. Their opinion on this issue
differs from that shared by most of the society,
which is conservative and religious and supports
a separation of religion and the state on different
terms (see Appendix 2). The determination of the
Kemalists to preserve the status quo substantiates
the existence of the fundamentalist religious mi-
nority, which includes groups of extremists who
resort to violence100.
Box 4. Relations between religious 
and secular circles between 1923
and 2002
The government of Kemal Atatürk (1923–1938),
who removed religion from public life by force
(instituting very limited religious education at
university level, removing lessons on religion
from school curricula and banning the wearing
of headscarves in public institutions), had
a great impact on the shape of the separation of
religion from the state. However, the establish-
ment of democracy after World War II made
the state depart to a certain extent from the ori-
ginal Kemalist version of secularism. Firstly,
public religious middle and secondary schools
(imam hatip), which used the programmes of
secular schools extended by religious curricula,
were established. Their intention was to pre-
pare future candidates for theological studies.
However, the number of imam hatips soon ra-
dically exceeded the Religion Ministry’s per-
sonnel demand, and continued to grow until
1997101. Girls also started attending imam ha-
tips, although women did not have right to per-
form the duties of an imam until 2004. Extra-
curricular religion classes were introduced to
schools in 1949. Courses of Koranic study start-
ed developing. The softening of the state’s ap-
proach was manifested in 1970 through the
emergence of the first Islamic party, which sup-
ported introducing some elements of sharia
into the Turkish legal system, opposed the pro-
cess of Turkey’s integration with the EEC, and
proposed an alliance with Muslim states as an
alternative. Its ideology was named Milli Gorus
(the National Vision). This Islamic party has
been banned four times. In the 1990s, at the
peak of its popularity, it operated under the
names of Refah (Welfare) and Fazilet (Virtue).
The presence of religion in public life reached
its apogee after the 1980 coup, when the
government and the army decided that Islam
had to be treated as an important element of
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Turkish national identity. The policy was inten-
ded to neutralise Kurdish nationalism, radical
left- and right-wing tendencies and Islamic fun-
damentalism. As part of it, obligatory religion
and morality classes were introduced, and the
number of imam hatip schools and Koranic
courses was significantly increased. These poli-
cies, the general increase in popularity of reli-
gious integrationism in the Muslim world, the
difficult financial conditions of millions of Tur-
key’s residents caused by the lack of economic
stability and mass migrations from villages to
cities, disillusionment with corrupt and ineffi-
cient politicians and the intensifying feeling of
not belonging to the Turkish state which many
Kurds shared during the armed conflict be-
tween the army and PKK, have all contributed
to the increasing popularity of Islamist circles,
who are seen as the only trustworthy alterna-
tive anti-system opposition. Refah won the par-
liamentary election in 1995, gaining over 20%
of the votes. The party’s leader Necmettin Er-
bakan headed the government coalition as the
first Islamist prime minister in the history of
the Turkish republic. This was unacceptable to
the army, who forced the dismissal of the go-
vernment on 28 February 1997. The new cabi-
net the liquidated imam hatip middle schools,
imposed scoring rules at university entry exa-
minations, which made it very difficult for gra-
duates of imam hatip secondary schools to en-
rol on other courses than theology, and set
more restrictive rules for opening Koranic cour-
ses. As an effect, the number of course partici-
pants and imam hatip pupils sharply decreas-
ed. The army’s intervention sharpened the pre-
viously existing conflict between the moderate
and conservative factions inside Refah, which
effectively split into two parties, Saadet (Felici-
ty) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The latter set Turkey’s accession to the EU as
the main goal of its foreign policy, and discon-
tinued efforts to introduce elements of sharia
into Turkish law. The AKP, unlike Saadet, sup-
ports the free market, an alliance with the USA
and correct relations with Israel together with
simultaneous rapprochement with the Islamic
world. The AKP ideology was named Muhafa-
zakar Demokrasi (Conservative Democracy).
The AKP differs from the secular establishment
in the way it perceives separation of religion and
the state. Its priorities include lifting the ban on
wearing headscarves at universities, removing
the barriers at university examinations for imam
hatip graduates who want to enrol at other de-
partments than theology, and removing limita-
tions on opening Koran courses102. These issues,
especially the ban on headscarves, are of great
symbolic significance for both secular and conser-
vative circles, and constitute the basis of their
respective political identities. The headscarf issue
is in a way linked to the prospect of Turkey’s in-
tegration with the EU. The AKP supported Tur-
key’s EU accession among other reasons because
it counted on the Union’s support for revising
the rigorous separation of religion and the state.
The European Union supported the secular es-
tablishment in the dispute over headscarves,
because the European Court in Strasbourg de-
clared in 2004 and 2005 that the ban on wearing
headscarves at universities in Turkey did not vio-
late human rights. Many observers claim that
these awards have made EU membership less at-
tractive to the elite of the AKP, which is the strong-
est and most pro-EU party in Turkey.
Being unable to implement its main three objec-
tives, the AKP has been trying to find some ‘sub-
stitute’ topics such as the penalisation of adul-
tery and limiting the sale and consumption of al-
cohol103. It cannot change the status quo mainly
because of the firm stance which the judiciary
has taken. Court awards have blocked the laws
passed by the AKP regarding imam hatip schools,
headscarves and Koranic courses. The present
composition of the most senior judicial institu-
tions (the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court
and the State Council) will change significantly
for the next decade at least104.
Tension between the secular establishment and
the conservative religious circles clearly increas-
ed in May 2006 as a consequence of the murder
of a judge of the State Council (Danistay) and the
wounding of several others by a religious fanatic.
The judges had approved a judgement forbidding
a teacher who wore a headscarf in her private life
outside of school to practice her profession. Mass
demonstrations in support of the secular nature
of the state were held in response. The demon-
strators were led by generals, opposition lead-
ers, judges and professors. The government, wish-
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ing to avoid an open confrontation with the army,
refrained from any disputes. As a result, the situa-
tion calmed down. General Yasar Büyükanit, who
is said to be a staunch supporter of maintaining
the status quo of the secular state, was nominated
as the new general chief of staff in August 2006.
In turn, the AKP is likely to win the parliamenta-
ry election in 2007 and will rule the country for
another five years. This composition of forces will
uphold the tension between the conservative re-
ligious circles and the secular establishment, a ten-
sion which may periodically increase.
A significant cooling of the dispute over values
is unlikely in the longer term. Social conservatism
will maintain its influence because of the higher
population growth rate among the more tradi-
tional and religious part of the society. Their con-
servatism will however be moderated by the ris-
ing education level and the improving economic
situation.
6. The Armenian issue
The ‘Armenian issue’ refers to the dispute be-
tween Turkey and some EU member states over
the matter of recognising the deportations and
massacres of Armenians committed by the Young
Turks regime during World War I as genocide, and
the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey
and Armenia. It has affected Ankara’s EU acces-
sion-related efforts for the following reasons:
– the demand made by many European politi-
cians that the Turkish government should refer
to the deportations and massacres as genocide.
The uncritical acceptance of the Armenian inter-
pretation of those events by many European me-
dia provide reasons for growing nationalist and
Eurosceptic sentiments in Turkey, and strength-
en the conviction that EU elites are employing
double standards;
– it is highly likely that some EU countries will
make Turkey’s accession conditional on Ankara’s
recognising the events as genocide, a condition
that neither Turkish society nor its elites will
accept;
– the demand to acknowledge genocide is often
linked to claims made by many Armenian circles
to territorial compensation, which in effect means
that when the EU raises this issue, Turkey’s ‘S¯v-
res syndrome’ is strengthened;
– the guarantee of an open debate on the depor-
tations and massacres on Turkish territory is an
important condition stipulated by the EU;
– one of the EU’s membership prerequisites is
that the candidate should have correct relations
with its neighbours.
a) The Armenian issue in Turkey’s
relations with EU countries 
and as an internal affair
The issue of referring to the Armenian deporta-
tions as genocide arose for the first time in Tur-
key’s relations with the EEC/EU soon after Turkey
applied for candidate status in 1987. In June of
that year, the European Parliament determined
that the deportations and massacres of Armenians
had been genocide, and that Turkey’s failure to
admit that was ìan impediment to considering the
possibility of Turkey’s accession to the Commu-
nity.’ In September 2005, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution by a clear majority of votes
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stating that recognising the deportations and
massacres of Armenians as genocide was one of
the prerequisites for Turkey’s accession to the EU.
The European Parliament’s resolutions are not
binding, and neither the European Commission
nor the European Council has set such a require-
ment for Turkey. However, the recognition issue
severely affects Turkey’s relations with some EU
countries. The Armenian deportations and mas-
sacres have been recognised as a case of genocide
in various declarations by the parliaments of nine
EU member states (Belgium, Cyprus105, France,
Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and
Italy). Six of the declarations were adopted after
Turkey was granted EU candidate status in 1999106.
Turkey’s refusal to recognise the Armenian geno-
cide affects the country’s relations with France
especially strongly, as one of the most numerous
and most influential Armenian diasporas in the
world is found there. Turkey’s negative response
to the demand to refer to the deportations as ge-
nocide significantly increases the probability that
French society will reject Turkey’s EU accession in
any referendum. In October 2006, the lower house
of the French parliament adopted a law which
provided for penalisation of the view that the
Armenian deportations and massacres were not
a case of genocide. The law is unlikely to take
effect because it would have to pass through the
Senate and be approved by the president, while
both the government coalition and the president
oppose it. However, it has caused great dissatis-
faction among the Turkish elites and public.
The demands by some European political elites
that the Turkish government should acknowledge
the Armenian deportations and massacres as
a case of genocide are perceived in Turkey as hypo-
crisy and double standards. Both Turkish elites
and the society at large believe that the same
should be demanded from other candidate and
member states in the cases of other crimes107.
A free discussion on the Armenian deportations
and massacres was impossible for many years in
Turkey due to strict legal regulations, a situation
which was criticised by the European Union. The
first publications by Turkish and Western histo-
rians which challenged the official version of
those events, which were published in Turkey in
the mid-1990s, encountered many legal problems.
As a result of expanding the freedom of speech
as part of the pro-EU reforms after 2001, the issue
of the Armenian massacres has been discussed
in Turkey on a hitherto unprecedented scale. More
than ten books and hundreds of articles and in-
terviews challenging the official version of events
have been published in Turkey since 2001108. Some
of them have been written by Armenian histo-
rians. Foreign historians have found it much easier
to gain access to the state archives, although they
still encounter some problems. A scientific con-
ference on the situation of Armenians during
World War I, which was organised by three pres-
tigious Istanbul universities, was held in late Sep-
tember 2005. Over 40 researchers, representing
a critical approach to the official version of the
Turkish historiography on those events, took part
in the conference109.
In 2003, the prestigious foundation Tarih Vakfi,
whose members include hundreds of historians
and a group of liberal intellectuals, prepared a pe-
tition in protest against the negative stereotypes
of Armenians presented in Turkish history school
textbooks. Discussions on the deportations and
massacres have been approved by most of the so-
ciety, although a smaller part of the Turkish public
(nearly 30%) are against it110. However, the vast
majority of the Turkish population does not accept
that their country’s accession to the EU depends
on the recognition of Armenian genocide by their
government. A regulation according to which re-
ferring to the deportations and massacres as ge-
nocide was an example of a crime against the
fundamental interests of the state was removed
from the new criminal code in July 2005111.
Although opportunities for discussing the depor-
tations have significantly increased, nationalist
circles use the regulations of the criminal code
(specifically article 301) on the protection of na-
tional dignity to bring suits against intellectuals
who criticise the official version of the country’s
history during World War I. So far, one such suit
ended in sentencing the defendant to imprison-
ment (which was replaced with a fine), and the
others have been discontinued112. Nevertheless,
an open discussion on Armenian massacres still
encounters serious hurdles in Turkey, a glaring
example of which was the January 2007 murder
of Hrant Dink, a Turkish journalist of Armenian
origin who was accused by radical right-wing
circles of denigrating national values.
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b) Turkey’s relations with Armenia
and the Armenian diaspora
Turkey keeps correct relations with all its neigh-
bours, with the exception of Armenia. The two
countries recognise one another, although Tur-
key does not have a diplomatic representation in
Armenia and vice versa. Turkey has maintained
a blockade of the Armenian border since 1993113.
The main reasons for that is the Armenian occu-
pation of nearly 14% of the territory of Azerbai-
jan114, which is officially recognised by Turkey as
the second state of the Turkish nation, as well as
the demands by the Armenian government and
diaspora115 that Turkey should recognise the cri-
mes committed against Armenians as genocide.
According to Armenia, modern Turkey is respon-
sible for the Armenian genocide116. Some Arme-
nian elites and a clear majority of the Armenian
public insist that the recognition of the genocide
by Turkey should automatically entail territorial
compensations. However, the Armenian govern-
ment has been avoiding any unambiguous decla-
ration that it would waive the claims117. Yerevan
is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Tur-
key without any preconditions. Agreement is addi-
tionally impeded by influential and uncompromi-
sing nationalist circles in both countries. The Ar-
menian diaspora, which provides Yerevan with
significant financial support, has a great influence
on the country’s policy on Turkey. Nationalism is
stronger among the diaspora than in Armenian
society. On the Turkish side, anti-Armenian atti-
tudes are represented by adherents of Pan-Tur-
kism, nationalists living in Eastern Turkey (which
had previously been inhabited by Armenians), and
descendants of emigrants from the Caucasus118.
The standpoints presented respectively in Turkish
and Armenian historiographies (the latter con-
cerning both Armenia proper and its diaspora)
completely differ in their evaluations of the Arme-
nian deportations and massacres. In Armenian
historiography, discussion of the dark sides of their
own history is more poorly developed than in Tur-
key. Political tensions and the living memory of
the harm translate into the mutual prejudices of
Armenians and Turks, which are stronger on the
Armenian side119. Regardless of the lack of formal
diplomatic relations, however, trade exchanges
and economic migration from Armenia to Turkey
develop120. Improving Turkish-Armenian relations
would undoubtedly bring a solution to the con-
flict between Azerbaijan and Armenia closer. How-
ever, it is almost impossible that Armenia could
give up its demands that Turkey recognise the ge-
nocide, just as Turkey is unlikely to accept the
condition121.
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7. Cyprus and relations 
with Greece
A settlement of the conflict between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, establishing Turkish-Cypriot
trade relations, recognition of Cyprus and set-
tling the territorial disputes between Greece and
Turkey are vital for Ankara’s relations with the
Union. This is for the following reasons:
– Greece and Cyprus have been members of the
European Union, since 1981 and 2004 respective-
ly, and their consent is necessary to open and close
every chapter of negotiations;
– the fact that Greece and Cyprus are EU member
states makes it difficult for Brussels to play the
role of an unbiased and efficient mediator in re-
solving the problems;
– Turkey’s accession to the EU will be impossible
unless the aforementioned problems are resolved;
– the issue of Cyprus and the EU’s stance towards
it are major sources of nationalism and Euroscep-
ticism in Turkey122;
– since 1974, Turkey has not recognised Cyprus
and has impeded its membership in internation-
al organisations; such a situation has not taken
place so far in relations between any EU candi-
date state and EU member state.
Box 5. An outline of relations
between Greece and Turkey 
and the Cyprus issue
Modern Greece and Turkey have defined them-
selves through mutual opposition, trying to
marginalise any of the common cultural ele-
ments which have arisen from a nearly mil-
lennium-long period of mutual relations123.
Four Greco-Ottoman wars were fought from
the beginning of the nineteenth century (1821–
–1829, 1897, 1912–1913, 1917–1918 and 1919–
–1922). Greek rebellions supported by Athens
(such as the Cretan rising)124 also happened in
the Ottoman Empire. These conflicts were ac-
companied by massacres, ethnic cleansings and
forced displacements. However, temporary im-
provements of Greco-Turkish relations were
also a fact. The longest period over which rela-
tions between Turkey and Greece were good
lasted from 1930 to 1955. They worsened due
to the issue of Cyprus, a former British colony
inhabited by communities of Greeks (nearly
three-quarters of the residents) and Turks (near-
ly a fifth of the residents)125. This has been the
greatest problem in Greco-Turkish relations un-
til today. The Greek population of Cyprus want-
ed unification with Greece, to which Turkish
Cypriots responded by dividing the island126.
The United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey con-
cluded a treaty in London in 1960, pursuant to
which Cyprus gained independence as a bina-
tional state, having no right to unite with
Greece or to divide the island. The signatories
reserved the right of military intervention in
case of a gross breach of the constitution. The
political system was based on the very exten-
sive veto powers granted to the Turkish com-
munity. The veto right was the main source the
Greek community’s dissatisfaction; they pro-
posed changing the system to transform Cyp-
rus into a Greek national state and grant mino-
rity status to the Turks. The Turkish Cypriots
feared that unification of the island with Greece
would be the next step. This led to ethnic
clashes recurring at intervals of several years127.
Radical Greek nationalists took over power in
a coup in 1974 and promised unification with
Greece. They also committed a massacre against
the Turkish population. As a result Turkey, us-
ing the powers granted under the London
Treaty, carried out a military intervention128.
This ended in the Turkish army’s occupation
of nearly 37% of the island129. The internatio-
nal community recognised Turkey’s invasion
of the northern part of Cyprus as an act of occu-
pation. Soon after the invasion, the Turkish Fe-
derated State of Cyprus was set up, which in
1983 proclaimed independence as the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), which was
unrecognised by any state with the exception
of Turkey130. Numerous efforts by the interna-
tional community to find a compromise be-
tween the conflicting communities has failed
to produce a solution.
As a consequence of the Turkish invasion of Cy-
prus, relations between Turkey and Greece were
very bad for the subsequent 25 years. In the
1980s and 1990s, Athens maintained close ties
with countries which were Ankara perceived as
enemies or rivals (such as the USSR to 1991,
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communist Bulgaria, Armenia, Syria and Rus-
sia). The process of improving Turkish-Greek re-
lations started in spring 1999. Its symbolic be-
ginning was marked with a meeting of the fo-
reign ministers of Turkey and Greece, the first in
forty years. The main reasons for changing the
relations between Athens and Ankara were the
following:
– the clear rapprochement of Turkey and the
USA, and a simultaneous weakening of the in-
ternational position of Greece as a consequence
of the negative stance taken by Athens on the
NATO intervention in Kosovo and its giving
shelter to the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in
the Greek embassy in Kenya;
– the prospect of Greece entering the euro zone
(1 January 2000) and the related conviction by
the Greek government of the need to cut its de-
fence expenses in order to adjust the macro-
economic indexes to meet the euro zone re-
quirements;
– Ankara’s strengthening position in the EU
upon the electoral victory of socio-democrats in
Germany, who support Turkey’s EU accession;
– the appointment of Ismail Cem, a supporter
of improving relations with Greece, to the post
of Foreign Minister of Turkey in 1999;
– mutual aid offered after the earthquakes (Au-
gust – September 1999);
– the upcoming EU Helsinki summit in 1999,
at which time a decision on the possible grant-
ing of candidate status to Turkey was expected
to be taken. Ankara wanted to improve its
relations with Athens because this would add
strength to its position131.
a) An outline of relations 
between Greece and Turkey 
and the Cyprus issue
Greece supported granting Turkey candidate sta-
tus at the Helsinki summit in December 1999.
Since that time, all serious political forces in Greece
have supported Turkey’s accession to the EU. This
support is based on the conviction that having
Turkey as a democratic, stable EU member state is
in Greece’s long-term interest132. The support of-
fered for the first time by both states to the most
serious plan to resolve the Cyprus problem, which
was devised by the UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan following the EU Copenhagen summit in
2003, was the most significant consequence of the
improvement in Turkish-Greek relations.
Box 6. The Annan Plan
The plan provided for establishing a United Re-
public of Cyprus as a loose confederation of two
component states, the Turkish Cypriot State (the
former KKTC) and the Greek Cypriot State (the
former Republic of Cyprus). The main common
institutions were to be the bicameral parlia-
ment (including the Senate, in which both re-
publics would have equal representations),
which would elect the Presidential Council
(4 Greeks and 2 Turks) which would elect the
president and the vice president by rotation, as
well as the Supreme Court, the panel of which
was to consist of equal numbers of both com-
munities’ representatives as well as three for-
eign judges. The constitution could be amended
only by a majority of votes cast by representati-
ves of both component states. The federal au-
thorities’ tasks were to cover foreign, fiscal and
customs policies and communications. The
Greek part would be increased in three years by
8% of the island’s territory controlled by the
KKTC and over 1% of the British sovereign base
areas. The border in the central part of the is-
land would significantly reduce the territory of
its Turkish part. Both component states were
given the right to impose limitations on the per-
manent residence of citizens of the other ethnic
origin in case their number reached 18% of their
respective populations within the period of 19
years, or until Turkey’s accession to the EU. This
solution was especially important for the small-
er Turkish community. Refugees were offered
the right to regain one-third of the value of lost
property, and to compensation for the remain-
ing two-thirds within a period of three to five
years. The plan also provided for granting Cy-
priot citizenship to a majority of settlers from
Turkey within four years. The military contin-
gents of Turkey and Greece were to be reduced
by 2011 (to 6,000 personnel each), by 2018 or
until Turkey’s accession to the EU (3,000 per-
sonnel each) and after that date (650 personnel
in the Turkish contingent and 950 in the Greek
contingent).
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During that summit, Turkey’s support for the set-
tlement of the issue of Cyprus was determined
as one of the key conditions for setting the date
to open negotiations with Ankara and for hold-
ing a referendum on this issue133. This was held
on 24 April 2004134. Nearly two-thirds of Turkish
Cypriots and less than 25% of Greek Cypriots
voted in favour of the plan135. Soon after the refe-
rendum, the European Council (without Cyprus
at that time) declared it was determined to lift
the isolation of the KKTC and obliged the Euro-
pean Commission to prepare a concrete propos-
al. In July 2004, the European Commission came
up with the proposal to offer 259 million euro in
aid to the KKTC for the period between 2004 and
August 2006, and to open the EU market on prefe-
rential conditions for exports from the KKTC,
which was to be the first step towards lifting the
international embargo. The EU accepted the trans-
fer of 200 million euro to the KKTC as late as
October 2006,although the Union has still not
agreed to open its market to goods from the
KKTC as of today136. This situation is principally
a result of the stances taken by Greece and Cyp-
rus. Their behaviour may be motivated by the fear
that ending the economic isolation of the Turkish
part of Cyprus will lead to an improvement in its
economic situation, in effect strengthening its
negotiating position. Their stances found favour-
able conditions in the situation of a lack of defi-
nite support for Turkey’s accession from EU mem-
ber states. In July 2005, the Turkish government
signed a document to extend the customs union
to Cyprus137. However, the protocol on extending
the customs union has to be ratified by the Turk-
ish parliament. At the same time, it made a decla-
ration stating that signing the protocol did not
mean the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. On 21
September 2005, the EU responded with a coun-
ter-declaration, which rejected the Turkish go-
vernment’s declaration and stated that in 2006
Ankara should bring the customs union into effect
with regard to all EU member states, that is,
opening Turkish air and sea ports to Cypriot pla-
nes and ships. Pursuant to the European Union’s
declaration, Turkey’s failure to carry out this de-
mand will adversely affect the negotiating pro-
cess, and Turkey must recognise Cyprus before
joining the Union138. This declaration is not bind-
ing on Turkey. Nevertheless, the condition of ex-
tending the customs union to Cyprus by the end
of 2007 is provided for under the Accession Part-
nership signed by Turkey and the EU. In January
2006, Turkey presented a plan to simultaneously
lift the trade embargo imposed on the KKTC and
open Turkish sea and air ports to Cypriot ships
and planes. This plan met with a cold reception
from Greece and Cyprus. In September 2006,
Finland (which held the EU presidency at the
time) suggested lifting the trade isolation of the
KKTC by opening the port of Famagusta under
UN supervision and bringing the small town of
Varosha, located in the Turkish part of the is-
land, under UN control. Turkey was to open seve-
ral ports to Cypriot ships in exchange for that.
However, the Turkish-Cypriot talks ended in fail-
ure. As a consequence, the European Union decid-
ed in December 2006 to exclude 8 chapters from
negotiations until Turkey extended the customs
union to Cyprus.
b) Disputable issues 
in the Aegean Sea region
The issue of borders in the Aegean Sea is a source
of a serious dispute in Greco-Turkish relations. In
June 1995, Greece signed the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (not rati-
fied by Turkey), which set 12 nautical miles as
a top limit of territorial waters. 148 states and the
EU ratified UNCLOS by 20 September 2005139. Tur-
key did not because it opposed the expanding of
Greek territorial waters from 6 miles, a zone res-
pected by Athens since 1936, to 12 miles. Accord-
ing to Ankara, this regulation increased the area
of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from
44% to 71%, and reduced the scope of interna-
tional waters from nearly 49% to less than 20%.
Soon after Greece’s ratification of the convention,
the Turkish parliament adopted a resolution, ac-
cording to which Greece’s expansion of the bor-
ders of its territorial waters to 12 miles was a ca-
sus belli. Since the intervention in Cyprus (1974),
Turkey has also started challenging the 10-mile
distance, which was determined by Greece as the
scope of Greek air space in 1931. This means that
incidents between both countries’ military aircraft
often happen in the disputed zone. In the 1990s,
Turkey and Greece twice found themselves on the
brink of war over the ownership of tiny islands in
the Dodecanese archipelago140. More than 30 Gre-
co-Turkish meetings have been held since 2002 to
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discuss the territorial disputes linked to the Aege-
an Sea, and still no solution has been found. A po-
sitive event was the establishing of a government
telephone ‘hot line’ in June 2006 between Ankara
and Athens to alleviate tensions in case of inci-
dents in the disputed zone. Joint manoeuvres by
the Turkish and Greek navies were held in early
October 2006 for the first time in history.
The status of minorities is also a source of misun-
derstandings in Turkish-Greek relations. Nearly
5,000 Greeks live in Turkey, while the population
of Greece includes between 100,000 and 120,000
Turks. Both parties, pursuant to the Lausanne
Treaty of 1923 which marked the end of the Turk-
ish-Greek war, recognise them not as ethnic but
religious minorities. However, neither Athens nor
Ankara fully respects the treaty’s provisions re-
garding the two minorities’ cultural and religious
autonomy.
Problems in bilateral relations between Greece
and Turkey are of secondary importance in com-
parison with the issue of Cyprus. If the latter was
resolved, compromise on other Greco-Turkish dis-
putes would become significantly easier. The EU
had little chance of success at linking Cyprus’ ac-
cession with the regulation of Greco-Turkish rela-
tions on the island because of the firm resistance
to such moves by Greece, which has been a mem-
ber of the EEC/EU since 1981. As an EU member
state, Greece could veto any EU decision. Another
reason why European integration could not be
used as a tool in the process of regulating Greco-
Turkish relations in Cyprus was the lack of any
clear support by European elites to Turkey’s mem-
bership in the EU. As a result, Brussels conferred
candidate status on Cyprus (1997), conducted
membership negotiations with it (1998–2002),
and then accepted its membership (2004) with-
out trying to reunite the island before that.
c) Conclusions and forecasts
The prospect of EU membership, which has been
the main driving force for initiating democratic
reforms in Turkey, cannot effectively and durably
stabilise the internal situation. The country has to
cope with more serious problems, both internal
and external, in its relations with the EU and the
Union’s individual member states than any other
previous candidate has had to. As a consequence,
negotiations between Ankara and Brussels are li-
kely to be significantly prolonged and even tem-
porarily withheld. The possibility that the nego-
tiations will finally be broken off is also real.
Currently, opening Turkish sea and air ports to Cy-
priot ships and planes is the key issue in Turkey’s
relations with the European Union. Pursuant to
the Accession Partnership, the Turkish parliament
has to ratify an additional protocol to extend the
customs union to Cyprus and provide Cypriot
ships and planes with access to all its ports and
airports by early 2008. Turkey has made the ratifi-
cation dependent on a total removal of the trade
isolation of the KKTC. The Turkish parliament will
certainly not vote for the customs union unless
the EU simultaneously lifts its isolation of the
KKTC. Reaching an agreement with the EU on this
point will not mean that the Cyprus issue will stop
being one of the biggest problems in Turkish-EU
relations. The issues of Turkey’s refusal to recog-
nise Cyprus and the unification of the island will
remain unresolved. Cyprus will continue making
its consent to open or close a subsequent chapter
on the recognition of its statehood by Ankara,
which in turn will not make such a decision un-
less the island is unified. Nicosia will probably de-
mand unification of the island on more favourable
conditions than those provided for under the An-
nan Plan. Ankara is very unlikely to make any sig-
nificant concessions regarding this issue. There-
fore, the stance of the key EU members and the
USA on the unification of Cyprus will be of key im-
portance in this case.
A crisis in Turkish-EU relations may be provoked
at the beginning of 2008 by a possible insufficient
implementation of the Accession Partnership by
Ankara. The main impediment to its implemen-
tation will be the conflict with the Kurdish guer-
rilla forces. The situation may be additionally com-
plicated by the possible disintegration of Iraq and
the emergence of an independent Kurdish state
in its northern territories. Strong nationalist and
Eurosceptic sentiments will have a detrimental
effect on the government’s readiness to satisfy the
European Union’s requirements. In 2007, the go-
vernment’s determination to do so will also be re-
duced due to upcoming elections141 as well as pos-
sible tensions between the new general chief of
staff and the prime minister over the definition of
the secular state. The parliament’s election of
a new president will be a very sensitive issue. The
secular establishment does not want a politician
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whose wife will wear a headscarf to be nomina-
ted to the post. The prime minister, whose wife
wears a headscarf, did not initially rule out run-
ning for the post, although it now appears that
his most likely replacement, the former foreign
minister, is also married to a woman who wears
a headscarf.
US intervention in Iran, which would lead to Tur-
key’s greater engagement in Middle Eastern af-
fairs at the expenses of European issues, and to
an intensification of anti-Western sentiments (the
conflict will be perceived in religious terms), can-
not be ruled out in the immediate future.
Reforms will not be put on a faster track after the
elections, if nationalism and Euroscepticism re-
main popular ideas in Turkey. Ending the military
conflict with Kurdish guerrilla forces and impro-
ving the EU’s attitude to Turkey’s candidacy could
contribute to reducing public support for them.
However, to achieve success in the fight against
Kurdish guerrillas, apart from military actions, it
is necessary to take brave and difficult political de-
cisions (such as declaring an amnesty for Kurdish
prisoners). Radical changes in Ankara’s policy to-
wards the Kurds are highly unlikely, as the pros-
pect of EU membership has become less real. In
turn, the possibility of accession will not become
more real unless the support of European societies
and political elites for Turkey’s membership rises.
Existing tensions between the West and Muslims,
economic, political and social problems in indivi-
dual EU member states, and problems with defi-
ning the political system of the Union itself and
a possible lack of improvement of Turkey’s inter-
nal situation142 all lessen the probability of rever-
sing Europeans’ negative attitude to Turkey’s can-
didacy. Even if the perception of Turkey’s acces-
sion improves in the EU and the negotiations end
in success, its membership will be uncertain until
the last moment because Turkey’s accession has
to be accepted by all member states. In turn, some
member states and communities in the EU pre-
sent a sceptical or very sceptical attitude to Tur-
key’s possible membership of the EU.
If the European Union decides to suspend nego-
tiations, because of Cyprus or a negative evalua-
tion of the tempo of Turkish reforms, this will give
rise to a crisis in relations between Turkey and
the Union. Its probable consequences will include:
– a regression of the democratisation process in
Turkey;
– growing tension between the army and the AKP;
– a smaller chance for any peaceful solution to the
Kurdish conflict;
– intensifying anti-Western sentiments among the
Turkish society and elites, which will accordingly
affect foreign policy;
– impediments to political and economic co-ope-
ration between Ankara and the EU countries;
– problems with integrating the Turkish minority
in the EU (the Turkish government’s support for
anti-integration tendencies in the diaspora);
– worsening relations between Turkey and Greece;
and
– Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia and Mus-
lim countries.
On the other hand, the scale of economic and po-
litical ties existing between Turkey and EU coun-
tries makes it highly unlikely that Turkey will
adopt a radically anti-Western foreign policy.
Adam Balcer
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Appendix 1
Public opinion poll results
1. Attitudes to the West and Europe
In the survey entitled NATO and Turkish Foreign
Policy, conducted in June 2004 by Pollmark re-
search centre, 47% of Turks declared that Turkey
was a Western country and 36% stated it was an
Eastern country (Asia), 54% had a positive atti-
tude to the West and 29% had a negative attitude.
The proportions of the answers to the questions
whether Turkey should be a Western state were
almost identical.
According to the survey Euroscepticism in Turkey
conducted in late 2003 by Hakan Yilmaz, 52% of
Turks believed that Turkey was historically a part
of Europe. In Eurobarometer no. 63 (spring 2005),
58% of Turks declared that Turkey was to some
extent a part of Europe in historical terms. 29%
were of the opposite opinion, including 16% who
were radically opposite.
At the end of 2003, 48% of Turks were proud of
being Europeans, and 24% were somewhat proud
of that. At the end of 2004, the number of Turks
who defined themselves as somewhat proud fell
to 15%. In Eurobarometer for candidate countries
no. 2003.4 (autumn 2003), 41% of Turks declared
they felt dedicated or very dedicated to the no-
tion of ‘Europe’, 26% felt slightly dedicated and
31% were not dedicated at all. In spring 2005, the
first group reduced to 30%, and the proportion
of respondents who declared a slight dedication
to Europe had risen to 36%. A lack of dedication
was declared by 29% of Turks.
There are no more up-to-date surveys, although
identifications with being Europeans, Europe and
the West have probably lessened due to the EU’s
reducing support for Turkey’s membership.
2. Attitude to the European Union
In the survey Türk Dis Siyaseti Arastirmasi carried
out in late 2003 by Pollmark, to the question of
which countries Turkey should co-operate with in
the long term, over 50% of respondents chose
the EU, 23% the Turkish republics, 13% the Middle
East and 6% the USA. In the poll conducted by
ANAR centre in November 2006, the following
answers were given to the question of ‘With
which countries should relations be given high-
er priority by Turkey?’: nearly 32% answered with
the EU, 23% with the Turkish republics, 21% with
Muslim countries, 15% with neighbours and 3%
with the USA.
The fact that Turkish society treats EU member-
ship as a matter of priority was proven by the sur-
vey conducted by Pollmark company in 2004 be-
fore the EU summit in December, when the deci-
sion to open negotiations with Turkey was expect-
ed to be taken. 56% of Turks answered that if
a date was not set, Turkey should continue its ef-
forts to attain EU membership. 37% were of the
opposite opinion. At the present moment, the ma-
jority of those supporting a continuation of the
membership-related efforts would probably be
significantly smaller.
According to Eurobarometer, 60% of Turks had
a positive attitude to the EU and 20% had a nega-
tive attitude in autumn 2005. In mid-2006, Euro-
barometer (no. 65) showed that 43% of respon-
dents presented a positive attitude and 26% a ne-
gative attitude to the European Union. The 2004
Transatlantic Trends survey revealed that 70% of
Turks believed that EU membership was a good
thing, and less than 10% thought it was a bad
thing. According to the same survey carried out
in 2006, 54% of Turks were of the opinion that
Turkey’s EU membership would be a good thing
and over 20% thought it would be bad. The Euro-
barometer survey at the end of 2005 showed that
35% of Turks distrusted the EU and more than
half trusted it. The same survey in 2006 showed
the reverse proportion.
According to the A&G centre’s survey in autumn
2004, 67% of Turks believed that Turkey’s EU mem-
bership was a necessity. 9% were of the opinion
that Turkey should not join the EU. In autumn
2006, the former opinion was supported by 32%
of respondents and the latter by 25%. The most
numerous group presented neutral views.
3. Attitude to democracy
Surveys conducted by World Value Survey, Gallup
International, the Pew Research Centre and Turk-
ish public opinion research centres have shown
that a vast majority of Turks perceive democracy
as the best system. According to the survey enti-
tled Türkiye’de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet,
Bati conducted by Hakan Yilmaz in 2006, nearly
35
T
h
e
 h
u
rd
le
 r
a
c
e
. 
T
h
e
 g
re
a
te
s
t 
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
b
a
rr
ie
rs
 i
n
 T
u
rk
e
y
’s
 p
a
th
 t
o
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
C E S  R e p o r t
75% of respondents declared that tortures and
censorship could not be used in any situation.
On the other hand, in the public opinion poll car-
ried out by Ali Çarkoslu and Ersin Kalayicoglu
Türkiye’de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi in 2006,
more than a half of respondents stated that dis-
respect of human rights was permissible in a si-
tuation of serious threat to state security and that,
if necessary, a strong leader should be able to rule
unrestricted by any legal limitations.
A great part of Turkish society is sceptical about
the possibility of building democracy in Turkey. In
the Pew Research Centre survey conducted in
summer 2006, nearly 40% of Turks stated that de-
mocracy could not operate in Turkey as a purely
Western invention.
4. The feeling of cultural difference
In the Gallup poll in 2001, 45% of Turks said that
the West had a bad influence on Turkish culture.
Sexual permissiveness, pornography and drug
abuse were the most frequently mentioned exam-
ples of negative Western influence on Turkey. On
the other hand, 73% of Turks admitted that the
West made good films and music. In that survey,
Turks stood out among other polled Muslim socie-
ties (such as Indonesia and Pakistan) as they em-
phasised democracy and human rights and not
technological development as the advantages of
the West.
In Eurobarometer no. 63 (spring 2005), 57% of
Turks (33% of whom were totally in favour) agreed
with the opinion that the cultural differences be-
tween Turkey and Europe were so great that they
would prevent Turkey’s accession to the EU. Ac-
cording to the survey Türkiye’de Muhazakarlik –
Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati, conducted by a team led by
Professor Hakan Yilmaz at the end of 2005, be-
tween 35% and 40% of respondents believed that
Turkish society should rely only on its own tradi-
tions in the field of culture, between 30% and 35%
supported limited Westernisation in this area, and
between 20% and 25% firmly supported copying
Western cultural models. In the same survey, res-
pondents stated that Turkey’s EU membership
would have a detrimental effect on religious val-
ues (63%), young people’s morality (61%) and the
family structure (52%). In comparison to the 2003
Euroscepticism in Turkey survey, these fears had
increased by 5% to 10%. According to the Trans-
atlantic Trends 2005 survey, 42% stated (includ-
ing 24% firmly) that the EU was a Christian club,
where no place for Turkey could be found. 52%
were of the opposite opinion.
5. Attitude to sovereignty
Eurobarometer surveys carried out between 2003
and 2005 showed Turkish society as being very
sceptical about the possibility of subordinating
the Turkish armed forces to a hypothetical Euro-
pean defence ministry. On the other hand, the
Turkish public supported a common European de-
fence and foreign policy, often more readily than
people in some EU countries. Due to worsening
relations between Turkey and the EU, in 2006 the
number of respondents who did not have an opi-
nion on the issue significantly increased, while
the number of supporters of such policies de-
creased. The Transatlantic Trends 2005 poll show-
ed that readiness to use force to defend the inte-
rests of their state was quite widespread in Tur-
key; it is stronger than in Europe and similar to
that in the USA. However, Turkish society’s devo-
tion to their state’s sovereignty does not mean
that Turks totally reject any compromises in for-
eign policy; this was best illustrated by their views
on the plan for the unification of Cyprus in April
2004. In a poll conducted at that time in Turkey
by Pollmark centre, 47% of respondents support-
ed the plan and 38% were against it.
6. Fears of threats posed by the West
and Europe to the country’s integrity
The Euroscepticism in Turkey survey conducted
by Hakan Yilmaz in 2003 showed that 36% of
Turks feared that Turkey’s EU membership would
cause their country to split up along ethnic lines.
According to Türkiye’de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din,
Devlet, Bati poll led by Hakan Yilmaz in the begin-
ning of 2006, between 65% and 70% of Turks
were convinced that European countries support-
ed Kurdish separatists and wanted to divide Tur-
key. In the same poll, over 45% of respondents
stated that the conditions imposed by the EU on
Turkey reminded them of the provisions of the
Treaty of S¯vres signed in 1920, pursuant to which
Turkey had lost most of its territories and sove-
reignty. In 2003, this opinion was supported by
36% of respondents. In the case of both surveys
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a significant part of the respondents did not have
an opinion on this issue. In the survey Türkiye’de
milliyet˜ilik carried out in spring 2006, 50% of
respondents claimed that the EU wanted to divide
Turkey, and one-third stated that the European
Union’s requirements were no different from the
provisions of the Treaty of Sevres.
7. Conservatism and views 
on the secular state
According to the survey What the World Thinks in
2003 conducted by Pew Research Centre, 73% of
Turks fully supported the separation of religion
and the state, and 15% supported it to a great
extent. Similar results were shown by Ali Çarko-
glu and Binaz Topak in their survey Degisen Tür-
kiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset carried out in 2006, in
which over 76% of Turks opposed introducing
sharia law in Turkey and 8% supported the idea.
Surveys in 1999 showed over 20% support for
introducing sharia. In the survey Türkiye’de Din,
Toplum ve Siyaset in 1999, nearly 15% of respon-
dents supported introducing into Turkish law
new rules regarding divorce, marriage (polygamy)
and inheritance which were based on sharia and
discriminated against women. In the same poll,
over two-thirds of Turks declared that publish-
ing books which denied the existence of God and
selling alcohol during the holy month of Rama-
dan had to be banned. In the same poll, 7% of
respondents stated that marital infidelity should
be punished by execution, 1.5% would impose the
lash, 17% imprisonment and nearly 16% would
impose a more lenient penalty (such as a fine). In
the Pollmark survey in 2004, in a debate on the
penalisation of marital infidelity, 37% of respon-
dents supported introducing a regulation to pe-
nalise adultery in the criminal code, even if that
would cause breaking off relations with the EU.
In the survey Türkiye’de Sosyal Tercihler Arastir-
masi conducted in 2006, over 30% of Turks de-
clared that boys and girls should be educated se-
parately.
According to the poll Türkiye’de Muhazakarlik –
Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati carried out in 2006, over 40%
of respondents claimed that a woman who de-
clared herself a Muslim should cover her head.
25% admitted they felt uncomfortable seeing
a woman without a headscarf, while 35% claim-
ed they did not fast during Ramadan. More than
half felt uncomfortable at the sight of ‘scantily’
dressed women and nearly two-thirds felt uncom-
fortable about unmarried couples. On the other
hand, nearly 40% of Turks felt uncomfortable at
the sight of women wearing charshafs (black ro-
bes covering all the body) and of bearded men
wearing religious headgear. In the survey What
The World Thinks in 2003 (Pew Research Centre),
25% of Turks fully agreed and 12% partly agreed
with the opinion that limitations on common
work of women and men should be imposed. Ac-
cording to the survey Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve
Siyasette Kadin carried out in 2004 by Binnaz To-
prak and Ersin Kalaycioglu, over 20% of respon-
dents believed that common work of men and
women was improper.
8. Views on the social position 
of women
According to the survey Türkiye’de Muhazakarlik
– Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati carried out in 2006, near-
ly 90% of Turks believed that women should
have absolutely equal rights as men in all areas
of life. At the same time, two-thirds agreed with
the opinion that if a woman could not combine
her professional work with her home duties, she
should give up work because taking care of her
home and husband was her natural duty.
Additionally, in a special Eurobarometer entitled
Social Values, Science and Technology (conducted in
early 2005), 58% of Turks stated that men were
generally better political leaders than women.
This was the highest coefficient among all the EU
member and candidate states. 51% presented this
view in the survey Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siya-
sette Kadin held in 2004. 36% of men would not
agree to their wives’ involvement in political acti-
vity. On the other hand, the same survey showed
that 78% of Turks did not mind having a woman
as president. 74% supported guaranteeing wo-
men places on lists of candidates in general elec-
tions. According to the survey conducted in 2006
by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), over three-quarters of respondents sup-
ported the guaranteeing of a certain number of
parliament seats to women.
According to various surveys, between 30% and
45% of Turks agree with the statements that uni-
versity education is more important for boys than
girls. On the other hand, in the poll Is Yasami, Üst
37
T
h
e
 h
u
rd
le
 r
a
c
e
. 
T
h
e
 g
re
a
te
s
t 
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
b
a
rr
ie
rs
 i
n
 T
u
rk
e
y
’s
 p
a
th
 t
o
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
C E S  R e p o r t
Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadin, 83% of respondents
admitted that the lower level of women’s educa-
tion has inhibited Turkey’s development. In turn,
64% declared a readiness to accept additional tax-
es for the benefit of women’s education.
In the poll on the sexual life of Turks carried out
for Hürriyet newspaper in summer 2005 by
TNS–Pinar, nearly half of the respondents were
fully convinced that men should marry virgins.
More than a half claimed that a daughter’s vir-
ginity was a token of her husband’s or father’s
honour. A small minority of parents declared per-
mission for their daughters to engage in prema-
rital sex (the percentage was much higher in the
case of sons). A significant minority accepted pre-
marital erotic experiences which did not cause
loss of virginity. Young people were more liberal
on these issues.
In the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey
carried out regularly for decades by the Hacet-
tepe University Institute of Population Studies,
nearly 40% of Turkish women stated that their
husbands had the right to hit them in certain si-
tuations. Nearly a quarter of respondents agreed
with this opinion in the survey Türkiye’de Muha-
zakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati.
9. Religiousness
Turkish society is less religious than most Mus-
lim societies. Still, Turks are much more religious
than residents of the West. According to surveys
carried out in 2006 by Ali Çarkoglu and Binnaz
Toprak, 64% of women in Turkey wore headscar-
ves (some of them were compelled to do so by
their families); the number of women wearing
headscarves had decreased by almost 10% since
1999. According to the survey by A&G in 2003,
32% of Turks prayed regularly five times a day,
39% quite often, 5% only on important holidays
and 20% never. In another survey, conducted by
the Pew Research Centre in 2002, 33% declared
they did not pray at all or prayed only on impor-
tant holidays. According to Ali Çarkoglu’s survey
in 2003, 43% of Turks went to mosques at least
once a week. A survey carried out at the end of
Ramadan in 2003 by Pollmark showed that 65%
of Turks had fasted regularly during the whole of
Ramadan, 15% on some days of Ramadan and
20% had not fasted at all. All the polls prove the
existence of differences between the generations;
young people adhere to religious rules to a less-
er extent. Public opinion polls indicate that over
60% of residents of Turkey support lifting the ban
on wearing headscarves by students and (to
a slightly smaller degree) by public servants. More
than half of Turks also support changing the uni-
versity examination rules, which pose a serious
barrier to imam hatip secondary school gradu-
ates who want to enrol at departments other than
theology. On the other hand, a clear majority of
the society do not consider the existence of these
restrictions as discrimination against religious
people. On the other hand, although the ban on
wearing headscarves is believed to be discrimi-
natory, this issue is not a serious problem for most
Turks. The conviction that religion is important
in their lives has strengthened among Turks over
recent years. In the survey carried out by Ali Çar-
koglu and Binnaz Toprak in 1999, 25% of respon-
dents declared to be religious and 6% identified
themselves as very religious. In 2006, the propor-
tions were 46% and 13% respectively. In 1999, 36%
of respondents identified themselves as Muslims
first, and in 2006 the percentage grew to 45%.
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Appendix 2
Armenian deportations and 
massacres during World War I
According to Turkish school textbooks, a great re-
bellion broke out during World War I among the
Armenians, who were collaborating with Russia
against the Ottoman Empire, and the state was
forced to deport them as a result. Reportedly,
300,000 Armenians (nearly a quarter of the popu-
lation) died. Most of them were killed by disease,
hunger and exhaustion. At the time of the depor-
tation, massacres were also committed by Kurdish
tribes, recalcitrant army units and paramilitary
troops. Armenians committed numerous crimes
against the Muslim populations. There were more
Muslim victims in absolute numbers, yet propor-
tionately they were less numerous than the Ar-
menians
According to Armenian history textbooks, the ge-
nocide claimed the lives of one and a half million
Armenians (nearly three-quarters of the popula-
tion). Armenians were defenceless victims of the
Ottoman government’s policy, which was aimed
at the physical eradication of the entire nation.
Armenian historians often compare the Armenian
genocide to the Holocaust against the Jews in
World War II. They even claim it was a paradigm
for all the genocides committed in the twentieth
century, and call it the first genocide of the cen-
tury. Some believe that the genocide was planned
before the outbreak of the war. Both versions raise
serious reservations.
The Tsar’s army already included volunteer units
consisting of Ottoman Armenians before the war.
Caucasian Armenians, including senior military
personnel, constituted a significant part of the
Tsar’s troops who fought against the Ottoman
Empire. Over the period which lasted between the
Ottoman Empire joining the war (autumn 1914)
and the deportations (spring 1915), the following
interlinked processes were taking place in Eastern
Anatolia: a regular Ottoman-Russian war was be-
ing fought, Armenian guerrilla activity was deve-
loping behind the lines, Ottoman troops were pa-
cifying Armenian villages and slaughtering the ci-
vilian populations, who were considered as a Rus-
sian ‘fifth column’, and Armenian guerrillas com-
mitted crimes against the Muslim population,
albeit on a smaller scale. The massacres commit-
ted by the Ottoman army spurred on the activi-
ty of Armenian guerrilla forces. Thousands of Ar-
menians deserted from the Ottoman army to join
the guerrilla troops or the Tsar’s army. In winter
1915, those Armenian conscripts who had remain-
ed were discharged from military service and
transferred to labour battalions. Many of them
died of hunger, diseases and fatigue. In spring
and summer 1915, they were executed.
To sum up, a large group of Ottoman Armenians
did join the struggle against the empire. However,
this group was clearly a minority of the Arme-
nian population. Armenian military activity, con-
trary to the official Turkish thesis, did not take
the form of a mass uprising. Nevertheless, it was
not a marginal issue, as the Armenian side would
like it to be seen.
The deportations began at the time when the Ot-
toman Empire found itself in a very difficult mili-
tary situation. The Ottoman army had suffered
heavy defeats on all fronts, especially in the Cau-
casus. In spring 1915, the Russian army and Ar-
menian rebels occupied the strategic city of Van,
and the Entente forces landed in Gallipoli, close
to the capital city of Istanbul, as well as in Kuwait,
and were also marching towards Baghdad. The
deportations, which had began in the east, ex-
tended over several months to Central and West-
ern Anatolia. A minority of those Armenians who
did not leave the empire’s territory between 1915
and 1918 survived the deportations. (Some Arme-
nians performed public functions over the entire
war period.) Tens of thousands fled in 1915 from
the east of the country to the Russian-controlled
Caucasus and Iran, where many of them died of
hunger and diseases in subsequent years. Accord-
ing to some moderate Armenian historians (such
as Ronald G. Suny) and Turkish historians who
recognise the deportations as genocide (Taner
Ak˜am and Halil Berktay), over 800,000 Ottoman
Armenians (nearly a half of the population) died
during the war.
The deportations took different forms in the East-
ern and Western areas of Anatolia, as well as in
individual regions. In Eastern Anatolia, the Otto-
man army, paramilitary troops and Kurdish tribes
on one side were fighting against Armenian
guerrilla forces and the Tsar’s army on the other
during the deportations. No railway network
existed. In effect, Armenians from Eastern Ana-
tolia were forced to walk long distances in un-
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favourable climate and geographical conditions.
Most of them died (due to diseases, hunger, thirst
and fatigue) or were killed by Kurdish highland-
ers, Ottoman soldiers and members of paramili-
tary troops.
Armenians from Western Anatolia were deport-
ed by rail, avoiding massacres and long marches.
All deportees were forced to settle in Syria, main-
ly in camps situated in the desert. The climate
conditions, food and water shortages and diseas-
es killed thousands of them. Several months later,
subsequent massacres were committed in east-
ern Syrian camps, in which thousands of Arme-
nians were killed. At the same time, the Tsar’s
army – supported by Armenian volunteers – oc-
cupied Eastern Anatolia, which was followed by
retaliatory massacres of the Muslim population
and by many Muslims fleeing to Central Anatolia.
The course of the deportations and the fate of the
deportees at the local level depended on the be-
haviour of the Ottoman personnel. Tens of middle-
and high-ranking officers and officials treated Ar-
menians in a humanitarian way or resisted the
deportations.
These deportations were based on the principle of
collective responsibility. The authorities deport-
ed a clear majority of Armenians, including from
those regions where no military activity had been
conducted. The deportation decree passed by the
government gave the army the right to crush re-
sistance by any means necessary. Women, chil-
dren and old people were noticeably overrepre-
sented among the deportees. The deportation was
accompanied by a confiscation of Armenian pro-
perty. Special regulations imposed very serious
restrictions on regaining property and compen-
sations. The authorities settled Muslims, mainly
refugees, in place of the deported Armenians.
Many thousands of Armenians were forced to con-
vert to Islam. Most crimes against Armenians
were committed by units which were linked,
either directly or indirectly, to the state. The state
imposed very lenient penalties on some of those
who were guilty of the crimes, and it often used
repressions against those officials and officers
who had treated Armenians humanely or resisted
their deportations. Even historians who do not re-
cognise the deportations as genocide admit that
the state treated Armenians during the war much
worse (regarding such matters as supplies and
protection) than Muslim refugees and the Otto-
man army. Some of them believe that the repres-
sions against Armenians were clearly dispropor-
tional to the threat posed by them to the empire.
The Ottoman war casualties would have been
much smaller if the deportation had not been
carried out. The number of Armenian victims kill-
ed by Muslims during the war exceeded the num-
ber of Turks and Kurds killed by Armenians by
many times.
The term ‘genocide’ has a very wide scope. It is
used in international law to define very different
crimes, ranging from the Holocaust of the Jews
through to the Srebrenica massacre committed
by Bosnian Serb forces during the Bosnian War
(1992–1995). In the opinion of most historians, re-
searchers of Armenian affairs and experts on ge-
nocide (including the author of the term, R. Lem-
kin), the Armenian deportations and massacres
do in fact meet the definition of genocide. Many
experts on the history of the Ottoman Empire
are of the opposite opinion.
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1 The Empire had also conquered Northern Africa and the
Middle East, yet its centres were located in the Balkans and
Western Anatolia. An Economic and Social History of the
Ottoman Empire 1300–1914, ed. D. Quataert, H. Inalcik,
Cambridge 1994.
2 In the course of the negotiations, the Turkish side fruit-
lessly tried to include a provision that would specify the date
on which Turkey would be accepted into the EEC, provided
that it had satisfied the required conditions. The Community
did not want to agree to that, and as a result, article 28 was
added to the agreement, which provided that if adequate
conditions for Turkey’s joining the EEC appeared, then both
parties should consider the issue of Turkey’s membership.
3 At the same time, Morocco’s application was rejected, be-
cause the Commission deemed it a non-European state.
4 The European Parliament insisted it would ratify the union
on condition that Turkey amended its constitution to expand
the freedom of associations and trade unions, amended anti-
terrorist legal regulations and released Kurdish party MPs
from detention. In response to the requirement, the Turkish
parliament passed 12 amendments, which convinced Euro-
MPs to ratify the customs union. Its scope is broader than
that of a typical customs union.
5 As a result of the amendments, the death penalty was abo-
lished, the scope of the freedom of speech, gathering and as-
sociations was significantly enhanced, the possibility of edu-
cation and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was
introduced, the legal status of women was improved and the
position of the army in the political system was diminished.
6 Negotiating Framework, October 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_frame-
doc.pdf
7 On the other hand, it has to be admitted that all negotia-
tions are implicitly governed by such a rule.
8 Negotiating Framework, ibid.
9 Vienna claimed it would agree to start negotiations with
Turkey on condition that an equivalent decision was taken
with regard to Croatia, and insisted that a provision on pri-
vileged partnership (special relations) as an alternative to
Turkey’s membership in the EU should be included in the
Negotiating Framework.
10 This condition was for the first time explicitly stated in the
Negotiating Framework. Nevertheless, it was one of the Co-
penhagen criteria, adopted in 1993, which set the rules of EU
membership.
11 The key requirements under the Accession Partnership
include guarantee of civilian control over the armed forces,
related expenditure and the process of developing the secu-
rity policy; adopting a ‘zero tolerance’ policy regarding tor-
ture and ill-treatment; ensuring the exercise of the freedom
of expression, including freedom of the press; implementa-
tion of all reforms covering the freedom of associations and
of peaceful assembly; adopting a law which comprehensively
addresses all the difficulties faced by non-Muslim religious
minorities and communities in line with the relevant Euro-
pean standards; adopting and implementing provisions con-
cerning the exercise of freedom of thought, conscience and
religion by all individuals and religious communities (remo-
ving the category ‘religion’ from identity cards and removing
the obligation to attend religion classes), and establishing
conditions for the functioning of all religious communities,
in line with the practice of member states. This includes legal
and judicial protection (inter alia through access to legal per-
sonality) of the communities, their members and their assets,
the teaching, appointing and training of clergy, and the en-
joyment of property rights; implementing legislation relat-
ing to women’s rights, pursuing measures against all forms
of violence against women, including crimes committed in
the name of honour, establishing shelters for women at risk
of violence in all larger municipalities, in line with current
legislation, further promotion of the role of women in society,
including their education and participation in the labour mar-
ket and in political and social life, and supporting the deve-
lopment of women’s organisations to fulfil these goals; en-
suring effective access to radio/TV broadcasting in langua-
ges other than Turkish, adopting appropriate measures to
support the teaching of languages other than Turkish; abo-
lishing the village guard system in the south-east; improv-
ing the economic situation in south-eastern Turkey; pursu-
ing measures to facilitate the return of internally displaced
persons to their original settlements, ensuring that those
who have suffered loss and damage as a result of the secu-
rity situation in the southeast are fairly and speedily com-
pensated; implementing fully the Protocol adapting the An-
kara Agreement to the accession of the 10 new EU member
states including Cyprus; continuation of the efforts to re-
solve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and unequi-
vocally committing to good neighbourly relations, and ad-
dressing any sources of friction with neighbours.
Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles and con-
ditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey,
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexa
pi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32006D0035&m
odel=guichett
12 In some countries, the results of surveys conducted at a si-
milar time differed significantly. The results probably varied
depending on whether the question regarded only Turkey or
all candidates and countries aspiring to the candidate status.
The countries which have joined most recently or will soon
become EU members (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) pre-
sented a positive attitude towards Turkey’s accession.
13 In the Transatlantic Trends 2005 survey conducted by the
German Marshall Fund, in nine countries, the total popula-
tion of which constituted a majority of EU residents, 35% of
respondents said that Turkey as a Muslim country could not
become a member of the EU. In the Eurobarometer 63 sur-
vey conducted in spring 2005, 54% of EU residents declared
that the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe were
too significant to enable Turkey’s integration with the EU.
33% were of a different opinion. However, 42% of respon-
dents believed that to a certain extent, Turkey was in histo-
rical terms a part of Europe; the same percentage of respon-
dents shared the opposite view. Eurobarometer 63, spring
2005, pp. 366 and 369.
14 Over 4 million people originating from Turkey (Turks and
Kurds) currently live in the EU. The most numerous Turkish
communities live in Germany, Holland, Belgium, France and
41
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Austria. Higher population growth, migration and the ac-
cession of Bulgaria, where 750,000 Turks live, will contribute
to increasing the number of the Turkish diaspora in the EU.
Members of the Turkish community in the EU predominant-
ly come from poorer, less modernised (with low levels of edu-
cation) and more conservative regions of Turkey. Over deca-
des, the Turkish diaspora has undergone profound transfor-
mations; for example, it has become more liberal than the
society in Turkey proper. However, the Turkish community
is still more poorly educated, financially poorer and more
conservative than European societies. The most serious pro-
blem the Turkish diaspora faces is the high unemployment
level, which results from the fact that it is a young and worse-
educated community. On the other hand, according to the
OECD, the education systems in many EU member states do
not provide sufficient educational opportunities for students
who come from blue-collar workers’ families.
15 The Turks’ attitude to the EU has been shown by surveys
regularly conducted by the Turkish research centre Pollmark.
http://www.pollmark.com.tr/
16 Some cold calculation can also be noticed in Turks’ atti-
tude towards the EU. In public opinion polls conducted in
autumn 2004 in the four largest cities by the Turkish Inter-
national Strategic Research Organisation, 35% of respondents
(the largest group) indicated EU member states, especially
Germany, as ones which Turkey could rely on in case of an
emergency (e.g. an earthquake or war). The United States was
mentioned in the second place (over 25%). International
Strategic Research Organisation, ISRO 2. Foreign Policy Per-
ception, http://www.turkishweekly.net/survey-tfpps.pdf
17 Paradoxically, some respondents who supported this view-
point declared at the same time a readiness to vote for Tur-
key’s accession to the EU in a hypothetical referendum.
18 The negative perception of Christians, rooted in the legacy
of numerous wars, has strengthened over recent years. In
the 1990s, several wars were fought between Muslims and
Christians in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Muslims, being
the weaker side, sustained much heavier losses. These re-
gions have historical ties with Turkey, and a significant part
of Turks come from there.
Recently, the main reasons for this include the US interven-
tion in Iraq in 2003, growing tension in Europe between
Muslims and other Europeans after September 11, and ten-
sions in relations between Turkey and the EU. In the Pollmark
and Pew Research Centre surveys conducted between 2004
and 2006, the share of respondents’ negative opinion on
Christians ranged from over 50% to nearly 70%. Pew Global
Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/reports/
19 The conservatism of Turkish society is especially strongly
manifested through patriarchal family and community beha-
viour, moral rigour (especially regarding the sexual life of wo-
men), a lack of acceptance of any criticism of fundamental
religious truths, and the arrangement of marriages. A signifi-
cant part of marriages in Turkey are still arranged, although
these are in a minority now, in contrast to previous genera-
tions.
20 The pivotal role of the family in Turkish society’s system
of values was proven by the Türkiye’de Muhazakarlik – Aile,
Din, Devlet, Bati surveys conducted in early 2006.
The proofs of the strong position of the family include the
proportionally smaller number of divorces, unmarried cou-
ples living together, persons living alone, nursing homes,
children’s homes and kindergartens, as compared to the EU.
The family has maintained its great role in social life mainly
because of the inefficiency of the state, the high rate of reli-
gious practice and the specific social structure (a high share
of the population living in villages and small towns).
21 In surveys conducted in 2002 by Ali Çarkoglu and Kemal
Kirisci, over 40% of respondents either declared that Turkey
did not have a best-friend state in the international arena,
or were unable to indicate such a country. Ali Çarkoglu and
Kemal Kirisci, ‘The View from Turkey: Perceptions of Greeks
and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public’, in
Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente, ed. Ali Çarkoglu
and Barry Rubin, London 2005, p. 125.
22 Using double standards by Brussels does not consist in
treating Turkey in an especially strict manner, but in exces-
sive leniency in dealing with other countries, which usual-
ly fail to satisfy EU standards to a lesser extent than Turkey.
Examples of such an approach by the EU:
– very lenient criticism of Greece, which rejects any cultural
rights to Macedonians, Roms, Vlachs and Albanians (who do
not come from new emigration), and discriminates against
religions other than Orthodox Christianity. Ill-treatment and
torture are not rare in Greece, and the perpetrators usually
go unpunished;
– failure to require from any member or candidate state to
determine certain crimes as genocide (e.g. the extermination
of between 5 million and 10 million of people at the turn of
the twentieth century in the Congo, which was governed at
the time by the Belgian King Leopold, and the killings of near-
ly 300,000 Serbs, Jews and Roms in the fascist Independent
State of Croatia, a satellite of Nazi Germany), while at the
same time demanding that Turkey call the Armenian mas-
sacres committed during World War I genocide;
– Turkey’s different treatment compared to other countries
which started negotiations before Ankara; the situation does
not concern Turkey alone (referendum on every new enlarge-
ment in France and the text of the Negotiating Framework);
– proportionally much smaller financial aid from the EU for
Turkey in comparison to that offered to the Central European
candidates;
– the EU’s failure to fulfil some promises (such as the failure
to end the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus in exchange for support to the Annan Plan, which many
EU politicians had promised before the referendum was
held in April 2004).
23 Between 2002 and 2004, the CHP voted in favour of most
pro-EU reforms. However, it firmly opposed the government’s
conciliatory policy on the key issue of Cyprus. In September
2006, the CHP declared it would not support any further
amendments to Turkish laws as required by Brussels.
24 Three religious minorities, Jews, Orthodox Christians and
Armenians, were treated as an exception.
25 Erik-Jan Zürcher, ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turk-
ish nationalists: identity politics 1908–1938’, in Ottoman
past and today’s Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, Leiden 2000,
150–179.
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Ahmet Yildiz, ‘Ne Mutlu Türkum Diyebilene’ Türk Ulusal
Kimligi’nin Etno-Sekuler Sinirlari (1919–1938), Istanbul 2004.
26 The most vivid example is the leader of the Kurdish sepa-
ratist movement, Abdullah Öcalan, whose native language
is Turkish. It is used, along with Kurdish, by the media which
sympathise with the separatists.
27 In 2000, every woman living in south-eastern Turkey,
where Kurds are in the great majority, had 5 children on ave-
rage; the national average was 2.5. Türkiye Istatistik Kuru-
mu, Bölgesel Istatistikler http://www.tuik.gov.tr
28 In the Türkiye’de milliyet˜ilik survey in spring 2006, nearly
7% of respondents stated they felt they were Kurds first of
all. The respondents in the survey were only legally mature
people, while Kurdish identity is stronger among young
people. In surveys conducted at the same time among peo-
ple who could vote for the first time, the support for the Kur-
dish party was higher by 70% as compared to general sur-
veys. Public opinion polls show that a definite majority of
the Turkish society identify themselves first as Muslims and
citizens of the Republic of Turkey.
‘Terörün sonu milliyet˜ilik’, Radikal, 6 April 2006, http://www.
radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=183584
Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the major ideologist of the Turkish
national philosophy, was of Kurdish origin. Three Turkish
presidents have had Kurdish ancestors. Currently, Kurds are
present in all state institutions. They are also represented
among intellectual elites and business circles.
29 These were fights in defence of autonomy and against se-
cularisation rather than national uprisings.
30 Kemal Kirisci, Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and
Turkey: an Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, London,
1997.
31 These relations were brought to light in 1996, when a po-
lice officer and a local crime boss who had links with the
Grey Wolves ultranationalist organisation were killed in a car
accident in Susurluk. Their companion, a Kurdish member
of a right-wing party, who was the head of one of the mili-
tias, survived. The investigation and trials failed to convict
the main suspects.
32 Such factors as the trans-border nature of the Kurdish
territories, which are located along the main heroin smug-
gling route running from Afghanistan to Europe, the fami-
ly structure and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe contribute
to the development of Kurdish organised crime.
33 Theoretically, Kurdish nationalist candidates could enter
the parliament if they sought election as independent can-
didates.
34 It is worth emphasising that information on fights is cur-
rently much more available to public opinion, considering
the improvement of the freedom of speech, than it was in
the 1990s.
35 Kurdish members of the governing AKP party were espe-
cially against this. Some of them voted against the agreement
in religious solidarity with the Sunnis, and some in ethnic
identification with the Kurds in northern Iraq.
36 Trade exchange has been developing on a mass scale (main-
ly exports from Turkey) between Turkey and Kurdish north-
ern Iraq since 2003. Turkish investments have also been grow-
ing. Numerous construction contracts have been implement-
ed by Turkish firms. Pipelines from oilfields in northern Iraq
run through Turkish territories. There is no other country
with which Iraqi Kurdistan has such extensive economic ties.
Turkey’s stance on the political system of Iraq (centralisa-
tion), which had been uncompromising at the beginning,
has been revised. In 2005, Turkey accepted the federal sys-
tem of Iraq and established intensive diplomatic relations
with Iraqi Kurds. The status of Kirkuk, where rich oilfields
are situated and Turkmen supported by Ankara live, is still
a disputed issue. According to Turkey, Kirkuk should not be
made part of the Kurdish autonomous area. Turkey is afraid
that control over them will make Iraqi Kurds more indepen-
dent of Ankara. According to the Iraqi constitution, a refe-
rendum on the status of Kirkuk has to be held by the end of
2007. The lack of precise voting rules (constituency borders
and rights to vote) may create tension between Turkey and
the Kurds. In the future, Ankara will have to face the chal-
lenge of the possible establishment of an independent Kur-
distan in the Northern Iraq, which may secede if the civil
war in the central part of the country intensifies. Probable
support from the USA and Israel for an independent Kurdi-
stan in northern Iraq, the self-rule of Iraqi Kurds (who are
aware of the negative attitude to Kurdish separatism present-
ed by such stronger countries as Iran, Syria and Turkey), An-
kara’s need to unite efforts together with Iraqi Kurds against
the PKK and the economic dependence of northern Iraq on
Turkey may result in good relations being established be-
tween Turkey and Kurdistan.
International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears Over
Kurdish Ambitions’, Middle East Report N°35, 26 January
2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/mid-
dle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/35_iraq_allaying_
turkey_s_fears_over_kurdish_ambitions.pdf
International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing
Battle over Kirkuk’, Middle East Report N°56, 18 July 2006,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east
___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/56_iraq_and_the_kurds__
_the_brewing_battle_over_kirkuk.pdf
37 The Kurdish population is more patriarchal, conservative,
religiously active and fundamentalist than Turks. Kurds are
clearly overrepresented in the Islamic terrorist organisations
(which are incomparably weaker than the PKK) which were
responsible inter alia for the Istanbul attacks in November
2003. On the other hand, proportionally more Kurds then
Turks are Alevis, these being a more liberal branch of Mus-
lims than Sunnis. Violence against women (including mur-
ders) is more common among Kurds than among Turks. The
illiteracy rate is higher, and the professional activity of Kur-
dish women is very low. Compulsory marriages happen more
frequently among Kurds than among Turks. They commit in-
comparably more honour killings. Failure to send girls to
school is practiced almost exclusively by Kurds. According
to the government’s estimates, 25% of girls did not start
education in south-eastern Turkey in 2004.
38 South-eastern Turkey follows the Shafii legal school of
thought, which is more rigorous than the Hanafi school
found in the rest of the country.
39 South-eastern Anatolia is a limited to external influence
by its geographical nature, where mountains and desert
43
T
h
e
 h
u
rd
le
 r
a
c
e
. 
T
h
e
 g
re
a
te
s
t 
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
b
a
rr
ie
rs
 i
n
 T
u
rk
e
y
’s
 p
a
th
 t
o
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
C E S  R e p o r t
predominate, and its unfavourable climate. It has been a pe-
ripheral region of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey for cen-
turies.
40 Examples of rotten compromises between the state and
the pre-modern social structure include alliances with Kur-
dish tribes in fights against rebels, i.e. village militias, and
the co-operation of political parties with the tribal aristoc-
racy (either whole tribes vote for a candidate indicated by
the sheik, or the sheik himself is engaged in politics), and
the lack of agricultural reform. David MacDowall, A Modern
History of the Kurds, Oxford 2004, pp. 395–401.
41 South-eastern Anatolia was much poorer than the West-
ern part of the country even under the Ottoman Empire,
and the disparity widened in the twentieth century. Be-
tween 1914 and 1928, with some breaks, south-eastern Tur-
key was the scene of very bitter clashes between the Otto-
man and Russian armies, between the Kemalists, the French
and the British supported by Armenian and Assyrian guer-
rilla forces, and then between Turkish troops and Kurdish
insurgents. These battles brought death, displacements and
migrations of millions of people, and vast economic losses
on a scale incomparable to the other regions of Turkey.
D. MacDowall, ibid., pp. 21–109.
Nowadays, poverty is a consequence of the large role played
by backward agricultural practices and shepherding in the
regional economy, the family-based and feudal structure of
land ownership (currently, nearly 10% of landowners own
almost half of the land), the high rate of population growth,
the war against the PKK, which has lasted for more than 20
years and scared away private investors, and insufficient pu-
blic investments due to the centralisation of the adminis-
trative system. Between 1990 and 2001, public investments
in this region, which is inhabited by nearly 10% of the
country’s population, accounted for 7% of the state budget.
Between 1994 and 2004, Ankara allocated slightly more
than 3% and less than 5% respectively of the public funds
designated for investment in those sectors to education
and healthcare in this part of the country. It must be added
that such unequal distribution of public spending also af-
fects regions of the country inhabited by ethnic Turks. On
the other hand, the economic disparities inside Turkish so-
ciety have been reduced over the whole country during the
last decade. Özsel Beleli, ‘Regional policy and EU accession:
Learning from the GAP experience’, Turkish Policy Quarterly,
Vol.4, no.3 2005, pp 7–8. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_
turkey_tpq_id_37.pdf
42 The Radio and Television Board imposed time limitations
on information, political commentary and educational pro-
grammes, and an obligation to use Turkish subtitles in the
other programmes. Kurds mainly watch Kurdish channels
broadcasting from Europe and Northern Iraq. Turkish autho-
rities have made attempts to block broadcasting by stations
linked to the PKK.
43 Zihni Erdem, ‘Kürtce yayinda sinirlar kalkiyor’, Radikal,
16 June 2006, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haber-
no=189892
Courses could be held only on weekends. Age limitations
were imposed in order to exclude a significant part of young
people. A non-Turkish language could not be the language
of instruction.
44 The main reasons for the closures were rigorous regula-
tions on opening courses, high prices, illiteracy, many Kurds’
assimilation into Turkish culture, and the lack of support by
Kurdish nationalists, who believed the courses were an in-
sufficient concession by the government.
45 More roads were built in south-eastern Turkey over a pe-
riod of two and a half years (2003–2005) than in the entire
period between 1923 and 2002.
46 216,000 applications were submitted by September 2006.
The authorities responded positively to 33,000 of them.
European Commission, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, p. 21.
47 In August 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stat-
ed during his visit to the south-east that the Kurdish prob-
lem did exist, it had to be resolved through further democ-
ratisation, and that the state had made numerous mistakes
with regard to the Kurds. In his subsequent speeches, Prime
Minister Erdogan said that Turkey was an ethnic mosaic
and proposed America as a model to be followed. According
to the prime minister, residents of Turkey shared a ‘higher’
political identity (as citizens of the republic), as part of which
various ‘lower’ value-related and ethnic identities operated,
including the two major ones, Turkish and Kurdish. In res-
ponse to allegations that he was pushing Turkey closer to-
wards a Yugoslavian scenario, Prime Minister Erdogan replied
that the residents of Turkey shared a common religion, which
was the strongest substance cementing the ethnic mosaic
together. Erdogan was again criticised for emphasising the
role of religion. These declarations by Prime Minister Er-
dogan have failed to produce constitutional changes. Erhan
Selen, ‘Kürt sorunu benim sorunum’, Yeni Safak, 13 August
2006, http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/agustos/13/
p01.html
48 In a survey conducted by the Turkish public opinion poll-
ing centre Pollmark at the end of 2003, 58% of respondents
declared they were against using Kurdish as the language
of instruction at schools (31% were for). The percentage of
respondents opposing Kurdish-language courses was only
slightly smaller. Nearly 50% of respondents displayed a ne-
gative attitude (40% were in favour) towards Kurdish broad-
casts in the media. The polls showed very clear differences
of opinion between Turks and Kurds (who showed great sup-
port). In a survey conducted in mid-2004, over 46% of resi-
dents of Turkey declared a positive attitude to programmes
in Kurdish broadcast by public television. However, nearly
45%, including a majority of ethnic Turks, were of the
opposite opinion. Pollmark, http://www.pollmark.com.tr/
arastirmalar.
49 In the Pollmark survey conducted in mid-2004, over 60%
of Turks declared they did not think Kurdish TV program-
mes posed a threat to the state integrity, and nearly 30% of
respondents claimed the reverse. In spring 2005, following
the riots during Nevruz, which is the most important holi-
day for Kurds, over 30% of respondents stated the riots had
been sparked due to excessive democratisation, while a ma-
jority of respondents were of the opposite opinion.
Pollmark, Ibid.
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On the other hand, in the survey conducted by he KONDA
centre in October 2006, 80% of respondents stated that com-
bating terrorism was the only way to resolve the Kurdish
issue. Two-thirds did not agree with the opinion that treating
Kurds differently from other citizens was a cause of the con-
flict with the PKK, and 75% believed that the war in the
south-east was an effect of the Kurds’ desire to set up their
own state.
‘Kürt sorunu yabanci kiskirtmasi’, Milliyet, 24 March 2006.
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/24/guncel/agun.html
50 Martin van Bruinessen, Transnational aspects of the Kur-
dish question, 2000, http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbru-
inessen/personal/publications/transnational_Kurds.htm
51 The maximum imaginable concessions by Turkish authori-
ties, to be implemented against the will of most of society
and realised over a certain time span – extracurricular Kur-
dish lessons at schools, liberalising the rules of broadcasting
Kurdish information and educational programmes, lowering
the election threshold to the level of 5%, and amnesty for
all excluding the PKK’s leaders – may still be insufficient for
Kurdish nationalists, who want Kurdish to be recognised as
the second official language, to be used to the same extent
as Turkish in the media, schools & offices, and who demand
deep decentralisation. Another problem is the support ex-
pressed by many DTP leaders and junior party members for
amnesty for Öcalan and for recognising the PKK, as the IRA
was in Britain, as a partner in negotiations covering the
status of Kurds. Ihsan D. Dagi, ‘Kürtler ne istiyor?’, Zaman,
31 March 2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/?hn=271416&bl
=yorumlar&trh=20060331
52 Many PKK fighters, who have been engaged in military
activity for years, do not recognise any other methods than
violence. The Kurdish terrorist organisation called the Kur-
distan Freedom Falcons (TAK), which chooses uncompromis-
ing struggle using any possible means, has been operating
for more than two years now. A part of the army, which is
interested in preserving the status quo and continuing the
hard-line approach on Kurds, are ready to fight them using
terrorist methods. In early November 2005 a bombing hap-
pened in the town of Semdinli. The bombers appeared to be
officers of the military gendarmerie wearing civilian clothes.
They were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in Ju-
ne 2006. According to many commentators, those who had
ordered the bombing remained unpunished because they
had higher positions in the hierarchy. ‘Susurluk Semdinli’de’,
Radikal, 11 November 2005, http://www.radikal.com.tr/
haber.php?haberno=169672
53 Regardless of the PKK’s defeat in 1999, the ethnically Kur-
dish party is today much more popular than it was ten years
ago. In the 1990s, Kurdish nationalism became stronger,
especially among young people. Judging from previous his-
torical developments, further urbanisation, the change of
the status of Kurds in Iraq and progress in education will
reinforce Kurdish identity in Turkey. The development of
Kurdish nationalism does not necessarily mean only nega-
tive consequences for Turkey, since its secular nature con-
tributes to the emancipation of women and the weakening
of social conservatism.
54 Apart from the DTP, which maintains contacts with the
PKK, other Kurdish political forces are weak and are often
intimidated by radicals (by means of assassinations).
55 The de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq is
used as a model by Turkish Kurds and as a base for the PKK.
Its existence adversely affects the readiness of the Turkish
side to conduct reforms for fear of escalating Kurdish de-
mands.
56 The declaration of halt military actions was made by the
PKK on 1 October 2006 under pressure from the USA and the
Iraqi Kurds. The latter probably see this move as an encou-
ragement for Turkey to accept a referendum on the status
of Kirkuk.
57 According to IHD statistical data, in 2003 not a single case
of ill-treatment and tortures was reported in nearly 65% of
the administration units (il). The remaining 35% cover big
cities (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Konya and Istanbul) and
the south-eastern part of the country. The great majority of
the victims were individuals of Kurdish origin. Insan Haklar
Dernegi (IHD), http://www.ihd.org.tr
58 Turkish human rights organisations present different
data on the violation of these rights.
59 In 2003, over a third of the cases were beatings. IHD, ibid.
60 Obviously, not all cases of using tortures and ill-treatment
are registered by human rights organisations. However, they
admit that the number of victims who have asked them for
help has significantly increased.
61 Some of those sentenced were punished just for partici-
pating in demonstrations, and some for assaults against
policemen and acts of vandalism.
62 Hundreds were detained after the riots. Many of them
were tortured and ill-treated.
63 In some cases similar sentences, considering the tightening
of antiterrorist laws in Europe, could also have been im-
posed by courts in some EU member states.
64 European Commission, Turkey, 2005 Progress Report, No-
vember 2005, p.15.
65 The prime minister declared in autumn 2006 that this ar-
ticle could be amended. However, AKP politicians are afraid
that this decision could lead to a drop in support from the
nationalist part of their electorate.
66 The law authorises the police to use arms without hesi-
tation during an antiterrorist operation in the situation
when the person pursued does not react to the request for
surrender and is ready to use a weapon. Public prosecutors
have been given the right to notify only the closest family of
the person suspected of terrorism of their detention. Accor-
ding to the law, the suspect detained on charges of terror-
ism can have only one defence counsel. The court may im-
pose a 24-hour ban on the detainee’s contacts with the law-
yer. However, the police and prosecution authorities cannot
interrogate the suspect over the duration of the ban. ‘Mah-
kemeye gidecek: Terör yasasina ‘serhli’ onay’, Radikal, 18 July
2006, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=193223
67 Provisions under article 301 provide for a less rigorous in-
terpretation. Clause 3 states that if the goal of the statement
is criticism, such a statement shall not be punished. The
surveys Türkiye’de Insan Haklari ve Ifade Özgürlügü con-
ducted by Metin Toprak and Ihsan Dagi in late 2002 showed
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that judges were less liberal regarding human rights and
tend to notice fewer human rights violations than the rest of
society. Baskin Oran, ‘Bu kafayla AB ger˜ekten zor’, Radikal,
2 July 2003, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno
=80055
Hukuk˜u Birligi (the Union of Lawyers), led by Kemal Kerin˜-
siz, is an organisation which very often brings suits ‘in
defence of Turkishness’.
68 ‘7 milyon Türk dernek üyesi’, Radikal, 26 October 2006.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=202655
69 The opinion that the key weaknesses of the non-govern-
mental organisations in Turkey are their fragmentation, he-
terogeneity and elitism stated by C. Rumford in 2002 is still
relevant. C. Rumford, ‘Placing Democratisation within the
Global Frame: Sociological Approaches to Universalism and
Democratic Contestation in Contemporary Turkey’, Sociolo-
gical Review, vol. 50, no. 2, 2002, p. 273.
70 This model subordinating religious structures to secular
authorities originates from the Byzantine and Ottoman tra-
ditions.
71 In the survey conducted by Ali Çarkoglu and Ersin Kalayi-
coglu Türkiye’de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi in June 2006,
more than half of Turks supported replacing the obligatory
religion lessons with extracurricular classes. Pinar Aktas,
‘Türkiye saga kaydi’, Milliyet, 14 June 2006. http://www.
milliyet.com/2006/06/14/guncel/agun.html
72 In Turkey also live several hundred thousand Shia Twel-
vers and followers of the other non-Sunni varieties of Islam
(such as the Alawi), whose status is identical to that of the
Alevis.
73 In June 2006, the local government in a district of Istan-
bul for the first time recognised the cemevi as a place of re-
ligious worship, and granted land for building the temple
to a local association of Alevis.
74 Before 2006, Alevis brought suits against the state to the
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, accusing the govern-
ment of violating human rights through the obligatory
classes in ‘religious culture and ethics’, which did not pre-
sent the rules of Alevism. Some suits have been brought by
secular circles, who generally oppose the obligatory nature
of this school subject.
75 The authorities claim that these privileges are based on
the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923. However, Turkey has
failed to meet its provisions because the treaty provides for
guaranteeing cultural and religious rights to all non-Muslims.
Otmar Oehring, ‘Human Rights in Turkey-Secularism = Re-
ligious Freedom’,
http://www.missio-aachen.de/Images/MR%20T%C3%
BCrkei%20englisch_tcm14-11238.pdf
76 Roman Catholics and members of Protestant churches do
not have their own religious community foundations; they
have only private foundations.
77 Non-Muslim clergymen have been deprived of the possi-
bility of religious education in Turkey since 1971. The Turk-
ish government emphasises that it is necessary to find a so-
lution that will include the possible education of priests in
the general system of higher education, so as to avoid setting
the precedent of separate religious educational institutions.
Pursuant to Turkish law, priests of all religions, with the ex-
ception of Roman Catholicism and some branches of the
Protestant Church, must have Turkish citizenship. Although
Turkish law allows missionaries to conduct their activity,
they still encounter many administrational problems. Cur-
rently, over 1,100 missionaries operate in Turkey. US Depart-
ment of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report 2005,
Turkey’, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51586.htm
78 In spring 2005, Diyanet prepared an exhortation for imams
which attacked missionaries for their alleged connections
with foreign powers and their desire to ‘take possession of
young Turks’ souls’, and published a book which stated that
Christian missionaries (unlike Muslims, who limit themsel-
ves to explaining the principles of Islam) use all possible
methods, including violence, in their proselytising activity.
US Department of State, ibid.
79 Public opinion polls indicate that most of society shares
a negative opinion on non-Muslims, although they accept
their right to religious practice. However, they are in favour
of curtailing proselytising activity (see in Ali Çarkoglu and
Ersin Kalayicoglu, Türkiye’de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi).
Pinar Aktas, ‘Türkiye saga kaydi’, Milliyet, 14 June 2006.
http://www.milliyet.com/2006/06/14/guncel/agun.html
Public dislike of missionaries has historical roots. Many nine-
teenth-century missionaries represented the interests of fo-
reign powers and minorities.
80 In January 2004, the Minorities Subcommittee, which mo-
nitored minorities’ activity, was liquidated. The state has le-
galised several Protestant associations and temples over re-
cent years. In 2004, the authorities accepted nominations
of Greek citizens to the council of patriarchs supervised by
the Patriarch of Constantinople. Until then, Turkish authori-
ties had not agreed to foreigners performing religious func-
tions, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church and
religious communities linked to diplomatic agencies. In mid-
2005, non-Muslim places of worship received the same rights
as mosques regarding the usage of water, power supplies, etc.
81 Foundations will be able to open branches abroad. Foreign-
ers will be allowed to establish foundations and hold execu-
tive posts in them. Foundations will have right to receive
foreign aid. Religious minorities are dissatisfied with the
imposition of the 18-month deadline for submitting appli-
cations to regain real property, and with the failure to un-
ambiguously determine the status of real estate which has
been bought from the state by third parties.
82 In the survey conducted in 2002 by E&G, nearly 67% of
respondents stated that the person whose opinion was most
important at home was the husband, 27% both spouses,
and less than 6% that of the wife. The poll also revealed signi-
ficant regional differences between the Western part of the
country and the more patriarchal East. ‘Ege erkegi light, Ka-
radeniz ma˜o’, Radikal, 11 September 2002. http://www.
radikal.com.tr/veriler/2002/09/11/haber_49517.php
83 On the other hand, the declared conservative perception
of women’s sexuality differs from the social reality, which is
proven by the fact that the average age of female sexual ini-
tiation is lower than the average age of marriage.
84 In 2000, 19% of women and 6% of men were illiterate. In
the 2003–2004 school year, girls accounted for 43% of sec-
ondary-school pupils and nearly 42% of university students.
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In 1990, the number of female secondary-school pupils cor-
responded to 65% of male pupils, and in 2003 the propor-
tion rose to 74%. In 1990, the number of female university
students was equal to 53% of males; in 2003 it was 74%.
The most extreme difference between the EU countries and
Turkey is that every year nearly 10% of girls are not sent to
school by their parents, almost exclusively in the south-east-
ern part of Turkey, which is inhabited by Kurds. Toplumsal
cinsiyet göstergeleri, pp. 18–20; http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/
toplumsalcinsiyet.pdf
85 In the surveys conducted in 2004 by Binnaz Toprak and
Ersin Kalayicoglu Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadin,
nearly 20% of non-working women stated they did not
work because their husbands did not allow them to.
86 According to data from the Turkish State Institute of Sta-
tistics (DIE), in 2000 women constituted 32% of economists,
28% of legal sector workers and 27% of financial consul-
tants and accountants, over 25% of professors and nearly
a third of PhDs. Toplumsal cinsiyet gˆstergeleri, p. 8.
http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/toplumsalcinsiyet.pdf
87 Women constitute only 0.5% of mayors and 2.4% of coun-
cillors at the community (il˜e) level, and 1.8% at the pro-
vince (il) level.
88 In 2001, women constituted 18% of judges and public
prosecutors. In 2002, they accounted for nearly 21% of me-
dium- and higher-level state administration officials, includ-
ing 5% of undersecretaries, 17% of heads of government
agendas, 7% of directors general and 13% of deputy direc-
tors general. Ibid., pp. 9–11. It must be added that women’s
representation has been slowly, albeit consistently, growing
in the parliament and local governments.
89 According to the survey conducted in March 2003 by the
Human Rights Centre of Bilgi University, over 30% of wo-
men stated their husbands had used physical violence against
them. ‘Dayak kadinin alin yazisidir’, NTV, 8 March 2003,
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/207773.asp. It is worth ad-
ding that the survey has demonstrated a link between vio-
lence against women and low education level.
90 According to statistical data from the Human Rights Asso-
ciation (IHD), 44 women were victims of honour killings
and 116 women were killed by a family member in 2005.
There were 30 suicides by women, often committed under
family pressure. Imposing stricter penalties for honour kill-
ings has caused a significant increase in the number of sui-
cides by women forced by their families. 79 suicides by wo-
men, 38 honour killings and 126 murders committed by fa-
mily members were reported in 2006. http://www.ihd.org.tr
The number of suicides committed in Turkey is much lower
than the European mean. On the other hand, the number of
male suicides in Turkey is slightly smaller than that of fe-
male suicides, whereas in Europe women commit suicides
much more rarely than men do.
91 Such double standards mean that marital infidelity is fre-
quent in Turkish families (this mainly concerns husbands),
which indirectly contradicts the desire to maintain the sta-
tus of the family as the most important social institution.
In the Global Sex Survey 2005, nearly 60% of Turks (women
and men) stated they had had extramarital sex. This was the
highest result (much higher than in ‘libertarian’ Western
countries) among the 41 states surveyed. The vast majority
of them were men. At the same time, a great majority of
Turks condemn marital infidelity, and a significant part of
them support its penalisation.
92 The amendments to the civil code adopted in November
2001 abolished the provisions which stated that the man
was the head of the family and consequently its legal rep-
resentative, which gave him the right to decide the place of
residence, among other matters, and required that both spou-
ses had to grant mutual consent in case one of them sought
employment. The new code also determined that the un-
paid housework done by women constituted their financial
contribution to the family budget, and in effect granted
women equal rights to property acquired after marriage,
the ownership title to which was held by one of the spouses.
In the previous code, individual ownership title had been
given priority.
In July 2004, the parliament voted for a law which imposed
an obligation on each municipality with a population exceed-
ing 50,000 to establish a shelter for women exposed to do-
mestic violence.
The new criminal code imposed penalisation of rape in mar-
riage, imprisonment for holding medical virginity tests with-
out a court’s consent and penalties for sexual harassment
at work. It abolished regulations discriminating against un-
married women and the article which made avoiding a pe-
nalty for rape possible if the rapist and the victim got mar-
ried. The code also abolished the general rule of applying
mitigating circumstances in the case of murders committed
in the name of honour against women who were accused
by their families of bringing disgrace on them (although it
provided for the possibility of making exceptions from this
rule by imposing the obligation on the court to consider
the individual context of each murder), and included a new
provision that murders ‘in the name of custom’ should be
punished by stricter penalties than ordinary murders.
Women for Women’s Human Rights, http:// www.wwhr.org
93 For example, although the number of shelters for female
victims of home violence grew between 2004 and 2006,
their quantity is still much lower than necessary.
94 In autumn 2005, a division of the Supreme Court applied
the definition of murder ‘in the name of custom’ only to
murders decided by family councils. According to the court,
in the case of a murder of a woman by a man it is possible
to apply the principle of mitigating circumstances (a crime
of passion). On the other hand, strict sentences imposed in
cases of honour killings in 2006 prove that judges have ceas-
ed treating the defence of honour as a mitigating circum-
stance.
95 The AKP, proportionally, has half as many female MPs than
the opposition left-wing CHP. In the internal AKP elections
held in March 2006, contrary to the prime minister’s pres-
sure to guarantee 30% of representation by women, only
10% of places in the decision-making structures of the
party at the level of municipalities were won by female can-
didates. As few as 5 women are among the 850 party heads
at the municipality level.
‘AKP’de kadinlar liste disi kaldi’, Milliyet, 28 March 2006,
http://www.milliyet.com/2006/03/28/siyaset/siy05.html
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96 The position of the army in the Turkish political system
is sometimes overrated. Turkish politicians are often said to
be totally subordinated to military officers. However, strong
politicians have been able to successfully implement poli-
cies against the wishes of the army. The late President Tur-
gut Özal pushed through his nomination of a candidate to
the position of the chief of staff, although he resigned some
time later in protest against the president’s foreign policy.
97 In October 2001, as part of the ‘National Programme’, the
Turkish parliament adopted amendments which introduc-
ed an equal number of civilians and military officers onto
the National Security Council, and abolished the provisions
which had determined opinions presented by the Council
as binding. In 2003, representatives of the council were re-
moved from other public institutions. In July 2003, the power
to choose the secretary was taken from the general chief of
staff and granted to the prime minister (proposing a candi-
date) and the president (approval). In August 2004, the coun-
cil was chaired by a civilian. In October 2006, the parliament
adopted amendments to the act on military courts, which
deprived them of the possibility to try civilians.
David Greenwood, ‘Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the
EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence’, November 2005,
Centre for European Security Studies, Istanbul Policy Centre,
pp. 8–10. http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/
pdfs/occasionals3.pdf
98 In May 2004, one of the amendments to the constitution
removed the provision which excluded defence expenses
from control of the Audit Court. It came into force in Septem-
ber 2006. A public finance law was introduced in December
2003 which included the Foundation of Turkish Armed For-
ces and the Arms Industry Support Fund in the defence mi-
nister’s budget. The law came into force in January 2005.
Both institutions are to be liquidated by 31 December 2007.
Ibid., 32-35.
99 The most important report is Almanak Türkiye, Güvenlik
Sektoru ve Demokratik Gözetim, published in summer 2006
by the TESEV foundation. http://www.tesev.org.tr. It was
sharply criticised by the generals.
100 The main Islamic terrorist organisations are Hizbullah and
the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front (IBDA-C). They are
responsible for tens of deaths. Numerous detentions have
very seriously undermined their combat capacity. According
to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Centre between
2002 and 2006, between 20% and 25% Turks believed that
in certain situations, killing civilians in defence of Islam was
justified (such as suicide attacks), and nearly 10% said it was
justified only in exceptional situations. The same surveys
indicated that confidence in Osama bin Laden was at the very
low level. Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/
reports/ Another survey, Degisen Turkiye’de Din Toplum va
Sigaset, conducted in 2006, showed that less than 10% of
Turks supported suicide attacks against civilians.
101 14 imam hatip schools with less than 900 pupils existed
in 1952. Over 1,200 such schools, attended by over 500,000
pupils, i.e. nearly 10% of all middle and secondary school
pupils in Turkey, were operating in 1996. Hakan Yavuz, Isla-
mic Political Identity in Turkey, Oxford 2003, pp. 122–129. In
the survey by Ali Çarkoglu and Ersin Kalayicoglu, Tür-
kiye’de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi, published in June 2006,
almost half of Turks stated they had considered sending
their child to an imam hatip.
102 In June 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sug-
gested a compromise solution offering private universities
the right to decide on whether their female students could
wear headscarves. University teachers, supported by the
army, responded negatively to the proposal.
In December 2003, the AKP government suggested intro-
ducing regulations to facilitate the opening of Koran courses.
The government gave up this idea under pressure from the
army. However, the authorities extended the duration of the
courses from three to five days a week. In February 2005, the
State Council deemed that regulation illegal, and applied to
the Constitutional Court for the possibility to eliminate hold-
ing summer and weekend Koran courses for younger pupils
as being contrary to the constitution. The application was
granted by the Constitutional Court.
In May 2004, the AKP voted for abolishing the scoring sys-
tem used in university entry examinations, which seriously
reduced the chance of imam hatip graduates’ enrolling to
other departments than theology. The amendments were
vetoed by President Ahmet Sezer. The government decided
it would not repeat the vote on them. In December 2005, the
education ministry passed a decree which enabled transfers
of pupils from vocational secondary schools, including imam
hatips, to general education secondary schools, and in effect
omitting the high thresholds at university examinations for
graduates of vocational secondary schools. Facilitations for
imam hatip secondary school pupils were especially favour-
able. However, the State Council deemed that decree uncon-
stitutional in February 2006. Ahmet T. Kuru, ‘Reinterpretation
of Secularism in Turkey’, in The Emergence of a New Turkey,
ed. Hakan Yavuz, Salt Lake City 2006, pp. 136–159.
103 After the AKP came to power, the prices of alcoholic beve-
rages, rose, especially of wine. In November 2005, the AKP
government adopted a decree which enabled local govern-
ments to limit alcohol consumption through setting special
zones for holders of licences to sell alcohol. The State Coun-
cil deemed the decree illegal in April 2006.
In September 2004, as part of work on the new criminal
code, the government suggested amending the articles on
the penalisation of adultery, which had not been applied
under Constitutional Court awards as of 1996 and 1998. The
old code provided for the possibility of prosecuting adultery
ex officio. The amendment only authorised spouses to bring
such charges. The government, under pressure from the se-
cular establishment and the EU, gave up the introduction of
this amendment to the new code.
Many commentators believed that the arrest of the president
of Van University in April 2005 on charges of heading a cri-
minal group responsible for corruption and embezzlements
was a kind of revenge by the government on secular circles.
The matter was discontinued following the lengthy deten-
tion of the university president.
104 The constitution of Turkey gives the president the right
to nominate judges to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme
Court and the State Council. The AKP has been interested in
amending the constitution so that it would authorise the
T
h
e
 h
u
rd
le
 r
a
c
e
. 
T
h
e
 g
re
a
te
s
t 
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
b
a
rr
ie
rs
 i
n
 T
u
rk
e
y
’s
 p
a
th
 t
o
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
48
C E S  R e p o r t
parliament to nominate a part of judges to the most impor-
tant Constitutional Court. However, to do that, the AKP would
have to get support from two-thirds of MPs (including the
opposition) and also convince the generals to accept the
amendment.
105 The parliament of Cyprus adopted the resolution on the
genocide in 1982, 22 years before the country joined the EU.
106 All the declarations are very brief and fail to take into
account Muslim victims. The statements of reasons for the
declarations often uncritically present the Armenian out-
look on the course of events during World War I.
107 One example of the inconsistency of the votes by parlia-
ments of European countries which Turkey has mentioned
is the failure to recognise as genocide the ruthless exploita-
tion of Congo (Kinshasa) by the administration of the Belgian
King Leopold at the turn of the twentieth century, which was
accompanied by large-scale massacres. The policy claimed the
lives of between 5 and 10 million victims. Turkey also re-
proaches the West for failing to adopt resolutions to recog-
nise the massacres and ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the
Caucasus by Tsarist Russia in the second half of the nine-
teenth century as genocide.
108 A classic publication as part of the ‘anti-official’ trend is
the book by Taner Ak˜am, Türk Ulusal Kimligi ve Ermeni So-
runu, Istanbul 2001.
109 Since that time more conferences have been held in Tur-
key where researchers, including Armenians, who believe
that the 1915 events were a case of genocidehave been able
to present their point of view. However, most of the speak-
ers have supported the official version promulgated by the
Turkish government. One of the faults of the September 2005
conference was that researchers representing the opposite
point of view were not invited. It is worth adding that some
differences of views on the course of those events and of the
putative Turkish responsibility for the crimes, can be noticed
among Turkish researchers who do not recognise the depor-
tations and massacres as genocide.
110 Turkiye Gündemi Arastirmasi, March 2005, p. 96.
http://www.pollmark.com.tr/arastirmalar/gundem/Pollmark
_TGA_Mart2005.pdf
111 The fact that the book by G. Levy, The Armenian Massac-
res in Ottoman Turkey, has won awards and has been pro-
moted by Turkish embassies, proves that the Turkish official
standpoint has evolved somewhat. The author does not re-
cognise the deportations and massacres as genocide in terms
of international law. Instead, he declares a readiness to use
the word in the moral meaning (as a slaughter, a massacre)
He also believes, in contrast to the official standpoint, that
the Turkish repressions against Armenians were unjustified.
He rejects the arguments of the civil war and the similar res-
ponsibility of both sides for the crimes. According to Levy,
nearly 650,000 Armenians were killed during the war, twice
as many as claimed in Turkish textbooks.
112 The trial of the Turkish journalist (of Armenian origin)
Hrant Dink, who received a suspended sentence of impris-
onment for spreading an opinion on Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions which was not directly linked to the genocide issue,
was an exception.
113 Turkey closed the border in response to Armenia’s enga-
gement in the conflict between Azeri citizens of Armenia
and Azerbaijan.
114 The occupation is a consequence of the armed secession of
Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian autonomous region which
is an enclave inside Azerbaijan. The secession would not
have been possible without the strong support offered by
Armenia, the Armenian diaspora and Russia. The demand
to make Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenia, which arose
in 1987-8, was not made in response to any threat by Azer-
baijan to limit the province’s autonomy. During the war,
which was fought between 1991 and 1994, Armenians oc-
cupied 7% of Azerbaijan’s territory located outside the pro-
vince’s borders. 11,000 Azeris and 6,000 Armenians were
killed in the war. 750,000 Azeris and 350,000 Armenians
have been displaced. Officially, Armenia does not recognise
the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it is in fact
a part of Armenia and is bound by strong political, military
and economic ties with it. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden:
Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York
2004.
115 The Armenian diaspora is proportionally the second larg-
est in the world, after that of the Jewish people. As a con-
sequence of its economic position, it has strong influence in
some countries (e.g. USA, France and Russia).
116 The continuity between the Young Turks regime and the
Republic of Turkey is a complex issue. On the one hand, Ke-
mal Atatürk represented a different ideology than the Young
Turks, and believed that the state founded by him was a to-
tally new entity; he was even ready to recognise the crimes
committed against Armenians. On the other hand, Kema-
lism did to a certain extent originate from the Young Turks
movement, and some of the activists responsible for the
Armenian massacres were offered high positions in Turkey.
This issue has been investigated into by the Turkish histo-
rian Taner Ak˜am, who recognises the deportations as ge-
nocide. See T. Ak˜am, ‘Sevr ve Lozan’nin Baska Tarihi’, Tür-
kiye’de Etnik Catisma, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher, Istanbul 2005,
pp. 51–88.
117 Turkey wants Armenia to officially recognise the Kars
Treaty, which was concluded by Turkey and Soviet Russia in
1921. The treaty delimited the present border between
Turkey and Armenia. The Armenian government answers
that the present Armenian state, being a successor to So-
viet Armenia, recognises all the treaties concluded by its
predecessor, and there is no need to make a special decla-
ration. Ruzanna Khachatrian, a journalist in the Armenian
section of Radio Free Europe, has stated that ‘at the same
time, Armenian authorities regularly reject Turkish demands
to declare that Armenia will never make any territorial claims
regarding areas currently located in eastern Turkey.’ Arme-
nia’s president Robert Kocharian has stated, ‘the issue of
genocide recognition is on our agenda today. Any ensuing
legal consequences of such recognition will be a task for fu-
ture presidents and politicians.’ Some Armenian politicians
emphasise that the Kars Treaty was dictated to Armenia
against the country’s will, which challenges its legal status.
Ruzanna Khachatrian, ‘Dashnaks Insists on Territorial Claims
to Turkey’, 27 January 2006, http://www.armenialiberty.org/
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armeniareport/report/en/2006/01/8a45c245-31e3-4ad2-
ad80-8aee76832e8b.asp
Emil Danielyan, ‘Turks Renew calls for Armenian Genocide
Study’, 13 April 2006, a4d65118d462.asp
118 Nationalist circles prevented an agreement which the
moderate presidents, Turgut Özal of Turkey and Levon Ter-
-Petrosian of Armenia, had wanted to sign in the 1990s.
119 The common survey conducted in 2005 by the Turkish
foundation TESEV and the Armenian centre HASA showed
that 45% of Armenians did not want to have a Turk as
a neighbour, and almost the same number would not like to
work with a Turk. 67% would refuse medical care provided
by a Turkish doctor, and 93% would not like their son to
marry a Turkish woman. Analogous answers from Turkish
respondents on Armenians showed results at the level of
25% in the first two categories and 63% in the latter cate-
gory. Ferhat Kentel, Gevorg Poghosyan, Ermenistan ve Turki-
ye Vatandaslari Karsilikli Algilama ve Diyalog Rapor,
Istanbul 2005, p. 37, http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/Turk_
ermeni_rapor.pdf
In a Pollmark survey held in spring 2005, 30% of Turks de-
clared themselves opponents of Armenians. Pollmark, http://
www.pollmark.com.tr/arastirmalar/
120 According to official statistical data, trade exchange be-
tween Turkey and Armenia in 2004 reached the level of near-
ly US$47 million (over 2% of Armenia’s trade exchange).
Unofficially, the trade balance is close to US$100 million,
considering exchange via third countries. The local govern-
ments of South-Eastern Turkey support opening up the bor-
der with Armenia, as they are interested in developing
trade. Nearly 37,000 Armenians visited Turkey in 2005. It is
estimated that approximately 40,000 Armenians (nearly 1%
of the population of Armenia) work, mostly illegally, in Tur-
key. The estimated number of their families is 30,000. Turk-
ish Airlines has operated a link between Yerevan and Istan-
bul since autumn 2004, with frequent flights available.
Foreign Trade of The Republic of Armenia 2004, http://www.
armstat.am/Publications/2005/trade_2n/indexeng.html
121 In March 2005, Turkey suggested establishing a Turkish-
Armenian historical commission to investigate the sequence
of events of the Armenian deportations. The prime minis-
ter declared his readiness to accept all its findings. Armenia
rejected the proposal, and suggested that an intergovern-
mental commission should be created instead to resolve cur-
rent issues. Turkish and Armenian historians are highly un-
likely to reach an agreement on the evaluation of the crimes
committed against Armenians during World War I. Attempts
to develop a common standpoint by the Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission, which operated between 2001
& 2004 and consisted of political scientists and ex-diplo-
mats, ended in failure.
122 In Turkey, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 is
seen as an act of self-defence in the process of Muslim mas-
sacres and displacements from territories of the Ottoman
Empire which were conquested by Christians since the end
of the 17th century.
123 During the centuries-long Turkish expansion in Anatolia
and the Balkans, military actions, hunger and diseases claim-
ed the lives of many thousands of Greeks. Ottoman rule
caused major changes in the ethnic and religious structures
of these regions as a consequence of Turkish colonisation,
Islamisation, and the assimilation of the Greek population
into the Turkish language and migrations. In the Islamic
state, Christian Greeks became second-class subjects (they
were forced to pay higher tax rates, banned from having
guns (with numerous exceptions), banned from proselytis-
ing to Muslims, treated unequally by the law, and subject
to restrictions concerning building churches and their way
of dressing, among other measures). On the other hand, the
‘infidels’ in the Ottoman Empire were treated much better
than those in Western Europe before the Enlightenment.
The Orthodox Church received a guarantee of its legal sta-
tus (extensive fiscal and administrative powers). Numerous
Greek islands and highland regions were given autonomy
or other privileges. Greeks had a dominant position in the
Empire’s economy and held important posts in the state ad-
ministration (diplomacy and finance). (Before the early se-
venteenth century, a significant part of the Ottoman army
consisted of Christian soldiers, including Greeks.) Until the
end of the seventeenth century, the security level in the Ot-
toman Empire’s lands (which then covered more of the Bal-
kans than Anatolia) was much higher than in the pre-Otto-
man period, or in then Western Europe. Moreover, the so-
cial and property status of peasants significantly improved
after the Ottoman conquest, and was better than in many
regions of Europe. The population of the Balkans and Ana-
tolia grew as a result. The Empire’s internal problems, which
had been deepening from the late seventeenth century, caus-
ed a worsening of Greeks’ situation (abuses by the local ad-
ministrations, growing taxes, strengthening control of Mus-
lim nobles over peasants and the activity of robber gangs).
As a consequence, uprisings had become more frequent
among the Greek population, who sought foreign support.
Modern Greece emerged as an outcome of the largest anti-
Ottoman uprising (1821–1829). Until the 1920s, the main
goal of the Greek policy was the Megali Idea (Great Idea), i.e.
the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire by expanding
their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, inclu-
ding areas which at that time were predominantly inhabited
by Muslims. J. Dalegre, Grecs et Ottomans 1453–1923. Paris
2002.
124 R. Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge 2002.
125 Cyprus has been inhabited predominantly by Greek peo-
ple from antiquity to modern times. In 1571, when Cyprus
was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, the process of Turk-
ish immigration and Islamisation, and consequently the
assimilation of part of the Greek population to the Turkish
ethnicity began. Before the British took control of the island
in 1978, the Muslim population was more numerous than it
is today.
126 The Turkish population used to live scattered around the
whole island. There were larger Turkish enclaves in some
regions.
127 Violence was used much more frequently against Turks.
30,000 Turks were driven out or escaped from ethnically mix-
ed regions to more homogenous ones. In effect, a system of
de facto autonomous Turkish enclaves emerged. Tensions in
the island caused tens of thousands of Greeks to leave
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Turkey (such as the pogrom in Istanbul) and thousands of
Turks left Greece after 1955. In effect, the Greek minority in
Turkey was radically reduced, and the size of the Turkish
minority in Greece decreased significantly.
H. Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus Ethnic Political Counterpoints,
Lanhem 2004, pp. 8–15.
W. Mallinson, A Modern History of Cyprus, London 2005,
pp. 26–27., pp. 39–41.
128 The Turkish intervention caused the collapse of the natio-
nalist regime and led to Cypriot-Turkish talks on the political
system of the state. Turkey set forth an ultimatum requir-
ing the creation of either a federation or 6 Turkish cantons
(either of which was to cover 34% of the island’s territory).
The new Cyprus government failed to provide an answer
by the set deadline, which was very short, and the Turkish
army resumed the offensive. N. Tocci, T. Kovziridze, Cyprus,
http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/1-2004Chapter2.pdf
129 Over 160,000 Greeks were driven out, escaped or emigrat-
ed from the north, and 70,000 Turks did so from the south
during the fighting and over the next few years. Migration
which was not forced by direct pressure happened more fre-
quently in the case of Turks than among Greeks.
130 Serious demographical changes have taken place in the
KKTC over the period of more than 30 years since the Turk-
ish invasion. Tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots have left
Cyprus, and a more numerous group of settlers from Turkey
has come in their place. Ahmet An, ‘Günümüze Kibris Türk
Toplumu’, in Kibris Dün ve Bügün, ed. Masis Kürkcügil, Istan-
bul 2003, pp. 341–372.
131 A. Evin, ‘Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An As-
sessment of the Post-Earthquake Rapprochement’, in Greek-
Turkish Relations in an Era of D¯tente, ed. A. Çarkoglu, B. Ru-
bin, New York 2005, pp. 4–20.
132 Panayotis J. Tsakonas, Thansos P. Dokos, ‘Greek-Turkish
Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century: A View from
Athens’, in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Lenore
G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, Cambridge Massachusetts 2004,
pp. 101–126.
133 In the case of Turkey, the decisive events were the estab-
lishment in 2002 of a government led by the pragmatic Is-
lamic-democratic Justice and Development Party (AKP) and
support for the plan from the chief of staff of the Turkish
army.
134 The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,
http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_
2004.pdf
135 According to Greek Cypriots, the main faults of the plan
were the regulations which provided for too slow a with-
drawal by the military, the continuation of the system of
guarantees given in 1960, too broad powers being offered to
the Turkish component state, and excessive restrictions on
the regaining of property and return of refugees.
136 ‘Turkey disappointed by EU aid deal on northern Cyp-
rus’, http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-dis-
appointed-eu-aid-deal-northern-cyprus/article-152958
137 The government was bitterly criticised for accepting this
condition at the EU summit in December 2004 by the Turk-
ish opposition, who ‘forgot’ that regardless of the member-
ship negotiations, Turkey was obligated under a separate
protocol to the Ankara Agreement (1970) to extend the cus-
toms union to all EU member states.
Mehmet Ugur, ‘Müzakerelerden Üyelige: AB-Türkiye Gün-
demindeki Sorunlar’, Istanbul 2005, pp.163–169.
138 ‘EU Enlargement: Turkey – Declaration by European
Community and Member States’ (21 September 2005: Brus-
sels) http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5045_en.htm
139 For example, UNCLOS was not ratified by the United States.
140 The archipelago belonged to Italy between 1912 and 1947.
Turkey, indicating the lack of ratification of the 1932 agree-
ment regulating the ownership of small islands in this re-
gion with Italy, claims that some of them belong to it. Tur-
key’s standpoint on this issue is contrary to the provisions
of the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which states be-
yond doubt that the territorial waters of Turkey are limited
to a distance of three nautical miles. On the other hand,
Greece has created a military infrastructure in some islands
of the archipelago, although under the Paris Peace Treaty of
1947, the Dodecanese was to remain a demilitarised area.
141 According to poll results, the AKP will win the election and
the CHP will take the second place. However, the MHP will
probably also manage to enter parliament, and DYP is not
without hope either. In such a case, there may be a problem
with forming a government coalition. Generally, the future
of Turkey’s pro-European policy will depend on the exis-
tence of a stable pro-European majority.
142 This is a kind of a vicious circle, because an improving
situation in Turkey depends on the EU’s attitude to Turkey’s
membership. Turkey’s chances will clearly lessen if the 2007
presidential election in France is won by Nicolas Sarkozy,
who is a staunch opponent of Turkish accession.
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The cold alliance.
Turkish-US political 
relations after 2003
Rafa∏ Sadowski
Theses
1. From the end of World War II, Turkey and the
United States formed a close partnership – albeit
with some periodical tensions arising – which
was cemented by the threat posed by the Soviet
Union. After Communism collapsed, their partner-
ship was based on Turkey’s strategic location, of
bordering on instable regions (the Middle East,
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans), some
of which had rich deposits of oil and gas (Central
Asia and the Middle East).
2. The most serious crisis in Turkish-US relations
happened in 2003, which was directly caused by
the US intervention in Iraq and Turkey’s negative
stance towards it. Turkey did not agree to the
opening of a northern front from its territory.
3. The greatest problems in Turkish-US relations
include the following questions: (a) the alliance
between the USA and Iraqi Kurds and Washing-
ton’s ensuing passive approach to the existence
in Northern Iraq of bases of Kurdish guerrilla for-
ces, which fight against the Turkish army, (b) the
emerging possibility of the creation or declaration
of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq as
a result of a large-scale civil war in Iraq and the
possible disintegration of the country, (c) the hard
line adopted by the US in its Middle Eastern poli-
cy on Iran and Syria, while Turkey’s relations with
the two countries have improved, and those with
Israel, the US’ closest partner in the region, have
worsened, and (d) the mutual crisis in trust since
2003 (the high level of anti-American sentiments
among the Turkish public and elites, and dislike
for the Turkish government among the US elites).
4. Turkey’s strong sense of sovereignty and the
improvement of its relations with Russia clash
with American attempts to significantly increase
US military presence in the Black Sea region.
5. Regardless of these significant disagreements,
the US-Turkish partnership is still based upon so-
lid foundations. The two countries also have some
common interests, such as the long-term stabili-
sation of the regions neighbouring on Turkey (thus
combating Islamic terrorism and preventing arm-
ed conflicts), support for Turkish accession to the
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European Union, and military & energy security
issues.
6. The future shape of US-Turkish relations great-
ly depends on the way the situation in the Middle
East develops. The region is unlikely to stabilise
soon. Therefore, the current cooling of relations
will probably last for quite some time.
1. Brief description of the
development of Turkish-US 
relations after World War II
a) The Cold War period
Turkish-US relations after World War II were shap-
ed to a great extent by the bipolar geopolitical
order which had come to exist at that time. From
the point of view of Washington’s interests, Tur-
key was a major player in the policy of ‘contain-
ing Soviet expansion, which was the major rea-
son for US engagement in developing relations
with Ankara. Turkey was important because of
its geopolitical location in the Black Sea region,
in the area between the Soviet Union, the Middle
East and the Balkans. It directly bordered on the
Soviet Union in Caucasus. For Turkey, close co-
operation with the USA was an essential ele-
ment of its foreign and security policy, one of the
key objectives of which was to counteract and
prevent the serious threat posed by the USSR,
which for its part was making territorial claims
against Ankara1.
There were better and worse periods in the Turk-
ish-US relations during the ‘Cold War’. Mutual
relations developed without any problems in the
immediate aftermath of World War II. Starting
with 1946, Americans openly supported Ankara
and, inter alia, assigned as part of the Truman
Doctrine a sum of US$400 million annually to
support the military development of Turkey and
Greece2. In 1948, Washington started transfer-
ring economic aid to Ankara as part of the Mar-
shall Plan. Close co-operation was strengthened
as Turkey sent its troops to fight in the Korean War
(1950–1953), and above all when it joined the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in
19523. The Soviet threat invariably made the se-
curity issue the main area of Turkish-American
relations, as a result of which the Turkish armed
forces began playing a major part in relations be-
tween the two countries.
Relations nevertheless cooled in the 1960s. The
first element to increase tension in mutual rela-
tions was the withdrawal in 1962 of the Jupiter
intermediate-range ballistic missiles by Americans
from Turkey without consulting Ankara; this hap-
pened after the end of the Cuban missile crisis
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and the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba4.
Yet the key factor in the worsening of relations
was the issue of Cyprus. In 1964, during the con-
flict between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, in
which Turkey supported its compatriots, the US
President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote a letter con-
demning the actions taken by Ankara. He stated
that the Turkish intervention would pose a threat
of the Soviet Union becoming engaged in the
conflict, and warned that in such a case the USA
and other NATO allies would not be able to offer
help to Turkey. The letter gave rise to resent-
ment and upset Ankara’s confidence in its NATO
ally5. A subsequent crisis in mutual relations was
provoked by the Turkish military intervention in
Cyprus in 1974, to which the US reacted by im-
posing an embargo on arms sales to Turkey in
1975, which was lifted in 1978. Ankara reacted by
suspending the Common Defence Agreement
During that period, additional tensions in Turk-
ish-US relations were also caused by the problem
of large-scale poppy cultivation in Turkey which
was used for heroin production. The principles of
operation of the US military bases in Turkey were
another disputed issue. This crisis in relations
with the USA gave to the development of a ‘multi-
directional’ approach in Turkish policy in the
1970s. Turkey started taking a balance between
Moscow and Washington, and when relations
with the US had worsened, it established closer
contacts with the USSR.
Relations improved markedly following the 1980
military coup in Turkey. The Turkish army was
traditionally more willing to co-operate with the
American partner than the civilian political elite
had been. The USA supported the coup leaders.
The election of the staunchly pro-American Turk-
ish Prime Minister, Turgut Özal (who was after-
wards elected president), together with the fact
that Ankara gave up the ‘multidirectional’ ap-
proach to its foreign policy, greatly contributed
to improving mutual relations also.
Turkish-American relations improved despite
some differences in interests and standpoints,
such as the US offering more funds in financial
aid to Greece than to Turkey, the US imposing im-
port quotas on Turkish goods, the opinion shared
by the majority of American elites that the depor-
tations and massacres of Armenians should be re-
ferred to as a genocide, and the influence of Ar-
menian and Greek lobbies (unfavourably for Tur-
key) on the US politics6. For Americans, the al-
liance with Turkey acquired more significance
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
and after the Islamic revolution in Iran in the same
year7. Military co-operation, especially US mili-
tary aid to Turkey, was crucial. It took various
forms, such as financial aid, privileged credits, free
supplies of weapons, contracts to sell military
equipment and training Turkish soldiers. The
amount of financial aid granted by the United
States to Turkey for military purposes between
1980 and 1998 totalled US$6.064 billion8. In ad-
dition to that, Americans trained over 3,000 Turk-
ish officers between 1983 and 2000, which cost
more than US$40 million9. Since Washington had
placed so much emphasis on the security issue,
it criticised Turkey much more leniently for the
violations of human rights which resulted from
Ankara’s conflict with the separatist Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) in the 1980s and 1990s than
the EEC and later the EU did.
b) The 1990s: new security challenges
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
USSR marked the beginning of a new era in bilate-
ral relations. The bipolar geopolitical structure
and the threat from the Soviet Union, which had
stimulated co-operation between the two coun-
tries, no longer existed. At the same time, new se-
curity threats appeared, first the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, the emergence of new states
in the post-Soviet area, and the conflicts in the Bal-
kans and Caucasus. These events meant that Tur-
key, considering its geopolitical location, remain-
ed an important partner – from the perspective
of American interests – and the security issue re-
mained the most significant area of co-operation.
Turkey firmly supported the United States during
the first intervention in Iraq in 1991, both politi-
cally and militarily. Ankara made its air space and
air force bases available to the US and British ar-
mies and deployed nearly 100,000 of its troops
along the Iraqi border, which tied Iraqi troops
down in Kurdistan10. Moreover, Turkey joined the
economic sanctions imposed on Baghdad, even
though it sustained serious economic losses itself,
principally from the cutting Iraqi oil supplies. The
person who played a crucial role in Turkey’s tak-
ing such a definitely pro-American stance, against
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the opinion of most of the society and of the gen-
erals, was then-President Turgut Özal. He was
convinced that such a policy would help his
country to win EEC candidate status because
Western European countries, in addition to the
USA, were key members of the anti-Iraqi in-
ternational coalition.
The Gulf War of 1990–1991 left many Turks dis-
illusioned with US foreign policy. This feeling was
caused by the financial losses Turkey sustained as
a result of the international sanctions imposed
on Iraq since 1991 and by the estalishment (with
Washington’s consent) of the exclusion zone in
Northern Iraq, which was controlled by Kurds and
was independent of Baghdad. The establishment
of Kurdish-American co-operation was regarded
with great anxiety by Turkey since the Kurdish
issue was of the utmost importance for Ankara,
both in internal and in regional terms11. The con-
flicts of interests regarding the Kurdish issue
which then came into existencere-emerged dur-
ing the Second Gulf War, and caused the worst
crisis in bilateral relations in 2003.
Differences in the policies of the two countries to-
wards Iraq under Saddam Hussein appeared in
the 1990s. Ankara supported the policy of con-
tainment and control of Iraq’s developing military
forces; however it made some objections against
American and British air raids attacking Iraqi tar-
gets (in 1998, 1999 and 2001). In the face of strong
objections from Washington, Turkey intensified
its trade exchange with Iraq. It also resumed
flights to Iraq in 2000, following a nine-year break.
In January 2001, it established full diplomatic re-
lations with Baghdad and opened a second border
crossing point. This policy was based on the be-
lief that excessively weakening Hussein’s regime
would enfeeble the territorial integrity of Iraq and
thus strengthen the position of the Iraqi Kurds.
In the 1990s, regardless of discrepancies between
Washington and Ankara over Iraq, Turkey tight-
ened its relations with Israel, the US’ most impor-
tant ally in the Middle East. It also supported
NATO enlargement (although it attempted to use
the issue as a bargaining chip in its relations with
the EU) and the American policy in the Balkans,
which was demonstrated by the full engagement
of Turkish forces in the operations in Bosnia (1995)
and Kosovo (1999). In turn, the United States ac-
tively supported Turkey’s attempts to be given
candidate status for EU membership. American
diplomatic efforts helped Turkey obtain this sta-
tus at the EU Helsinki summit in 1999. The US-
Turkish relations reached their peak in 1999, when
Turkish intelligence services, assisted by the CIA
and under US diplomatic pressure, arrested Ab-
dullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK). His detention seriously undermined
the activity of Kurdish separatists. To emphasise
the special nature of Turkish-US relations at that
time, they were named as a ‘strategic partnership’
in September 199912. In early 2001, the United
States played a major part in convincing the In-
ternational Monetary Fund to help Turkey during
an economic crisis. The IMF then granted an un-
usually large loan of US$39.5 billion13. In 2001,
soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
Turkey definitely supported Washington in the
‘war on terror’ declared by the latter. It actively
helped the Americans, offering them political and
military support. This included sending its troops
to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led operation
ISAF, taking command of the mission twice. Du-
ring the US-led actions in Afghanistan, it agreed
to the use of the US military base in the Turkish
town of Incirlik. Additionally, it provided Ameri-
cans with intelligence assistance and engaged in
support for the Pakistani leader, General Pervez
Musharraf, who co-operated with the USA in the
war against the Taliban regime14. The Turkish go-
vernment supported the US intervention in Afgha-
nistan, although public opinion in Turkey was
clearly against it15.
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2. The 2003 crisis
The most significant event in American-Turkish
relations, which has essentially determined the
present shape thereof, was the 2003 US interven-
tion in Iraq and the Turkish parliament’s refusal
to provide US troops with access to Turkish ter-
ritory for that operation.
The ‘war on terrorism’ declared by the USA after
September 11 offered the Turkish government an
opportunity to internationalise the problem of
Kurdish separatism and its fight against PKK guer-
rilla forces, which had existed since the early
1980s. Moreover, Islamic terrorism was also a pro-
blem for the Turkish authorities. Although Turk-
ish organisations of Islamic radicals (such as Hiz-
bullah and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’
Front (IBDA-C)) had had rather limited potential,
subsequent attacks in Istanbul in November 2003,
in which over 60 people were killed, proved that
due to their connections with Al-Qaeda they were
capable of plotting large-scale operations that
could put Turkey’s security at risk. However, from
the very beginning of the ‘war on terrorism’ the
Turkish government had raised serious objections
to any military operation in the Middle East, es-
pecially in Iraq. They were anxious about the
threat of destabilisation of the region on which
Turkey bordered, and about the possible disinte-
gration of Iraq and the establishment of an inde-
pendent Kurdish state in the northern part of the
country.
The breakthrough happened on 1 March 2003,
when the Turkish parliament refused US troops
access to Turkish territory, which they wanted to
use for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and did not agree
to the establishment on its territory of a northern
front to attack Iraq in exchange for admitting
Turkish troops into Northern Iraq16. The resolu-
tion fell only four votes short of approval.
Talks on the US troops’ attack against Iraq from
Turkish territory started in December 2002 and
lasted until the end of February 2003. During that
period, the government changed in Turkey; the
democratic-Islamic Justice and Development Party
(AKP) won the elections in November 2002. The
government was temporarily headed by Abdullah
Gül, since the party’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdo-
gan, had to wait until the parliament had voted
for an amendment to cancel a ban prohibiting
participation in political life for people who had
been sentenced by a court. This meant that until
March 2003 the AKP was focused on forming a new
government. At the same time, negotiations on
the unification of Cyprus, which were very im-
portant for Turkey, were being conducted under
UN auspices. Regardless of those problems, the
talks with the US ended in an agreement, which
was approved by the government on 25 February
2003 and supported by Erdogan. However while
negotiating, the AKP leaders failed to make efforts
to convince their society that supporting the US
was in Turkey’s interest17. They did not do so be-
cause of the extreme unpopularity of the invasion
of Iraq among the Turkish public. Many AKP mem-
bers were also strongly opposed to the attack
against Iraq. According to many observers, Erdo-
gan chose not to exert too much pressure on his
party’s MPs because he was afraid of a split. 264
AKP MPs (70%) voted were in favour, 250 MPs
(some of the AKP and the entire opposition Repu-
blican People’s Party, the CHP) were against the
move. 19 AKP members abstained from voting.
The agreement was nevertheless rejected as it had
not received the necessary support from half of
all MPs.
Those AKP members who voted against or ab-
stained from the voting mainly came from the
Kurdish south-eastern part of Turkey. Their stance
could have been motivated either ethnically (MPs
of Kurdish origin opposed the entry of Turkish
troops into Iraqi Kurdistan) or religiously (object-
ing against the US invasion of a Muslim state).
The opposition CHP, which imposed a party whip
during the voting, mobilised as many of its MPs
as it could. The nationalist CHP was definitely
against letting foreign troops onto the country’s
territory. Moreover, the party leaders hoped that
a rejection of the bill would cause relations be-
tween the AKP government and Washington to
worsen.
The army’s stance on the US opening a northern
front was also unclear. The supreme command
was in favour of Turkey’s participation in the Iraq
operation. However, they met with internal resis-
tance from some military circles who were against
letting foreign troops into their country, and fear-
ed that the Iraqi Kurds could become stronger
and that Iraq might disintegrate. Some analysts
highlighted the differences of opinions inside the
supreme command, regarding the extent to which
their troops should engage in co-operation with
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Americans18. The military were trying to play
a political game, as a result of which the parlia-
ment would be held responsible for taking a deci-
sion that would be very unpopular among the
public. Therefore, the army adopted a very pas-
sive approach in the public discussion on making
Turkish territory available to US troops, and did
not exert any pressure on either the AKP’s or the
CHP’s politicians. On 1 March 2003, shortly before
the vote in the parliament, consent to the agree-
ment with the USA was rejected at the meeting
of the National Security Council (MGK), members
of which included the highest-ranked comman-
ders of the armed forces, the president and the
prime minister.
Turkey tried to mitigate the negative consequen-
ces which the vote of 1 March 2003 had had on
its relations with the USA. On 8 March, the Turkish
parliament voted for a resolution permitting the
US air forces to use Turkish bases and air space.
American-Turkish talks to send Turkish forces to
central Iraq started in summer 2003. An initial
agreement on granting an US$8.5 billion loan to
Turkey was even signed in September 200319. On
7 October 2003, the parliament in Ankara agreed
to send 10,000 Turkish troops to act as peace-
keeping forces in central Iraq. However, the deci-
sion was taken too early, before an agreement de-
fining the rules of the Turkish troops’ presence
was achieved with the Americans, and the move
met with determined resistance from all political
forces in Iraq. In effect, the USA and Iraq chose
not to accept the Turkish offer. The decision by the
Turkish parliament was motivated less by an at-
tention to good relations with the United States
than by attempts to prevent the emergence of an
independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
Attempts to improve Turkish-US relations were
unsuccessful due to the deep crisis of mutual
trust. The negative result of the 1 March vote to
allow US access to Turkish territory was sharply
criticised by representatives of the US adminis-
tration, who saw it as a sign of their ally’s dis-
loyalty20. In turn, Turks’ trust in Americans was
undermined due to the detention of Turkish in-
telligence officers by US forces in Suleymaniyah
in Northern Iraq on 4 July 2003. At that time near-
ly 100 American soldiers carried out an operation
as a result of which 11 Turkish intelligence offi-
cers were captured. They were treated as terror-
ists (they were disarmed, handcuffed and their
heads were covered) and were accused of at-
tempting to murder the Kurdish governor of the
province. Information on that event was leaked
to the press by Turkey, although the most senior
state authorities do not seem to have had any-
thing in common with the leak21. To many Turks
this incident proved that the Americans were treat-
ing their NATO ally Turkey unfairly, and were clear-
ly discriminating in favour of the Iraqi Kurds22.
57
T
h
e
 c
o
ld
 a
ll
ia
n
c
e
. 
T
u
rk
is
h
-U
S
 p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
 a
ft
e
r 
2
0
0
3
C E S  R e p o r t
3. Discrepancies in bilateral
relations in the Middle East
a) Iraq
Ankara is in favour of ending the conflict Iraq,
setting up a stable state and preserving its terri-
torial integrity. For this reason it can be believed
that the Turkish government is interested in the
success of the American mission in Iraq. However,
Turkey has very serious objections against the
methods used by the USA. These concern Wa-
shington’s alliance with the Iraqi Kurds, whose
position has been significantly strengthened since
2003; thousands of casualties among Muslim civi-
lians caused by American actions; and the emer-
ging threat of a massive civil war in Iraq, the dis-
integration of the country and the possible ap-
pearance of an independent Kurdistan23. There-
fore, any improvement of Turkish-American rela-
tions depends to a great extent on stabilising
the situation in Iraq itself and on the US inter-
vention succeeding.
The USA entered into its alliance with Iraqi Kurds
as a result of the Turkish parliament’s refusal to
open a northern front on 1 March 2003. Iraqi
Kurds, together with Israel, are currently the most
pro-American nation in the Middle East. Military
and political co-operation with Americans has
definitely reinforced the position of Iraqi Kurds
in the international arena, Iraq and the region at
large. Thanks to this, the area under their con-
trol has been significantly expanded. Washington
is currently playing the role of their protector.
Never before in their modern history have Iraqi
Kurds been as powerful as they are today. In ex-
change, their alliance with the Iraqi Kurds has
given the Americans a guarantee of peace in a lar-
ge part of Northern Iraq, where US bases may be
set up in the future. The north of Iraq is strategi-
cally important for Washington, considering the
proximity of Syria and Iran, which the USA per-
ceives as its most serious regional opponents, as
well as the large deposits of oil and gas located
there. As a consequence of their common inte-
rests and the US’ serious military engagements
in other parts of Iraq, American troops have not
undertaken any active military operations against
Turkish Kurd units. The former PKK party, which
is considered a terrorist organisation by the USA,
has its bases on Iraqi Kurd territories and launch-
es its attacks from there against targets in Tur-
key. The US, fearing that a war could break out
between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, has not agreed
to Turkish military expeditions entering deeper
into Northern Iraq; the Turkish army used to do
so, thus causing very serious losses to Kurdish
separatists during Saddam Hussein’s rule. The
former PKK has benefited from this situation,
and has been able to partly rebuild its potential.
American passivity towards the PKK and the lack
of permission for any Turkish intervention in Iraq
are the most serious complaints made by Turks
against the USA, and are the key causes of the
high level of anti-American sentiments among
the Turkish population. For over a year now Wa-
shington has been trying to adjust its policy to-
wards the PKK by intensifying its co-operation
with Turkish intelligence services. Washington
has also supported Turkey’s efforts to delegalise
media and associations which support the PKK, as
well as its financial bases in European countries.
In summer 2006, according to the Turkish press,
American intelligence materials were used for two
successful operations conducted by Turkish secu-
rity forces against Kurdish separatists24. In April
2006, during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
visit to Turkey, Ankara put pressure on Washing-
ton by deploying nearly 200,000 soldiers along
the Turkish-Iraqi border.
In late August 2006, Washington appointed Ge-
neral Joseph Ralston as coordinator for countering
the PKK. His task is to intensify intelligence and
military co-operation between Turkey and the
USA on this issue. A change in the US’ approach
to Turkey’s fight against the PKK has also been
confirmed by Kurdish media reports of bombard-
ments of Northern Iraq by Turkish artillery and
air forces25. On 20 September 2006, the Iraqi go-
vernment banned the activity of the PKK on its
territory26. On 1 October 2006, the Kurdish Work-
ers Party announced a cessation of armed opera-
tions. However, the main problems (American pas-
sivity towards the PKK and the lack of permis-
sion for Turkish intervention in Iraq) remain un-
resolved.
Turkish elites are particularly anxious about the
potential disintegration of Iraq and the possible
emergence of an independent Kurdistan. Many
Turkish politicians and generals see such a sce-
nario as a beginning of the process of secession
of Turkish Kurds and the building of a ‘Greater
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Kurdistan’. For this reason Turkey has long oppo-
sed the US-supported idea of transforming Iraq
into a federation.Ankara finally accepted the fede-
ral system of Iraq in 2005. However, it has main-
tained its negative stance on including Kirkuk in
the Kurdish region. Large oil and gas deposits may
be found around the city. Turkey fears that if Kir-
kuk is made a part of the Kurdish region, this will
increase the Kurds’ independence from both An-
kara and Baghdad.
Turkey’s concern about the possible disintegra-
tion of Iraq is additionally strengthened by the
number of casualties in the clashes between Sunni
Arabs and Shiites, which has been growing ra-
pidly since early 2006, thus increasing the risk of
a massive civil war. Many Turkish politicians and
military officers believe that mistakes made by
Americans after the intervention in Iraq (such as
the failure to dissolve religious militias) have con-
tributed to the situation. To prevent war, Turkey
has been trying to include Sunnis in the govern-
ment structures.
Moreover, Turkey has reservations against the US’
giving permission for Kurdish people to settle in
cities inhabited by the Turkish-speaking Turkmen,
which is happening simultaneously with the ex-
pansion of the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq27.
The problem especially concerns the city of Kir-
kuk, which is surrounded by oilfields.
Turkish-American relations have also been adver-
sely affected by the deaths of many thousands of
Muslim civilians caused by US activities. This has
been very sharply criticised by many Turkish po-
liticians. Especially severe criticism has been di-
rected against the bombardments of towns sup-
porting the insurgents, in which many civilians
had been killed, and against US forces using tor-
ture against people suspected of involvement in
the insurgence. Such criticism has often taken
very harsh forms (one AKP MP called the assault
on Fallujah an act of genocide; Americans in Iraq
have also been compared to Nazis). The Turkish
public, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims,
feel more sympathy for Sunni Arabs, who are the
main opponents of the American army there28.
b) Iran, Israel and Syria
Although the USA and Turkey define their long-
term strategic goals regarding the Middle East (de-
mocratisation; ending the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict by building a Palestinian state; preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons; the develop-
ment of regional co-operation) in similar ways,
there are still significant differences in the levels
of implementation thereof29. Turkey prefers the
policy of persuasion and dialogue with the autho-
ritarian elites, while the United States has chosen
the policy of pressure. In effect, the stances and
the actions taken by the two countries with re-
gard to the region are often different and mutu-
ally contradictory. Such differences are most clear-
ly apparent in the respective approaches the coun-
tries take towards Syria and Israel, and to a certain
extent towards Iran.
As recently as 1998, Ankara very seriously threa-
tened Syria with a military intervention because
of the support offered by Hafez Assad’s regime to
PKK guerrillas. Also, relations with Iran were quite
tense for several reasons: (1) Iran’s support for
Armenia in the latter’s conflict with Azerbaijan,
which in turn was supported by Ankara, (2) Turk-
ish criticism of the position of the Azeri minority
in northern Iran, (3) Iran’s support for the PKK
and Islamic radical circles in Turkey, and (4) Tur-
key’s close co-operation with the USA and Israel.
Since 2003, these relations have improved for both
internal and external reasons, the most signifi-
cant of which are the strengthening position of
the Kurds as a result of the US intervention in Iraq,
and the electoral victory of the Justice and Deve-
lopment Party (AKP) in 2002, which sees Islam as
an important point of reference and supports
closer relations with the Islamic world30.
Ahmet Davutoglu, international policy advisor to
Prime Minister Erdogan, can be recognised as the
initiator of the new Turkish policy towards the
Middle Eastern neighbours. In his book named
Stratejik Derinlik (A Strategic Depth) he presents 
a concept for strengthening Ankara’s internatio-
nal position by improving and developing com-
prehensive co-operation with all the regions bor-
dering on Turkey. As can be expected, this would
make Turkey a more attractive candidate for the
EU and could help Ankara become a better part-
ner in relations with Washington. On the other
hand, in the case of any problems in relations
with the EU or the USA, close ties with regional
partners could provide an alternative to a pro-
Western line of Turkish foreign policy31. Cooling
relations with the United States and tensions in
contacts with the European Union have led to
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voices urging Turkish foreign policy to reset its
long-term priorities now by rapprochement with
Russia, Muslim states and China32. However, such
opinions currently have no place in Turkey’s main-
stream foreign policy.
The emergence of the common platform of inte-
rests as a result of the change in the balance of
forces in the region following the US interven-
tion in Iraq has been of key significance for Tur-
key’s rapprochement with Iran and Syria, which
has also been supported by Turkish public opi-
nion. The common platform principally covered
regional security and economic co-operation. The
Turkish parliament’s decision on 1 March 2003 not
only caused a caesura in Ankara’s contacts with
Washington but also affected Turkey’s relations
with its Muslim neighbours. Turkey, Iran and Syria
were critical of the US intervention in Iraq, since
they shared a common anxiety about the possible
emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
Turkey’s stance on Iran and Syria has been great-
ly affected by the change in those countries’ ap-
proach to the PKK. Their governments, under so-
me pressure from Ankara, have taken active mea-
sures against PKK guerrillas. Syrian and Iranian
security forces have contributed to the liquidation
of PKK bases on their territories, a step which has
been welcomed by Turkey. In late 2003, Syria also
helped Ankara capture the co-planners of the ter-
rorist attacks on Istanbul. According to media re-
ports, Turkish and Iranian armed forces have been
sporadically engaging in tactical co-operation
against the PKK33.
Numerous diplomatic visits, during which many
treaties and agreements were signed, have prov-
ed that Turkey’s bilateral relations with Iran and
Syria are improving34. Syria has given up its terri-
torial claims on Turkey (the Hatay region) and no
longer criticises the building of a dam on the Eu-
phrates and Tigris rivers, which is also a token of
warming relations with Ankara. The Turkish go-
vernment has appealed to the Syrian regime for
democratisation, co-operation with the UN dur-
ing the investigation into the murder of the Le-
banese prime minister and the withdrawal of
troops from Lebanon, which was done under in-
ternational pressure in 2005. However, Ankara has
categorically refused to take a tough line on Da-
mascus (such as sanctions or the threat of a mili-
tary intervention).
Trade exchange between Turkey, Syria and Iran
has also significantly grown over recent years35.
Nevertheless, its level is rather limited in compa-
rison with Turkey’s economic relations with EU
member states and the USA. Co-operation on ener-
gy issues with Iran, the development of which
has met with Washington’s discontent, is impor-
tant for Turkey. Thanks to gas supplies from Iran,
Turkey has been able to reduce its dependence
on Russian gas and renegotiate the disadvanta-
geous gas contract with Gazprom in 2004. How-
ever, energy co-operation between Turkey and
Iran has not been developing well, and many
problems still exist in this area. Turkey criticises
Iran for its unreasonable cuts to gas supplies and
its habit of breaching contracts, and wants to re-
negotiate them since it has overestimated its de-
mand for gas.
The clear improvement in Turkey’s relations with
Iran and Syria led to sharp criticism from Wa-
shington in 200536. However, regarding Turkey’s
policy on Syria, Washington has recently modi-
fied its stance, and has started to treat Turkey as
an intermediary in communicating with Bashar
Assad’s regime37.
The United States wants to bring about the com-
plete isolation of those countries which it has
branded as ‘rogue states’. Iran was also classified
as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in the strategy for the
war on terror which George W. Bush announced
in January 2002. In turn, Syria was accused by
Washington of sheltering members of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, and supporting Iraqi insurgents
and terrorists who destabilised the situation in
Iraq. The Syrian regime was also sharply criticis-
ed by the Bush administration for interfering in
the internal affairs of Lebanon (supporting Hez-
bollah) and its bad relations with Israel.
The USA perceives Iran as the most serious threat
to the region, and America itself, because of Iran’s
officially stated desire to destroy Israel, support-
ing anti-American radical Shiite groups in Leba-
non (Hezbollah) and Iraq, and in particular be-
cause of its nuclear programme, which Washing-
ton believes to be aimed at building a nuclear
bomb. Turkey and the USA would not like Iran to
have nuclear weapons. Currently, the United States
and Turkey have given top priority to negotia-
tions conducted by countries which belong to
the UN Security Council plus Germany. Ankara has
declared its readiness to support possible inter-
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national sanctions that could be imposed by the
UN on Iran, even though they would have an ad-
verse effect on the Turkish economy. However,
Ankara is definitely against any military inter-
vention in Iran, which the present US adminis-
tration has not ruled out. This sceptical approach
by the Turkish government to a possible US attack
on Iran results from its fear of Iranian counter-
action (large-scale terrorist activity) which could
destabilise the regions that border Turkey. De-
finite support for US actions by Ankara has been
ruled out due to the strong anti-Americanism of
the Turkish public and elites, as well as fear that
Iran could support Kurdish and Islamic terrorism
in Turkey.
In turn, the modification of approaches in the
Turkish policy of warming relations with Muslim
states has caused a cooling in Ankara’s relations
with Israel. This has been negatively received by
Washington, which is a close ally of Tel Aviv.
Good Turkish-Israeli relations had been based on
military co-operation, the respective alliances of
the two countries with the USA, common inter-
ests in the region (including conflicts and dis-
putes with Syria and Iran) and dynamic econom-
ic co-operation38. However, the AKP government,
which relied on an Islamic electorate, has started
distancing itself from Israel in its policy, a change
which was welcomed by a majority of Turkish
society. Turkey’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict under the AKP government became more
favourable to the Palestinian side. In spring 2004,
following the Israeli attacks on Rafah, Prime Mini-
ster Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of using
‘state terrorism’, withdrew Turkey’s ambassador
from Israel for consultations, and raised the rank
of the Turkish diplomatic agency in the Palesti-
nian Autonomy to that of an embassy. Informa-
tion in June 2004 that Israeli intelligence had
been training Kurdish troops in Iraq certainly con-
tributed to the worsening relations between Tur-
key and Israel39. The Israeli government denied
the information, although a BBC report broadcast
in September 2006 showed that former Israeli
secret service officers employed by private com-
panies had in fact worked as military instructors
in northern Iraq40.
From the point of view of Turkey, which takes
a strong stance the Kurdish issue, these events
undermined its confidence in its Israeli partner41.
In February 2006, leaders of Hamas made a pri-
vate visit to Turkey. During the visit, the Turkish
government appealed to Hamas to recognise the
state of Israel and renounce the use of terror.
The visit was very strongly criticised by both
Israel and Washington. In turn, the Israeli inter-
ventions in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip in June
and July 2006 were opposed by Prime Minister
Erdogan, who claimed they were not a justified
reaction. Many Turkish MPs left the Turkish-Is-
raeli friendship group. Some of them suggested
that Israel’s actions reminded them of Nazi poli-
cy. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül criticised the
USA for its unconditional support to Israel which,
according to Ankara, made settling conflicts be-
tween Israel and its neighbours more difficult.
Ankara, in contrast to Washington, supported
France in its appeal to reach a truce as soon as
possible. Regardless of these tensions, Turkey is
still the country with which Israel has the best
relations in the region. This has been proven by
Israel’s support for the participation of Turkish
troops in the UN-led operation in Lebanon, which
Tel Aviv has not granted to any other Muslim
country.
c) Turkish anti-Americanism
One of the underlying reasons for the change in
Turkish policy towards the United States is the
intensifying anti-American sentiments among
the Turkish society, including the political elites.
This concerns not only Islamic circles, who are tra-
ditionally believed to be anti-American, but also
a much broader group of nationalists, Kemalists
and secular liberals42. Furthermore, the impact
of public opinion on foreign policy has grown in
connection with Turkey’s ongoing democratisa-
tion as part of its adjustment to EU requirements.
Turkish anti-Americanism has caused Americans
to perceive Turkey in a less favourable way. Soon
after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
Turkey was presented by the USA as a model Mus-
lim state, whose political system was based on
secularism. At that time, the AKP was praised as
an Islamic democratic party. However, as of 2003,
the US administration has definitely ceased pro-
moting Turkey and the AKP as models to be fol-
lowed by the Muslim world. Representatives of
neo-conservatives, such as Michael Rubin and Da-
niel Pipes, who provide the ideological base for
the present administration, have started accus-
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ing the AKP of Islamising the country in their
publications.
Turkish anti-Americanism consists of a critical
perception of the US foreign policy43 as threaten-
ing the interests of the Turkish state, is unilater-
al and does not take into account the interests of
Turkey or other countries, and is in general defi-
nitely anti-Muslim. Public opinion polls have
shown that Turks clearly differentiate their sen-
timents on the United States, Americans and Pre-
sident George W. Bush. For example, polls con-
ducted in June 2005 by the ARI Haraket institute
showed that 27% of respondents had a very nega-
tive attitude towards Americans, 49% towards the
United States and 71% towards George W. Bush44.
Answers given by Turkish respondents concern-
ing the reasons for and consequences of US poli-
cy in the Middle East are similar to the opinions
of the French or German publics, as has been in-
dicated by polls conducted by Pew Research
Centre between 2002 and 2005. However, Turks’
dislike of Americans is much stronger than that
felt by Western European societies45. This is con-
nected with a feeling of religious solidarity and,
above all, with a negative opinion on Americans’
relations with Iraqi Kurds and tolerating PKK bas-
es in Iraq. However, the general dislike of Ame-
ricans does not translate into hatred of indivi-
dual Americans, which happens in some Arab
communities46.
In the late 1990s, a definite majority of Turks had
a positive opinion of the USA and Americans.
America’s image among Turkish society started
worsening due to the operation in Afghanistan,
strong US support for Israel and the eruption of
the second intifada. However, a turning point
came with the US intervention in Iraq and pre-
parations for it. In spring 2003, the amount of
positive opinions on the USA reached its lowest
level of 12% (at the end of 2002 it had been as
high as 30%) and rose slightly thereafter47. Sur-
veys for Foreign Policy Perception, which have
been conducted regularly since 2003 by the Turk-
ish International Strategic Research Organisation,
have shown that approximately 25% to 30% of
Turks believe that the USA poses the most serious
threat to the security of their country. In polls
conducted by Pollmark in early March 2005, over
30% of Turks stated that the USA could attack
Turkey in the near future. Polls conducted by the
same firm at the end of 2004 indicated that the
United States was perceived by nearly 85% of
Turks as a country which posed a threat to glob-
al peace (the highest result of all the survey-co-
vered countries, including Russia and Iran, and
giving a significant lead for the USA over other
countries) and by over 30% as the country that
posed the greatest threat48.
The negative approach of Turkish society to US
policy has also indirectly influenced the activities
of the Turkish government. Out of respect for pub-
lic opinion, the governing AKP party and its lead-
er Recep Tayyip Erdogan will not take any ac-
tions that could adversely affect public support
for his party. On the other hand, US politicians
have reacted negatively to this passivity on the
part of Turkish authorities in overcoming anti-
American stereotypes and opinions among the
Turkish population.
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4. The platform of common
interests
Regardless of existing discrepancies and negative
opinions, Turkey and the United States share
a broad platform of common interests. Ankara’s
reserve in its policy towards Washington has not
fundamentally affected the activities undertaken
by the USA with regard to Turkey. For the United
States, a Turkey which is stable, democratic and
integrated into Western structures (NATO and the
EU) is a necessary precondition the for stabilisa-
tion and democratisation of the Middle East,
which is a top priority objective of US policy. The
key areas of Turkish-US co-operation principally
cover the process of Turkey’s European integra-
tion. In this context, the issue of divided Cyprus
can be used as a positive example, which plays
an important role in mutual Turkish-US relations
and is essential for the Turkey’s prospects of join-
ing the EU.
Security co-operation, which covers combating
terrorism, preventing ethnic conflicts and mili-
tary & energy collaboration, is still very impor-
tant. Owing to the extensive field of common in-
terests, the US-Turkish alliance still works, regard-
less of existing differences of opinion on the
Iraqi issue.
a) Turkey’s integration 
with the European Union
EU membership is a priority of the Turkish go-
vernment’s policy. The United States also sees the
‘European anchor’ as the most effective tool to
guarantee Turkey’s establishment in the Western
world and for maintaining a democratic political
system in the country49. For this reason, Washing-
ton has for many years been the chief advocate
of Turkey’s EU membership. The intensified acti-
vity of US diplomacy can be proven by its enga-
gement in lobbying among European partners
(especially Germany) for establishing a customs
union between the EU and Turkey (1995) as well
as during the Helsinki summit in 1999, when
Turkey was officially granted candidate status50.
The USA lobbied for Turkey in European capitals
before each summit when the EU took decisions
on future relations between Ankara and the Union
(2002, 2004 and 2005)51.
However, Washington’s ability to support Tur-
key’s membership using political means was re-
duced as a consequence of the outbreak of the
second war in Iraq, which led to a sudden wors-
ening in trans-Atlantic relations. This was affect-
ed by the following two factors: (1) the crisis in
relations between the USA and France & Germany,
the countries which play a key role in the Union’s
decision-making process and (2) the cooling of
US-Turkish relations and the increasing similari-
ty of Turkey’s position to that of its European
partners.
Washington’s support for Turkish membership
may still turn into a disservice for Ankara. Many
European politicians fear that American support
for Turkey’s accession stems from the US’ desire
to weaken the European Union by preventing its
further internal integration, as a result of which
Brussels could become a more equal partner in
trans-Atlantic relations. In the opinion of these
politicians, such support is also a manifestation
of American arrogance. The negative reception to
the US lobbying for Turkey in Europe was perfect-
ly illustrated by a statement made by the French
President Jacques Chirac in June 2004; ‘It’s a bit
as if I told the United States how they should
manage their relations with Mexico’52.
The US operation in Iraq posed a dilemma for
Turkish diplomacy; whether to support the United
States or the European Union, mainly France and
Germany, which had adopted a critical stance on
American activities. Turkey’s negative opinion on
US policy towards Iraq brought it closer to the
EU’s position. However, from the end of 2004, pro-
blems appeared in relations between Turkey and
those EU member states which had become in-
creasingly critical of Turkey’s membership aspira-
tions. As a consequence of the criticism, Turkey
started feeling rejected by the European Union.
This situation created a possibility of the worst-
case scenario coming true, in which Turkey’s
relations with both the EU and the USA would
clearly worsen53. A dangerous effect of that could
be a certain revaluation of Ankara’s foreign policy
and closer relations with Russia, Iran and Syria54.
Although such a scenario is currently far from
coming true, it still cannot be excluded. To side-
step this potential threat, Washington – regard-
less of the bilateral tensions – continues its efforts
to maintain correct relations with Turkey and
strongly supports Turkish membership in the EU.
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However, the United States does see certain pro-
blems that may arise out of Turkey’s rapproche-
ment with Europe. If Turkey establishes closer
relations with the EU, Ankara will have to har-
monise its foreign policy activity with Brussels
to a greater extent, and not with Washington, as
has so far been the case. Differences of opinions
and controversies existing between Americans
and Europeans may provide another point of dis-
pute in US-Turkish relations in addition to the
current three major areas of disagreement, which
are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey’s sup-
port for the establishment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the stance on possible
military intervention in Iran55.
b) Cyprus
The unsettled conflict over the divided island of
Cyprus is a major issue in Ankara’s relations with
both Brussels and Washington, and is one of the
key problems in the process of Turkey’s integra-
tion with the EU. In turn, from the United States’
perspective, it is a significant factor in building
stability in the Mediterranean region. Although
Cyprus does not currently play a major role in
Turkish-American relations it could still be a sig-
nificant stimulant to improve relations between
the two countries, thanks to the positive recep-
tion by the Turkish side of the US engagement in
settling the conflict.
During the cold war period, the United States at-
tached great significance to alleviating the nega-
tive consequences of the division of Cyprus. The
main objective was to prevent a conflict between
two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, for which
this issue was the main point of dispute.
As of 2002, the United States, along with the UN
and the EU, actively participated in developing
a plan for the peaceful unification of the island,
the so-called Annan Plan. It very warmly welcom-
ed the constructive engagement by Prime Mini-
ster Erdogan in activities for a peaceful settlement
of the problem of Cyprus; he played an essential
role in convincing domestic Turkish public opi-
nion to accept some of the concessions necessa-
ry for the conflict resolution. He backed the poli-
tical forces which supported the Annan Plan
(these were now ruling the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (KKTC)), and appealed to the Cy-
priot Turks to vote for the Plan in the referendum
on 24 April 2004. However, the Annan Plan did
not come into force, as it was rejected by the
Greek community in the Republic of Cyprus. Due
to the rejection of the peaceful plan, the process
of political settlement of the conflict was with-
held. Thereafter, the United States concentrated
its efforts on economic support for the Turkish
part of the island and reinforcing democratic in-
stitutions. In 2005, the American programme of
support for the KKTC economy was worth US$30.5
million56. The United States also activated con-
tacts with representatives of the Turkish Cypriots.
A US trade delegation made an official visit to
Northern Cyprus on 17 February 2005. In turn, on
19 June 2005, the US and KKTC ambassadors in
Turkey met in Ankara57. The official visit in Wa-
shington on 28 October 2005 by the KKTC Presi-
dent Mehmet Ali Talat, who had been invited by
the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, was a ve-
ry important event. During her visit to Greece
and Turkey in April 2006, the American head of
diplomacy criticised the policies of Athens and the
Cypriot Greeks and appealed to them to change
their stance on the KKTC. Although the problem
of Cyprus had not been settled, the efforts made
to do so were positively received by the Turkish
public. In Ankara’s opinion, the position taken by
Washington is much more constructive and fa-
vourable than the EU policy, which is believed to
be insincere58.
c) The Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative
The US intervention in Iraq was part of a broader
concept to democratise the Muslim world, which
the Bush administration perceived as a necessary
precondition for achieving a lasting stabilisation
of the Middle East and eliminating terrorism. The
concept was translated into the Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI), which
is a priority issue of US foreign policy59. The pro-
ject was initiated by the United States in June
2004 at the G-8 summit in Sea Island. Its objec-
tives include socioeconomic reforms and the de-
mocratisation of Muslim states from Morocco
through to Pakistan. Turkey has declared its sup-
port for the initiative. Ankara’s engagement in
the BMENAI may provide a significant stimulus
to improving Turkish-US relations. Turkey belie-
ves that it can be helpful in the following three
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areas60. Firstly, it can act as a mediator between
the West (including the USA) and Iran & Syria. Se-
condly, Ankara can play a similar part in the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict. Thirdly, it can contribute
to fostering democratic processes in the countries
located within the area covered by the BMENAI.
However, Turkey’s participation in the project is
rather potential than certain at this stage, due to
a number of limitations. Turkey is too weak an in-
ternational actor to be able to play a major role
in negotiations with Iran. It also lacks any instru-
ments to influence the government in Tehran.
Turkey has a greater potential for playing the part
of mediator in the case of Syria, although an im-
provement of relations between Damascus and
Washington primarily depends on the settlement
of the Syrian-Israeli conflict over the Golan
Heights. As for the conflict between Israel and
Palestine, the Israeli side has lost confidence in
Ankara as a result of worsening Turkish-Israeli
relations, which makes it difficult for Turkey to
act as a trustworthy mediator for both sides. Fi-
nally, in the context of engagement in democra-
tisation in the BMENAI area, there are two major
problems concerning Turkey. Firstly, the secular
model of the Turkish state, which is presented as
one to be followed by Muslim states, is not attrac-
tive to many of them and seems impossible to
adopt. This is related to the special circumstances
of Turkey’s historical development. Secondly, Tur-
key focuses too much on stabilisation in fear of
the negative consequences of overly hasty demo-
cratisation61.
d) Co-operation in the areas 
of security and economy
Security co-operation is still the main platform on
which the alliance between Turkey and the USA
is based. Although differences of opinions have
somewhat weakened it, the existing threats –
above all terrorism and destabilisation of the situ-
ation in Turkey and neighbouring regions, and
common interests in the fields of energy and the
arms industry – still form a solid basis for further
co-operation. Turkey and the USA are co-operat-
ing especially intensively within the framework
of NATO. Turkish and US armed forces participate
in common operations in Afghanistan and Koso-
vo, as well as in the Alliance’s manoeuvres. The
two countries co-operate as part of NATO’s Part-
nership for Peace with Moldova, Ukraine and Cau-
casian & Central Asian countries. They both sup-
port Georgia’s and Ukraine’s NATO membership,
and are especially engaged in modernising the
Georgian army. The Incirlik Air Base has been of
key logistic significance for the US operation in
Iraq. Many of the supplies for US troops in Iraq
are also delivered from Mediterranean ports by
ground transport through Turkey.
However, Turkey’s strong sense of sovereignty,
together with improving Turkish-Russian rela-
tions since 2003, have given rise to certain prob-
lems in Turkish-US military co-operation, espe-
cially in the Black Sea region. Rapprochement be-
tween Turkey and Russia is an effect of the wors-
ening relations of these two countries with the
USA as well as tensions in Turkish-EU relations.
This move is intended to expand the room for ma-
noeuvre for both Russia and Turkey in their rela-
tions with Washington and Brussels62. Turkey
does not want the American military presence in
the region to grow significantly because it sees
such a scenario as causing confrontation with
Russia and diminishing Turkish influence. In April
2005, Turkey’s abstention enabled Russia to pre-
vent the USA from being granted the status of an
observer in the Organisation of Black Sea Econo-
mic Co-operation (BSEC), the most important re-
gional organisation, although the USA finally re-
ceived the status in September 2005 together
with Belarus, which was accepted at Moscow’s
special request.
The American desire to increase their military pre-
sence in the Black Sea region was manifested in
the idea of expanding the NATO-led antiterrorist
operation Active Endeavour over the Black Sea.
However, to do so, it would have been necessary
to renegotiate the Montreux Convention (1936),
which imposes a certain limit on the presence of
warships of other countries than those border-
ing the Black Sea. The proposal was opposed by
Turkey, which saw the Convention as a pillar of
its national sovereignty. The US stopped pressing
Turkey on this issue in May 2006. According to
some analysts, Washington wanted to put off An-
kara’s closer co-operation with Moscow by reco-
gnising Turkish interests63. As a result, in early
June 2006, Turkey took part in the new pro-Ame-
rican regional initiative, the Black Sea Forum,
which was ignored by Russia.
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Another significant element to cement Turkish-
US co-operation is the implementation of common
energy projects64. Turkey, after Russia, is the most
important country for energy transit from Central
Asia and the Caucasus65. Ankara and Washington
are interested in developing this role for Turkey,
and effectively reducing the Russian domination
of the energy market. The most important pro-
ject in which Turkey and the USA currently par-
ticipate is the start-up of the Baku–Tbilisi–Cey-
han (BTC) oil pipeline, which officially took place
in July 2006. The BTC pipeline enables oil transit
from the Caspian Sea region without involving
Russia. This is one of the largest oil projects that
have been recently implemented; its construc-
tion cost nearly US$4 billion. The construction of
the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, planned
to be launched in autumn 2006, is another pro-
ject in which the USA and Turkey are strongly en-
gaged. Since early 2006, Washington and Ankara
have been trying to convince Turkmenistan to ac-
cept the idea of exporting gas via the Caspian Sea,
Caucasus and Turkey, and skipping Russia.
As part of its plan to diversify its energy sources,
Turkey is planning to build three nuclear power
plants by 2015. Pursuant to an agreement with
the United States, which was accepted by the
Turkish parliament in July 2006, the nuclear tech-
nology will come from America.
Last but not least, the United States and Turkey
are engaged in very close military co-operation,
the key manifestations of which are the education
of Turkish officers at US military universities and
the purchase of US military equipment by the
Turkish army. A great majority of weapons in its
arsenal come from the USA66.
For Turkey, the United States has been an impor-
tant trade partner for many years (on average, it
takes fifth place, and trade exchange with the USA
accounts for nearly 5% of Turkish trade exchange)
as well as a significant foreign investor (fourth
place, nearly 10% of foreign investments). The
USA is also a guarantor of financial aid granted
via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
to a lesser extent via the World Bank to the Turk-
ish economy, which is still not exactly stable.
Turkey is the most significant IMF debtor.
5. Conclusion and forecast
In 2006, three years since the emergence of the
crisis, the greatest problems in US-Turkish rela-
tions have not been solved. These have mainly
been caused by the lasting instability in the Mid-
dle East region, especially in Iraq. One can hard-
ly expect that the main problems of the Middle
East, the Kurdish issue, the stabilisation of Iraq,
Iran’s atomic programme and the conflict be-
tween Israel and the Arab world will be resolved
soon. It must be taken into account that these
issues may cause some problems in relations be-
tween Washington and Ankara for a long time to
come. The status of the city and environs of Kirkuk
may be an especially controversial issue in the im-
mediate future. The Iraqi constitution provides
for a referendum on the status of Kirkuk to be held
by the end of 2007. Considering the problems
with setting the borders between polling dis-
tricts and designating the electorate authorised
to vote, the referendum, if held, may cause ten-
sion between Turkey and the USA.
However, it is worth noting both sides’ clear will
to improve mutual relations. Neither the USA nor
Turkey wants to escalate the disputes. Regard-
less of their existing differences of opinion, since
2003 many major Turkish politicians, diplomats
and military officials have visited the USA, and
vice versa. Both countries have been trying to
take actions that will bring them closer to rappro-
chement. In early July 2006, during the visit by
the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to Wa-
shington, both countries signed a document in-
tended to revive the strategic US-Turkish part-
nership. The Strategic Vision document specifies
areas of their co-operation (including the stabilisa-
tion of Iraq and the region covered by the BMENAI,
Central Asia and the Caucasus; settling Arab-Is-
raeli conflicts; combating terrorism and other
threats such as smuggling, arms trafficking, etc.)
and is aimed at intensifying the dialogue to carry
out specific tasks67. The United States has been
trying to emphasise Turkey’s significance as a key
ally and partner during the visits. Events of this
kind improve the atmosphere of mutual relations,
even though they do not predetermine that the
crises will be overcome.
The USA needs Turkey’s favourable stance to-
wards and support for its policy in the Middle East,
especially on the issues of Iran and Iraq. A grad-
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ual improvement of stability in Iraq would enable
Turkey, the Kurds of northern Iraqi and the USA
to take more effective political and military action
against the PKK, and thus to remove one of the
greatest problems in their mutual relations. A fur-
ther change of Turkish internal policy on the Turk-
ish Kurds is equally important to resolve the pro-
blem, however. If the conflict between Iraq’s Sun-
nis and Shiites escalates further and turns into
a full-scale civil war, the country may disintegrate
and another challenge, to wit the possible inde-
pendence of Kurdistan, may arise in Turkish-US
relations. Washington would have to take on the
difficult task of finding a modus vivendi between
Ankara and Irbil, without alienating any of the
partners.
Turkey’s favour for the American policy in the
Middle East would certainly grow if the USA and
the EU could reach a compromise in their talks
with Tehran. Unfortunately, such an optimistic
scenario is rather improbable. Possible UN sanc-
tions on Iran will be supported by Ankara, which
will not take the risk of being isolated by the in-
ternational community. This policy will be unpo-
pular in Turkey because of the financial losses it
will entail. If the violent scenario is realised and
the USA attacks Iran (bombardments, paratroops
attacks by special units), Ankara’s consent for
the US Air Force to use the airbase in Incirlik will
be a problem. Turkey will probably accept Wa-
shington’s request, if the United States receives
approval for its activities from the European
Union. As was the case in the US intervention in
Iraq, the great majority of the Turkish public will
be against the American actions. Turkish-US re-
lations may worsen as a result of Tehran’s reac-
tion to an American attack (such as large-scale
support for terrorism), which would destabilise
the situation in the region. If the international
community grants only limited support for the
attack on Iran, this may also lead to Turkey re-
fusing the US access to the airbase in Incirlik.
Another development in the Turkish-American
relations which would have grave consequences
may be the potential vote by the US Congress on
a resolution concerning the Armenian genocide.
Such a motion has became even more likely as the
Democrats, who enjoy close ties with the Arme-
nian lobby in the US, secured a majority in the US
Congress in the mid-term elections in November
2006.
The process of Turkey’s integration with the Eu-
ropean Union will also have a great impact on
the further development of US-Turkish relations.
A possible failure of the Turkish-EU negotiations
may lead to anti-Western sentiments rising, and
the Turkish government’s search for compensa-
tion for such failures by developing relations with
Muslim countries, Russia and China. Such a swing
in Turkish policy would undoubtedly make it im-
possible to maintain a close alliance with the USA.
A crisis in Turkey’s relations with the European
Union does not have to mean a collapse of its al-
liance with the United States, provided that a mo-
derately positive scenario is realised in the Middle
East. In such a case, the alliance with the USA
could become an alternative for Ankara to its re-
lations with the EU. In turn, the USA would gain
an important ally in its possible political rivalry
with Europe.
The ‘worst-case scenario’, i.e. open enmity be-
tween Turkey and the EU & the USA, and Anka-
ra’s rapprochement with anti-Western states is
rather unlikely. Washington will try to avoid such
a situation, as will some of the EU’s member sta-
tes. The scale of politico-economic relations be-
tween Turkey and the West is so great that an un-
certain alliance with China, Russia, Iran and Syria
is perceived by a majority of realistically–dispos-
ed Turkish elites as merely a sham alternative to
the Western direction. However, it is possible that
a prolonged period of colder relations between
Turkey and the Western world is imminent.
Rafa∏ Sadowski
Co-operation Adam Balcer
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support for Israel. Turkey and Russia claim they are willing
to co-operate in the transit of Russian gas through Turkey
to Europe and the Middle East.
However, Turkish-Russian relations are ambivalent in many
fields, and the two countries’ interests are often in conflict.
Russia’s approach to the US engagement in Asia is more un-
compromising than that of Turkey. Ankara is interested in
common activities with the USA, however on the under-
standing that it is treated as a partner, which means less
direct involvement by the USA. Russia is Turkey’s second big-
gest trade partner; however, this trade exchange is based
on the enormous (and still growing) deficit on the Turkish
side. Russia’s key export commodity is gas, which Turkey de-
pends on. Due to unfavourable trade contracts entered into
during the 1990s, the gas prices are high and supplies ex-
ceed Turkey’s demand. Ankara has for several years been try-
ing in vain to convince Russia to renegotiate the contracts.
Turkey is interested in diversifying its energy sources, and
in the transit of gas and oil from Central Asia without Mos-
cow’s control. Russia and Turkey also have differing visions
of the planned routes of pipelines to go around the straits.
Ankara has curtailed the activity of supporters of Chechen
separatists, and Russia that of the PKK sympathisers. How-
ever, Russia has not included the PKK in its list of terrorist
organisations. In turn, some local AKP activists have sup-
ported Chechen separatists. Moscow is the patron of Arme-
nia, which Turkey has very bad relations with, and supports
Cyprus in the international arena, which has not been re-
cognised by Ankara. Most importantly, Moscow is not inte-
rested in significantly increasing Turkey’s influence in the
Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia ir the Black Sea re-
gion, or in Turkey’s EU membership. According to Fionna Hill
and Ömer Taspinar, ‘As both sides will admit, there is not yet
much political substance to their relations. The states are
still more natural rivals than regional allies.’ Fionna Hill,
Ömer Taspinar, Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?,
p.10. http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fhill/2006_
survival.pdf
63 Umit Enginsoy, ‘US drops Black Sea plan, Turkey relieved’,
Turkish Daily News, 8 May 2006.
64 Agata ¸ oskot, Turkey – an energy transit corridor to the EU?,
CES Studies no. 17, 2004, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/
eprace/17/01.htm
65 The Turkish armed forces’ equipment includes over 1600
M60 tanks (some of them are older models which have been
modernised), over 3300 M-113 armoured personnel carriers,
280 F-16 aircraft and over 150 F-4 aircraft, more than 70
Blackhawk helicopters and 40 Cobra helicopters, and 11 fri-
gates built by the United States. International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2006; http://www.iiss.
org/publications/the-military-balance
In January 2007, Turkey and the United States signed a me-
morandum of understanding for the U.S.-led F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter program, officially making Ankara one of the
nine partner states in the production of the next-genera-
tion aircraft. Turkey announced plans to buy 100 F-35s worth
nearly $11 billion over the next 15 to 20 years. The F-35
program is the largest and most strategic defence procure-
ment project in Turkey’s history. On 7 February 2007, the
Turkish state-owned TÜSAS Aerospace Industries (TAI) sign-
ed a letter of intent with a principal member of Lockheed
Martin’s F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft team to be a second
source for the aircraft’s construction, a deal which was worth
more than $3 billion for TAI.
66 Ümit Enginsoy, ‘Turkey, US invest hopes in shared vision
document’, 7 July 2006, Turkish Daily News.
67 Yüksel Söylemez, ‘The first testing of Turkey’s shared stra-
tegic vision with the United States’, 23 July 2006, Turkish
Daily News.
T
h
e
 c
o
ld
 a
ll
ia
n
c
e
. 
T
u
rk
is
h
-U
S
 p
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
 a
ft
e
r 
2
0
0
3
70
C E S  R e p o r t
Chasing Europe: 
the Turkish economy at
the onset of negotiations
with the European Union
Wojciech Paczyƒski
Theses
1. Over the last four years, Turkey has managed
to implement changes which have significantly
strengthened its economy. This has been possi-
ble thanks to a coincidence of several external and
internal factors, both economic and political. The
prospect of integration with the European Union
has played a pivotal role in improving Turkey’s
economic policy and its progress in other fields.
Its effect may last into the future, provided that
the prospect is real. Uncertainties about the ac-
cession negotiations, which are appearing now,
may seriously weaken that same mechanism
which has mobilised Turkish society and its poli-
ticians to carry out reforms. It is still unclear whe-
ther the social and political consensus necessary
for further transformation can be achieved if the
process of Turkey’s integration with the EU finds
itself in a serious crisis.
2. In terms of demographic and economic poten-
tial, Turkey is comparable to the bloc of 10 states
which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.
The country’s development level is still similar
to, or even slightly lower, than those of Bulgaria
and Romania.
3. For several decades Turkey has been strongly
integrated with the European Union in terms of
trade. The rapid growth in foreign direct invest-
ments noticeable since 2005 may be a significant
factor contributing to the modernisation of the
country.
4. The major challenges Turkey’s social and eco-
nomic policy will have to face include ensuring
good conditions for creating new jobs for people
who reach working age or have left agriculture;
increasing employment; improving the education
system; raising the levels of education & employ-
ment of women; and lessening the developmen-
tal differences between particular regions.
5. Short-term forecasts for Turkey’s economic de-
velopment are optimistic, although a risk of ma-
croeconomic instability cannot be excluded.
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1. A brief historical overview 
of the Turkish economy’s 
development during 
the twentieth century
When the Republic of Turkey was established in
1923, it was a very poor and backward country.
Between 80% and 90% of its inhabitants were
farmers and could not read or write. Over the sub-
sequent eight decades, Turkey has made a civili-
sational leap. Currently, nearly 30% of its popu-
lation are employed in agriculture, and only about
13% of the country’s residents are illiterate. Al-
though the civilisational gap between Western
Europe and Turkey has significantly shortened,
it is still quite considerable. Since the 1920s, Tur-
key has been developing at an average rate of over
4% annually, yet its per capita GDP growth has
been significantly lower (nearly 2.5%). This is an
effect of high population growth1, the rate of
which has consistently been falling, as well as the
considerable slowdown in the Turkish economy
between the mid-1970s and the beginning of this
century.
From the onset of the Republic until the early
1980s, Turkey’s economic policy was state-con-
trolled and protectionist. It yielded high economic
growth, on the average at over 7% annually (with
the exception of World War II), although in the
1970s, when globalisation of the world’s economy
expanded and the oil shocks took place (in 1973
and 1979), this policy proved inefficient2. In the
1980s, Turgut Özal’s government started free-
market economic reforms (liberalisation of trade
& finances and privatisation). However, political
instability (the conflict with Kurdish separatist
guerrilla forces) and the continuation of the popu-
list economic policy by subsequent governments
(including social expenses) caused high inflation
(the average annual rate was nearly 90% in the
1990s), the development of the informal economy,
high growth of public and foreign debt, and re-
peated economic crises (1994, 1999 and 2001).
This led the economic growth to be smaller in
comparison with the preceding periods (the ave-
rage annual rate in the 1980s and 1990s was
about 4%)3. The last of these crises was the worst
in the Republic’s history, although Turkey mana-
ged to overcome it thanks to support from inter-
national financial institutions (principally the In-
ternational Monetary Fund)4. Then Ankara, moni-
tored by those institutions, carried out structural
reforms (such as making the central bank inde-
pendent, amending the banking laws and
changing the system of agricultural subsidies),
which created favourable conditions for an eco-
nomic stabilisation for the first time in the last
past 25 years.
2. General characteristics 
of the present condition 
of the Turkish economy
Turkey is now in a crucial moment of its econo-
mic history. As recently as six years ago, follow-
ing a very serious financial crisis, its economy
was in deep recession, the inflation rate reached
70% and the public debts exceeded 90% of the
GNP. The depreciation of the Turkish lira by 50%,
interest rates of nearly 100%, the serious break-
down in the banking sector and a wave of bank-
ruptcies were elements of a rather sad picture.
Nevertheless, recovery from the crisis has appear-
ed to be rapid and successful. Beginning in 2002,
Turkey showed fast economic growth and mana-
ged to restore its macroeconomic balance; for the
first time in the past 35 years the inflation rate
has dropped to single digits, and the proportion
of public debt to the GNP has decreased from
nearly 100% in 2001 to 55% in 2005.
Turkey owes its recent success to several factors;
political stabilisation since the 2002 elections,
the prospect of European integration and backing
from international financial institutions have all
helped it embark on an ambitious reform pro-
gramme. Deep-seated changes in the operation
of public finances, the institutional basis of the
monetary policy and labour, commodity and fi-
nancial markets offer an opportunity for Turkey
to break out of the vicious circle of economic in-
stability which the country has been trapped in
for decades. On the other hand, further reforms,
which are necessary to maintain the high pace
of economic growth, reduce delays and bring the
country closer to European standards of develop-
ment will be hard, and successes in this field will
not be easy to achieve.
The prospect of European integration still plays
a key role in stimulating reforms. The European
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Union’s decision to start accession negotiations
with Turkey in December 2004 and the beginning
of the negotiations in October 2005 was an im-
portant sign for the government, society and fi-
nancial markets. According to an optimistic sce-
nario, the mechanism will work for many years
as Turkey will slowly make progress on its way
towards EU membership (which, however, will
not take place any earlier than 2014). However,
on the other hand, a positive outcome of the ac-
cession negotiations is not a foregone conclusion,
and the idea of accepting Turkey into the EU re-
mains very unpopular in many member states.
Therefore, making a strong connection between
Turkish reforms and the accession process can also
be risky. If the process encounters serious impe-
diments, either posed by the EU or arising inter-
nally in Turkey, confidence in the reforms could
suddenly be undermined, which may cause seri-
ous unrest or a financial crisis.
3. Turkey as compared 
to Europe and the world
Turkey is one of the largest European countries
in terms of territory and population number. In
2004, the number of Turkey’s inhabitants (over
71 million) was equivalent to over 15% of the po-
pulation of the entire European Union. Moreover,
population growth is much faster in Turkey than
in EU countries. Between 2003 and 2004, Turkey’s
population grew by as much as 1.5%, while the
same rate was at 0.4% in the EU-15 and even low-
er in most of the new member states. Turkish
society is very young; the share of people under
15 years of age in the total population reached
29.2% in 2004, as compared to 16.2% in the EU-15,
17% in Poland and 14% in Germany, the latter be-
ing the only EU country whose population is larg-
er than that of Turkey.
Turkey’s economic role in Europe is also signifi-
cant, albeit definitely smaller than its demogra-
phic potential. According to data from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Turkey’s GDP in 2005,
calculated according to market currency exchange
rates (US$362 billion), is the 19th largest in the
world and 8thlargest among the group of EU mem-
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Notice: Data for 2005 are forecasts.
Source: Eurostat
Figure 1. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2000 and 2005 (EU-25 mean = 100)
HungaryCzech RepublicEU 15 Poland Latvia Croatia Bulgaria Romania Turkey
ber and candidate states, just behind Belgium. If
the comparison is based on currency exchange
rates which take into account the purchasing po-
wer parity (PPP), Turkey would rise to 6th in the
group of EU member and candidate states, just in
front of the Netherlands and Poland. In terms of
GDP per capita, Turkey is the poorest country as
compared to the current EU member states and
the candidates to membership engaged in acces-
sion negotiations, although the differences be-
tween Turkey and Romania or Bulgaria are very
small.
Other standard of living indices do not reach the
levels that a developed country would normally
have. In 2004, life expectancy in Turkey (71) was
definitely lower than in any other country which
belonged to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). In the same
year, Turkey’s infant mortality rate was over three
times higher than the highest in the European
OECD member states, namely Slovakia, Poland
and Hungary5.
According to the Human Development index pu-
blished by the UN, Turkey is 92nd of the 177 coun-
tries for which the index has been calculated.
For comparison, Poland is 37th, Bulgaria 54th and
Romania 60th 6.
The vast gaps in the level of development be-
tween the western and eastern regions of Tur-
key (which are larger than those in EU member
states) are a serious problem. This concerns both
the GDP per capita rates and many other human
development indices such as life expectancy, edu-
cation, infant mortality, etc. Moreover, although
the poorer regions are developing economically,
the richer part of the country is developing even
faster, and so in some areas the differences have
increased rather than lessened.
A characteristic feature that distinguishes Turkey
from its European partners is its employment stru-
cture. Nearly 50% of professionally active Turks,
including over 30% of non-agricultural workers,
are employed in the informal sector. The under-
ground economy generates more than a third of
Turkey’s GDP7.
The rate of professional activity in Turkey is much
lower than in any EU member state. Moreover,
some data indicates that the levels of professional
activity and employment have fallen over recent
years. According to Eurostat’s data on economic
activity in 2005 (data for the first three quarters),
only 46% of Turkey’s residents aged between 15
and 64 were employed. This was about 2 to 3 per-
centage points less than in the years 2000–2001.
For comparison, the same survey indicated that
the employment rate was at nearly 64% through-
out the EU, 56% in Bulgaria and 58% in Romania.
This disproportion is an effect of the especially
low professional activity by women in Turkey
which, at 27% in 2006, was less than half of the
respective levels in the EU, Bulgaria or Romania.
The low level of professional activity by women
is principally a consequence of the patriarchal and
conservative model of a major part of Turkish so-
ciety, and the low education level, which serious-
ly diminishes opportunities of employment in ot-
her sectors than agriculture or the informal eco-
nomy. In effect, uneducated women who migrate
from rural to urban areas are unable to find legal
jobs, and work in the informal sector much more
often than men do.
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Category
GDP per capita (PPP) in US$
Total fertility rate
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)
Hospital beds per 100,000 residents
Rate of illiteracy 
among the entire population
Agricultural employment share 
(data for 2005)
East Marmara Region
(Western Turkey)
9668
2,0
40
228
7%
19%
North-Eastern 
Anatolia
2881
3,8
62
184
16%
62%
South-Eastern 
Anatolia
3550
4,8
42
134
22%
30%
Table 1. Regional differences in Turkey in 2000
Source: Türkiye Istatik Kurumu (Turkish Board of Statistics), http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr
Agricultural employment share, which was 29%
in 2006, twice as much as in Poland and almost
six times more than the average in the OECD, is
very high8. However, the share has been dropping
as a consequence of rural-urban migration; as
recently as six years ago it exceeded 40%.
The aforementioned issues give a true picture of
the vast challenges Turkey has to face, the need to
provide conditions to ensure the very fast emer-
gence of new jobs (mainly in the services sector)
for legions of young people and emigrants from
rural areas, and to reduce the informal sector.
In comparison to EU member and candidate states,
Turkey has much poorer results in the fields of
education and investment in human resources.
Nearly 13% of its residents cannot read or write,
and the illiteracy rate among women is even high-
er, reaching nearly 20%. Regardless of significant
the progress which has been made in this field,
pre-school education is at a level several times
lower than in EU member states; nearly 10% of
children between the ages of 6 and 14 (predomi-
nantly girls) do not go to school, and despite re-
cent enormous changes the disproportion in the
numbers of male and female students at secon-
dary schools and higher education facilities is still
significant. Improving the accessibility, universa-
lity and quality of education, especially women’s
education, is of key importance for many econo-
mic and social processes in Turkey. For example,
the problem of the low professional activity by
women in cities does not concern women with
higher education at all, and affects female secon-
dary-school graduates only to a limited extent.
4. Trade integration with the EU
and direct foreign investments
Turkey is very strongly integrated with the Euro-
pean Union in terms of trade. In 2005, over 52%
of total Turkish exports went to the 25 member
states. Over 42% of its total imports came from
the EU. Turkey also has quite strong trade rela-
tions with Romania and Bulgaria (nearly 4% of ex-
ports and 3% of imports), which are about to join
the Union in 2007. Trade integration with the EU
is not a recent issue; from as early as the 1950s,
nearly half of total Turkey’s foreign trade has
been carried on with the 25 countries which now
make the European Union. For the EU, Turkey is
now its sixth or seventh biggest trade partner.
Turkey’s other key trade partners, apart from the
EU, are Middle Eastern countries, the USA, China
and other Asian states, and Russia, from which
Turkey imports a significant part of its raw ener-
gy materials, mainly gas. Russian gas supplies
meet around 60% of Turkey’s demand.
Since 1996, Turkey has been the only country with
which the EU has a customs union. The customs
union does not cover trade in agricultural or steel
industry products (these areas of trade are regu-
lated under separate agreements), or service ex-
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Figure 2. Geographic structure of Turkish exports, 
percentage shares (2005)
Figure 3. Geographic structure of Turkish imports, 
percentage shares (2005)
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
change (this is not regulated under any agree-
ment). The union has caused not only a signifi-
cant growth in the trade exchange between Tur-
key and the EU but also a deepening trade deficit
on the Turkish side. Practically, the customs union
obliges Turkey to adjust its trade policy to that of
the European Union. In the EU’s opinion, Turkey
has failed to meet all its commitments related to
the operation of the customs union9. Turkey has
also signed free trade agreements with EFTA and
with several countries in the Mediterranean Sea
region (including Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ma-
cedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
Turkey mainly exports textiles to the EU (making
up nearly 40% of its total exports), while the
Union’s key export merchandise to Turkey are ma-
chines and equipment (28%) and chemical pro-
ducts (16%). Turkish imports from Russia are do-
minated by raw energy materials (over 70%) and
metals.
A relatively large part of Turkish foreign trade is
officially unregistered, and so the statistical data
quoted above should be seen as giving only an ap-
proximate picture of the trade structure. This ob-
viously has a great impact on the operation of
some commodity markets, as well as serious fiscal
consequences. For example, liquid fuel smuggling
is a big problem. As a consequence of very heavy
tax levies, petrol and diesel oil prices in Turkey are
higher than in most OECD countries10. The large-
scale smuggling causes serious problems to oil
sector companies, especially as this is happening
while reforms intended to improve the operation
of the sector are being conducted, and where the
rapid growth of domestic demand should be con-
tributing to new companies entering the refinery
sector.
Exports of services, especially tourist services, are
growing rapidly. Turkey has become a popular de-
stination for European tourists. Between 2001 and
2004, sales of tourist services doubled. 21.2 mil-
lion tourists visited Turkey in 2005, most of who
came from the EU and candidate states. However,
the latest statistical data indicates that the num-
ber of tourists for 2006 will be lower by nearly
20%.
In contrast to the new EU member states and can-
didates to membership, the level of foreign direct
investments in Turkey was relatively low until
recently. Comparison to other South-Eastern Euro-
pean countries also shows Turkey in a disadvan-
tageous light. In 2004, Moldova and Greece were
the only two countries to have lower FDI-to-GDP
rates than Turkey. However, the results for the
years 2005–2006 and forecasts for the immediate
future are much more optimistic11. In 2005 the
FDI influx (including real estate) reached US$9.8
billion. The amount for 2006 exceeded a record-
breaking level of US$20 billion. For comparison, the
total value of foreign investments made in Turkey
before 1999 was as low as US$2.1 billion, and in-
creased in the period 2000–2004 to US$10 billion.
Approximately 75% of the FDI flowing into Turkey
between 2000 and 2006 came from the EU. In turn,
the absolute majority of Turkish investments went
to the European Union. Turkey is an important
partner for EU investors in the strategic energy
sector, since it can become a transit state, and
thus enable the diversification of energy supplies
for the EU. In May 2005, Austrian, Bulgarian, Ro-
manian, Turkish and Hungarian companies sign-
ed an agreement to construct the Nabucco pipe-
line, to enable gas supplies from the Middle East
and Asia to run through Turkey to the Balkans and
Central Europe. At the same time, Turkish foreign
investments were increasing; between 1999 and
2005, Turkey invested nearly US$5.7 billion abroad.
It cannot be said that Turkey’s lower FDI inflows
are caused by the activity of foreign investors be-
ing hindered. Turkey has one of the most liberal
regulations of the OECD countries concerning such
investments. However, a real barrier is posed by
problems which all enterprises, domestic and fo-
reign, have to face, namely red tape, a weak judi-
ciary authority, changing regulations, including
tax regulations, and corruption. The factors which
discouraged investors in the past were the rather
unpredictable political situation and a lack of ma-
croeconomic stability. In the World Bank’s Doing
Business in 2007, which ranked 175 countries ac-
cording to the ease of doing business (regulations
and practice), Turkey was 91st, a position that –
in comparison with EU member and candidate
states – was better only than that of Croatia, Ma-
cedonia and Greece12. In the Transparency Inter-
national 2006 report, which presented the per-
ception of corruption in 146 countries, Turkey re-
ceived 3.8 points on the 1–10 scale, which put it
ahead of Croatia, Macedonia, Poland and Roma-
nia. In the Economic Freedom 2007 report prepared
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by the Heritage Foundation, Turkey’s economy
was determined as ‘mostly unfree’. The countries
among EU member and candidate states to have
received worse results than Turkey were Croatia,
Greece and Poland. Only these four countries were
ranked as countries whose economies are mostly
unfree13. Therefore, eliminating these shortcom-
ings is the key to increasing FDI inflows, which
would contribute to the modernisation and struc-
tural transformation of the Turkish economy.
5. Current economic trends
Turkey has shown strong economic growth since
2002. Over that time it has managed to achieve
macroeconomic stabilisation, which gives hope
that these good trends will be continued in the
future (Figure 4).
The structural change to the inflation mecha-
nisms which enabled price stabilisation was pos-
sible inter alia thanks to fiscal reforms. After the
period of double-digit deficits in the public finance
sector in 1999–2003, the deficit was reduced to
just under 2% of the GDP in 2005. The continua-
tion of a responsible fiscal policy in the immedi-
ate future (regardless of the results of upcoming
parliamentary elections) is of key importance to
minimise the risk of financial instability.
The institutional background of the monetary po-
licy changed as of January 2006, when Turkey join-
ed the group of countries which have adopted the
direct inflation targeting strategy. The central
bank announced target inflation levels at 5% for
the end of 2006, and of about 4% for the end of
2007 and 2008. However, the significant reduc-
tion of the price of the Turkish currency in May
and June 2006 is likely to raise inflation in the se-
cond half of 2006 and in 2007. Maintaining and
reinforcing the reputation of the central bank as
a successful inflation stopper and achieving a sta-
ble low level of inflation expectations are the hard
tasks which the monetary authorities will have
to handle.
The current high influx of capital to Turkey is a
sign that investors believe that this country has
good prospects. However, this influx also poses
challenges to the country’s economic policy due
to the growing current account deficit (over 6%
of the GDP in 2005) and the pressure of apprecia-
tion on the lira. In addition to a cautious fiscal
policy, reforms must be undertaken which will
increase the adjustability and competitiveness of
the Turkish economy.
77
C
h
a
s
in
g
 E
u
ro
p
e
: 
th
e
 T
u
rk
is
h
 e
c
o
n
o
m
y
 a
t 
th
e
 o
n
s
e
t 
o
f 
n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
o
n
s
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
C E S  R e p o r t
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database and Turkish Statistical Institute
Figure 4. GDP growth and average annual inflation between 1999 and 2005
GDP growth Inflation
6. Prospects
Short- and mid-term forecasts for Turkey are rela-
tively optimistic. Strong domestic demand, includ-
ing investments encouraged by low interest rates,
makes it possible to continue the economic growth
at the annual level of 4% to 5% in 2006 and 2007.
Considering the weakening of the lira, inflation
at the end of 2006 is likely to reach a higher level
than that targeted by the central bank. Still, there
is a chance that the inflation growth will only be
temporary. The low public-finance sector deficit
will enable further reduction of the public debt-
to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, the risk still exists of
a financial destabilisation that may prevent this
optimistic scenario from being realised (proof to
this being the size of the current account deficit
and the debt structure). Continuation of an ambi-
tious and internally consistent reform programme
is therefore vital.
The key goals of Turkey’s economic policy are clo-
sely related to its ambition to join the European
Union, and to the task of reducing the develop-
ment differences and achieving a level similar to
those of EU member states. The following four
main areas of the country’s developmental chal-
lenges can be distinguished:
– a stable and responsible macroeconomic policy,
– fair social and human resources development,
– a good business climate, and
– a system for managing natural environment
and disaster responses14.
Limiting the state’s role in the economy (by con-
tinuing privatisation) and reducing the scope of
the informal economy appear to be the major
tasks for the economic policy. It is estimated that
as much as one-third of urban workers, and up to
three-quarters of those working in rural areas, are
not registered in the social insurance system15.
In the longer term, further improvement of the
education sector is also a serious challenge, consi-
dering the role education plays in preparing young
people to function in society, and in particular on
the labour market. It is also essential to continue
work on increasing social integration; contem-
porary Turkey is to a great extent divided on the
one hand into traditional rural communities
(mainly farmers), characterised by very weak ties
with the state institutions and low standards of
living, and on the other, much more ‘modern’ ur-
ban communities associated with the services
sector and partly with industry. Creating condi-
tions for the better social integration of women
is also a task that cannot wait.
The scale of the problems and the very ambitious
goal of EU membership have obliged Turkish po-
liticians and Turkish society in general to take on
very difficult tasks. Previous reforms have been
successful inter alia thanks to the existence of
a clear goal, namely EU membership. The way
Turkish politicians and the EU use the accession
negotiations as a mechanism to mobilise reform
efforts may decide on the prospects of the coun-
try’s development in the next decade. The Euro-
pean Union is aware of this fact, at least at the le-
vel of official publications. The Communiqué from
the European Commission of November 2005 no-
tes that ‘in Turkey, the effectiveness of conditio-
nality in driving reforms depends on maintaining
a credible political perspective for eventual inte-
gration into the Union. Aspirant countries can
best sustain public support for bold and often
painful reforms when the EU supports them,
works with them, and keeps its own promises’16.
(January 2007)
Wojciech Paczyƒski
CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research
Co-operation Adam Balcer
C
h
a
s
in
g
 E
u
ro
p
e
: 
th
e
 T
u
rk
is
h
 e
c
o
n
o
m
y
 a
t 
th
e
 o
n
s
e
t 
o
f 
n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
o
n
s
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 U
n
io
n
78
C E S  R e p o r t
1 Turkey’s population increased nearly six times, from 12
million to 72 million, between 1923 and 2006.
2 Between 1970 and 1979, the average annual inflation rate
grew from less than 10 percent in the preceding period to
25%. Turkey’s foreign debt rose from US$2 billion to US$14
billion. The levels of public debt and the trade deficit signi-
ficantly increased. Deniz Akagül, ‘L’economie turque depuis
l’avencement de la République: performances ou contre-per-
formances’, in La Turquie, ed. Samih Vaner, Paris 2005. pp.
463–464.
3 Ibid.
4 Ankara concluded three financial agreements covering as
a total US$40 billion with the IMF in 1999, 2002 and 2005.
So far, it has borrowed over US$30 billion from the IMF.
http:// www.internationalmonetaryfound.org
5 Ibid.
6 UNDP (2006), Human Development Report 2006, http://
hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf
7 Teoman Pamuk˜u, Ahmet Hasim Köse, ‘L’Èconomie grise’, in
La Turquie, ed. Samih Vaner, Paris 2005. pp. 468–470.
8 The agricultural sector (in contrast to Poland) also has a si-
gnificant share in generating added value in the economy,
up to almost 12% in 2003 (compared to 3% in Poland), al-
though the values are not really comparable. In absolute va-
lues, Turkey has the largest agricultural population among
all the other candidates to EU membership. On the other
hand, the agricultural employment share in employment as
a whole is higher in Romania than in Turkey. It is worth ad-
ding that as recently as the early 1980s, most professional-
ly active people in Turkey worked in the agricultural sector.
OECD, OECD in Figures 2005 Edition, Paris 2006.
9 A discussion of this subject has been presented among
other documents in the European Commission’s Turkey 2005
Progress Report; http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/
report_2005/pdf/package/sec_1426_final_en_progress_rep
ort_tr.pdf
10 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Coun-
tries. Turkey 2005 Review, Paris 2005.
11 US Department of State, 2005 Investment Climate Sta-
tement: Turkey, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/
12 Doing Business in 2007, http://www.doingbusiness.org/
EconomyRankings/Default.aspx?direction=asc&sort=1 _
13 The ranking considers the following criteria: property
rights, regulation, informal economy, prices and wages, bank-
ing and finance, foreign investments, fiscal policy, state in-
terventionism, trade and taxes. Heritage Foundation, 2007
Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org
14 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report
for the Republic of Turkey for the Period FY 2004 – 2007,
2005, World Bank, Turkey – Country Economic Memorandum,
Report No. 33549-TR, 2006, http:// www.worldbank.org.tr
15 World Bank, Turkey – Labor Market Study, Report No.
33254-TR, 2006, www.worldbank.org.tr
16 European Commission, Communication from the Com-
mission. Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM (2005) 561,
Brussels, 9 November 2005.
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